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Abstract  
 
In my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called second 
Heidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according to 
which talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also show 
that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction of 
being as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison between 
Heidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities between 
Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality, 
and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpret 
Heidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In the 
third chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical to 
nothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makes 
formal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, the 
totality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and the 
complement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what we 
obtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger, 
nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well. 
Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory of 
grounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong form 
of foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions of 
foundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism 
2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the second 
Heidegger.  
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6 CONTENTS
Speaking with Heidegger, the Buddhist monk [Maha Mani] said: “ultimately, there is
only nothingness. Nevertheless, nothingness is not nothing; on the contrary, noth-
ingness is also the opposite of nothing. (. . . ) Nothingness is – it is nothing at all
and everything”. Heidegger agreed with the monk and he said: “This is exactly what
I have said my whole life”. The monk: “You should come in our lands [in the East].
We will understand you” (Saviani, 1998, p. 35).
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Chapter 1
Prelude
In his hut, lost in the Black Forest, near Todtnauberg, Martin Heidegger changed the
history of European philosophy. As Karl Löwith pointed out (2011), his metaphysics
has had an extraordinary influence on the history of continental philosophy, becoming
the center of an evolving debate. Having said that, most of Heidegger’s philosophy
remains obscure and incomprehensible. This is particularly true for the developments of
Heidegger’s ideas after the so-called Kehre. The expression ‘Kehre’ was used by Heidegger
himself to refer to the turning point, in the mid-1930s, in which Heidegger abandons and
tries to overcome the phenomenology defended in Being and Time (1927). Following this
distinction, scholars have decided to divide Martin Heidegger’s philosophy in two main
parts: Heidegger’s philosophy before the Kehre (also known as ‘the first Heidegger’) and
Heidegger’s philosophy after the Kehre (also known as ‘the second Heidegger’).
As we have already mentioned, very often, the so-called second Heidegger is consid-
ered inaccessible, obscure and unintelligible. His Contributions to philosophy (1989a), a
posthumous essay which represents Heidegger’s most radical attempt at systematizing
his later thoughts, was described as “an idiosyncratic symphony of meanings” (Polt, 1999,
p. 140), a “collection of ellipses” and “an assertoric monolith” (Schurmann, 1992, p. 313).
Such critiques have been extended to the whole trajectory of his late philosophy.
Beside these stylistic observations, late Heidegger’s philosophy seems to be highly
problematic also because of its heterodox content. For instance, in the contemporary
debate, his endorsement of poetry and philology as a guide for philosophy was often
taken to be wrong (cf. Priest, 2015). However, the main issue is that, during the
11
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last trajectory of his philosophy, Heidegger clearly holds inconsistent positions, which
intentionally challenge the principle of non-contradiction (cf. Philipse, 1999). Since,
according to the majority of philosophers, contradictory statements, as with any other
possible violation of the fundamental laws of (classical) logic, are absurd, Heidegger’s
metaphysics has often been treated as absurd too.
This rejection of the late Heidegger is particularly evident in the case of analytic
philosophers, who have focused their attention exclusively on the early Heidegger. On
the one hand, the phenomenological account of the human being proposed in the first
division of Being and Time has generated a vast debate in philosophy of mind and
cognitive science (cf. Dreyfus, 1990; Haugeland, 2013; Kiverstein and Wheeler, 2012); on
the other hand, Heidegger’s early attempt at answering the question of Being has recently
produced an interesting debate in analytic metaphysics as well (McDaniel, 2009; Moore,
2012; Priest, 2006, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015). But what about the late Heidegger?
Unfortunately, no analytic philosophers have seriously engaged with it.
The present work tries to fill this gap in the Heideggerian scholarship. It presents
a novel interpretation of the late Heidegger according to which it is possible to give a
rigorous and understandable reading of his arguments, overcoming the esoteric style.
Moreover, in order to make sense of the many inconsistencies of late Heidegger’s meta-
physics, we show that, at the end of his philosophical trajectory, he endorsed dialethesim,
namely the view according to which there are true contradictions.
The ideas that ground this work were presented in more than 25 talks around the
world. I had the pleasure to discuss my ideas in Australia (University of Melbourne,
Monash University), in Germany (Paderborn Universität; Ruhr-Universität Bochum), in
the United States (City University of New York, University of Massachusetts, Lehigh
University, Ohio University), in Japan (University of Kyoto), in India (Statistical Insti-
tute of Kolkata), in Korea (Yonsei University) and, finally, in Italy (University of Padua
and University of Turin). I would like to thank all the people that, during the last
three years, gave me feedbacks on my research. Invited by Professor Wansing, I also had
the invaluable opportunity to teach a postgraduate corse about my own interpretation
of Heidegger: I thank my students for pushing me to make my ideas both clearer and
sharper.
Some of the ideas presented in this thesis are already published. Part of the first
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chapter is published in Philosophy Compass under the title ‘The recent Engagement be-
tween Analytic Philosophy and Heidegger Thought: Metaphysics and Mind’, while the
last chapter is forthcoming in a collection of essays entitled Reality and its structure, pub-
lished by Oxford University Press and edited by Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest. Some
material of the third chapter has also grounded my critique of Oliver and Smiley’s inter-
pretation of Heidegger’s nothingness published under the title ‘Better than Zilch?’ for
Logic and Logical Philosophy. Finally, some of my ideas about Meinongianism has been
published in Philosophia under the title ‘Nonexistent objects as truth-makers’ and they
will appear in the first and second volume of the second edition of Routley’s Exploring
Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (Springer).
To conclude, I would like to make two remarks about both the translations of Heidegger
used in the present work and the formal notations employed in chapter 3 and chapter 4.
First of all, since the english translations are famously unreliable, all the translations of
Heidegger’s texts are mine. I translated them comparing the original German text, the
english translation and the italian translation. All the references come from the italian
editions. Moreover, in order to make Heidegger’s language more accessible, I added a
Glossary in which some of the Heideggerian jargon is explained. The terms that appear
in the Glossary are marked by a star in the main text of my thesis. It is also important
to mention that, following Heidegger himself, we write BeingMET in order to refer to
the treatment of Heidegger’s being before the Kehre and we write BeyngMET in order
to refer to the treatment of Heidegger’s being after the Kehre. Finally, concerning the
formal notation, I would like to specify that, in chapter 3, the arrow (→) simply repre-
sents a logical connective (which has to be read as ‘if . . . then’), while, in chapter 4, the
arrow (→) represents a grounding relation: thus, x → y means ‘x depends on y’. The
notation will be explained in more details in the relevant chapters.
14 CHAPTER 1. PRELUDE
The general structure of this work goes as follows:
• First Chapter: Sein . The first chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part,
I introduce the two main components of Heidegger’s metaphysics, namely Being
[Sein] and the ontological difference [ontologische Differenz ]. According to Heideg-
ger, Being makes all entities be and, since there is an ontological difference between
Being and entities, Being itself is not an entity (cf. Heidegger, 1927). Then, we
show why talking and thinking about Being leads to a paradox. In a nutshell, the
paradox of Being goes as follows: since Heidegger takes an entity to be everything
we can refer to with an intentional activity, whenever we speak or think about
something, we speak or think about a thing, an entity. From these metaphysical
premises, it follows that, even though Being is not an entity (because of the onto-
logical difference), Being has to be an entity too (because we are referring to it right
now!). In the second part of this chapter, we propose an interpretation according
to which the late Heidegger solves the problem of Being challenging (classical) logic
and accepting the fact that Being is truly an entity and not an entity. From this
point of view, Heidegger endorses dialethesim, namely the metaphysical position
according to which there are true contradictions. To conclude, this chapter shows
that this interpretation has some interesting exegetical virtues, casting a new light
on crucial notions in Heidegger’s philosophy, such as the Event [Ereignis∗] (cf. Hei-
degger, 1989a), the truth [Aletheia] (cf. Heidegger, 1988), along with his account
of negation (cf. Heidegger, 1989a).
• Second Chapter: Außersein . In the second chapter, we reformulate the para-
dox of Being in more familiar analytic terms proposing an analogy between Meinong
and Heidegger. We defend an account of Meinong according to which every time we
speak and think about something, we speak and think about an intentional object
(in Meinong’s terms, a Gegenstand). Moreover, every intentional object trivially
instantiates the property of being an object (following Meinong himself, let’s call
such a property outside-being [Außersein] (cf. Priest, 2014c)). At this point, the
analogy with Heidegger should appear clear: as for Meinong, every intentional ob-
ject has Außersein, for Heidegger every entity has Being [Sein]. However, since in
Meinong’s framework, it is possible to speak and think about something that is
not an object, Meinong finds himself in the same situation of Heidegger. Indeed,
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if something is not an object, then it does not instantiate the property of being an
object (Außersein). Nevertheless, since we speak and think about that something
that is not an object (we are doing it right now!), that something has to be an ob-
ject too – it has to instantiate the property of being an object. Thus, as Heidegger’s
Being is an entity and not, according to Meinong’s metaphysics, something that is
not an object, it is an object and not.
• Third Chapter: Nichtsein . The third chapter is divided into two main parts.
In first part, we argue in favor of the identity between Being and nothingness,
which is defended by Heidegger himself in his What is metaphysics? (1967). Given
that Being and nothingness are identical, since Heidegger’s Being is contradictory,
nothingness is contradictory as well. We also continue the comparison between
the Heideggerian and the Meinongian ontology, reviewing some of the contempo-
rary neo-Meinongian accounts of nothingness (Jacquette, 2013, 2015; Parsons,1980;
Priest, 2014b; Sylvan, 195x -1996). From this comparison, we see how it is possi-
ble to formally understand Heidegger’s paradox of Being and nothingness. In the
second part, we present a paraconsistent mereological system according to which
Being and nothingness are represented as the complement of the totality for the
following reason. Since the totality is characterized as the mereological sum of ev-
erything that is an entity, the complement of the totality (which is the mereological
sum of everything that is not part of the totality) is not an entity. This is why the
complement of the totality represents being and nothingness. However, given the
dialetheic interpretation of Heidegger presented in chapter one, Being and nothing-
ness are also entities: it follows that the complement of the totality needs to be part
of the totality too. Such a mereological system is important because, contrary to a
great part of the secondary literature, it shows that late Heidegger’s metaphysics
is certainly contradictory but not unacceptable. Indeed, since it is grounded on
a paraconsistent logic which can tolerate contradictions, the mereological system
presented in this chapter is inconsistent but not logically trivial.
• Fourth Chapter: Grundsein . In this last chapter, we bridge Heidegger’s discus-
sion of Being with the current grounding literature. As we claim in the first chap-
ter, Being provides the reason in virtue of which every entity is an entity. Another
possible way to understand the relation between Being and entities is that Being
grounds entities. Nevertheless, since Being is contradictory (as we argue in the first
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chapter, being is an entity and not), the grounding relation is inconsistent as well.
Indeed, since all entities need to be grounded in Being and Being is not an entity,
Being is ungrounded. At the same time, since Being is an entity as well, then Being
needs to be grounded in something and, since Being is the ground of all entities,
Being grounds itself. Thus, Being is both (fully) grounded and (fully) ungrounded.
We call this new inconsistent grounding theory para-foundationalism. To conclude,
using Bliss and Priest’s framework (forthcoming), we propose two formal models
that can show how, working in a paraconsistent setting, para-foundationalism does
not lead to logical triviality.
Chapter 2
Sein
Overview. Εἴναι, Sein, being. These terms have characterized the philosophical debate since its
origin. The phenomenological evidence that there are human beings (as there are tables, chairs,
prime numbers and works of art) has been an inexhaustible source of philosophical interest. Why
is there such a vast multitude of entities? What makes these entities be? And, if they are in
virtue of their own being, what is being? In what follows, we discuss the answer given by Hei-
degger. We show how, in his late production, he endorses the idea that every entity is in virtue
of being [Sein] and that being itself is both an entity and not an entity. In Heidegger’s terms,
since he takes the world [Welt∗] to be the totality of all entities, being itself is part of the world
(because it is an entity) and it is not part of the world (because it is not an entity).
Structure. In Section 1.1, we introduce the two main components of Heidegger’s metaphysics,
namely being and the ontological difference. In Section 1.2, we show how, according to Hei-
degger himself, speaking and thinking about being leads to a paradox. In Section 1.3, we
present a novel interpretation, according to which, in his late production, Heidegger deals with
this paradox endorsing dialethesim, namely the metaphysical position according to which there
are true contradictions. In Section 1.4 and in Section 1.5, we argue that this interpretation
casts a new light on crucial notions in Heidegger’s philosophy, such as truth and negation.
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2.1 BeingMET
Freiburg, 18 June 1950. Dear Mr. Buchner, thinking about being [Sein] is something
very risky and always open to the possibility of mistakes. (. . . ) However, maybe,
one day, it will be possible to find a solution among all these attempts that, like
mine, look cluttered and arbitrary. For the moment, it is just the pilgrimage of
the asking-answering which demands vocation. Please, remain on this path and
correspond to the vocation of thinking. Always yours, Martin Heidegger (Heidegger,
1957b, pp.122-123).
Faithful to the suggestion that he made to Mr. Buchner, Heidegger patiently adhered
to that solitary path trying to answer the so-called question of being [Seinsfrage]: how
shall we understand the expression ‘being’? What is its meaning? What is being?
According to Heidegger, the meaning of ‘being’ has been often considered “self-
evident” (Heidegger, 1927, p.3) because, in our everyday life, we always deal with it.
On the one hand, we are surrounded by entities that are.1 There are rooms, tables, trees
and windows. There are concrete entities such as hammers, jumpers and walls; there are
abstract entities such as numbers, equations and ideas. In one way or another, all these
entities are. On the other hand, being is often used in our languages and, in particular,
in propositions such as ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘I am happy’. Nevertheless, from both the
fact that we daily deal with entities that are, and the fact that we use the verb ‘to be’,
it does not follow that we, thereby, understand the meaning [Sinn∗] of being. Thus, the
question of being remains unanswered.
Heidegger thinks that being can be understood in two different ways: metaphysically
and grammatically. Let’s begin with the former one.
BeingMET : being as that which makes all entities entities
This first characterization interprets BeingMET as the quidditas (the that-ness) of
a quid (of a that). BeingMET is the ‘being an entity ’ of an entity. BeingMET does
not make this table exactly this table (namely the table that is flat and placed in New
1Heidegger uses different terms to talk about entities [Seiendes] (for instance, thing [Ding ] and object
[Objectum]). All these terms have different (phenomenological) meanings. Nevertheless, for simplicity,
the present work uses all these terms as synonyms.
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York); it only makes this table something and not nothing.2 Even though this “seems just
trivial” (Heidegger, 1927, p.4), BeingMET makes all entities be. Such a characterization
can be understood in three ways.
[1] First of all, BeingMET can be understood as Seiendsein∗, namely the being an entity
of all entities. According to Heidegger, BeingMET determines entities as entities (cf.
Heidegger, 1927, p.13). Since BeingMET makes entities entities, when an entity ceases
to be, it is not an entity anymore; it is nothing at all. “The lack of being [BeingMET]
means the lack of the capacity of enduring of an entity as an entity” (Heidegger, 1966,
p.74).
[2] Secondly, BeingMET can be understood as Grund∗, namely the ground of all entities,
which makes all entities be. In Heidegger’s words, “being [as BeingMET] is intrinsically
ground-like, what gives ground” (Heidegger, 1936, pp. 170-171) because it is the reason
in virtue of which every entity is an entity. BeingMET is the reason why all entities are.
Since all entities are entities, all entities need to be grounded in something that makes
them entities, namely BeingMET; entities can be entities only in virtue of BeingMET
and no entity can be an entity in virtue of itself. Thus, as we have claimed before, if
something is not grounded in BeingMET, it is nothing at all.
[3] Finally, BeingMET can be understood as Selbstheit∗, namely the being itself of
an entity or the property of being self-identical. According to Heidegger, “the most ad-
equate formula [to express this idea] is A = A (. . . )”, which should be read as “every
A is identical to itself [ist selber dasselbe]” (Heidegger, 1957a, p.28). He also adds that
“[the is contained in the proposition ‘A is identical to itself’] says why every entity is”
(Heidegger, 1957a, p.30). Therefore, not only is it the case that “each entity is itself”
(Heidegger, 1957a, p. 28) but it is also the case that an entity is an entity exactly in
virtue of the fact that each entity is itself. From the fact that BeingMET, understood
as being self-identical, determines entities as entities, it follows that, what is not self-
2During a conference held in 1955, Heidegger claims that philosophy should not answer questions
such as “what is that – beauty? What is that – nature? What is that – knowledge? What is that –
justice?” (Heidegger, 1956, p.17) because philosophy is not concerned with specific entities (such as the
beauty, the nature, the knowledge and the justice) but with the reason in virtue of which all entities are,
namely BeingMET.
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identical, it is not an entity either: once again, it is nothing at all.
Following Heidegger, these three understandings of BeingMET are equivalent: since
all entities have the feature of being entities, all entities are grounded in BeingMET.
Similarly, since all entities are grounded in BeingMET, all entities are self-identical. If
something is not grounded in BeingMET, it is not self-identical either and, thus, it does
not have the feature of being an entity. It is nothing.3
Let’s continue with the second understanding of being, namely the grammatical one.
BeingGRA : being as expressed through the copula
This second characterization interprets being as what is expressed by a grammatical
component of the language which is present in statements of the form: ‘x is [y]’ (where
y is optional). At least in an Aristotelian framework (which is the one employed by
Heidegger), BeingGRA unifies parts of the language (for instance, ‘sky’ and ‘blue’) in
order to obtain a meaningful sentence according to which ‘the sky is blue’.4 Without
BeingGRA, the parts of the language do not unify themselves into a meaningful propo-
sition, as in the case of ‘sky blue’. According to Heidegger, in unifying propositions,
BeingGRA expresses both the being of existence and the being of predication. On the
one hand, “being [BeingGRA] is found in that-ness and what-ness, reality, the objective
presence of something, subsistence, existence” (Heidegger, 1927, p.6); on the other hand,
3Someone could ask why I think that these three understandings ofBeingMET are actually equivalent.
Concerning this point, I would like to draw a distinction. On the one hand, I am not committed to
believe that these three characterizations are interchangeable. On the other hand, I am committed to
show that Heidegger treats them as interchangeable. Indeed, Heidegger defines BeingMET in these
three ways in (1927, 1936, 1957a). Having said that, it is also possible to defend the equivalence of these
three characterizations of BeingMET assuming that BeingMET itself is something that all entities have
in common. First of all, following Priest, all entities are – all entities have in common BeingMET.
Consequently, he believes that all entities are in virtue of BeingMET, because BeingMET is the reason
why everything is. Moreover, Priest believes that every entity is self-identical because this is a logic truth
(see, 2014c). The three characterizations of BeingMET are interchangeable: they all refer to something
that is common to all entities.
4It is important to specify that this is what Heidegger thinks Aristotle claims about the verb ‘to be’
and not necessarily what Aristotle really claims. For the Heideggerian interpretation of Aritotle and
the verb ‘to be’, see (1966) and (1993). For a complete account of possible other ways of interpreting
Aristotle’s account of ‘being’, see Moro (2010).
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“being [BeingGRA] is used in all knowledge and predicating” as in “ ‘I am happy’ and
similar statements” (Heidegger, 1927, p.3).
Even though the focus of Heidegger’s research is BeingMET, he is also interested in
BeingGRA because he believes that the latter necessarily implies the former. Indeed,
when we say either that an entity is (namely that an entity exists), or that an entity is
something, we indirectly attribute BeingMET to an entity. If we say that ‘the sky is
blue’, we refer to an entity (the sky) that instantiates the property of being blue; if I think
that ‘I am happy’, I refer to an entity (myself) that instantiates the property of being
happy. In both cases, an entity is required in order to be able to say or think something
about it. If this is the case, since an entity is required, BeingMET is required as well
because BeingMET is what makes all entities entities. In other words, ‘the sky is blue’
is a meaningful proposition in virtue of BeingGRA, which brings together parts of the
language unifying them into a meaningful proposition. Then, the meaningful proposition
is about an entity (‘the sky’) which has some features (‘blue’) and, of course, such an
entity is an entity in virtue of BeingMET. Every time we employ BeingGRA and we
meaningfully unify a proposition, the proposition is about an entity and this entity is
an entity in virtue of BeingMET. This is why BeingGRA always implies BeingMET.5
Having said this, in what follows, we will be focused on the metaphysical aspect of the
question of being, namely on BeingMET.
As it has been presented until now, the first characterization of being (which is
BeingMET) faces a problem, namely it appears to give rise to a vicious infinite regress.
To see it clearly, take into consideration the second understanding of BeingMET, namely
the BeingMET as the ground of all entities. As we have claimed before, BeingMET
grounds all entities and all entities need to be grounded in something else. Moreover, no
entity can be an entity in virtue of itself. If everything is an entity, including BeingMET,
then BeingMET needs to be grounded in something else as well. For the sake of the
argument, let’s say thatBeingMET is grounded inBeingMET−2. However, as everything
is an entity, what grounds BeingMET, namely BeingMET−2, must be an entity as
well and, as such, BeingMET−2 must be grounded in something else too (let’s say that
5Heidegger believes that language is always concerned with entities and, as such, it always implies
BeingMET, namely the reason in virtue of which all entities are entities. He metaphorically claims that
“letters are the signs for the sounds of the voice, the sounds of the voice are the signs of our soul; these
[namely the signs of our soul] are the signs for the entities” (Heidegger, 1959, p.160). This is way words
are symbols (Heidegger uses the greek expression σύμβολα), which express or refer to entities.
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BeingMET−2 is grounded in BeingMET−3). At this point, it is easy to see that we are
off on an infinite regress; a regress which one may suppose to be vicious. If BeingMET
is the ground of all entities and BeingMET is an entity itself, then entities are grounded
in something of the same kind, namely entities. One may think that this is a problem
because, even though a member of a kind can explain why another member of the same
kind is, a member of a kind cannot explain why that very same kind is in the first place.
In other terms, one may take as reasonable the idea that, in our explanans, we cannot
invoke that very thing for which we are seeking an explanation. In Heidegger, where
BeingMET is an entity, the infinite regress is vicious because we are invoking an entity
to explain why there are entities in the first place.6
It is difficult to say if Heidegger was actually aware of this problem; what is sure is
that he avoids this potential issue, stipulating that BeingMET is simply another kind of
thing than the kind of things that BeingMET wants to explain (namely entities). More
precisely, Heidegger stipulates that BeingMET is not a thing at all. This assumption
is called ‘ontological difference’.7 Heidegger assumes that BeingMET is not a simple
entity among entities. “Being [BeingMET] cannot be thought as an entity” (Heidegger,
2010, p.4). BeingMET is what makes any entity an entity, but BeingMET is not an
entity itself. In other terms, everything that is grounded in BeingMET is an entity and
BeingMET is not grounded in BeingMET because it is not something – it is not an
entity. “The being [BeingMET] of entities is not itself an entity” (Heidegger, 1927, p.6).
In support of the ontological difference between BeingMET and entities, Heidegger
6We do not want to say that this argument (namely the argument according to which, in our ex-
planans, we cannot invoke that very thing for which we are seeking an explanation) is necessarily correct.
We simply want to point out that, if you think that such an argument is correct, then you may find
problematic the characterization of BeingMET delivered above. It is also important to remark that
the argument discussed is a common one in the contemporary analytic debate concerning grounding.
See Bliss (2014), Passmore (1970) and Lowe (2003). Nevertheless, this idea was recently challenged by
Maitzen (2013). As it was suggested by Kris McDaniel in private conversation, it would interesting to
run a comparison between Heidegger’s ontological difference and Aristotle’s argument about the fact
that being is not a genus. This topic will be developed in my future research.
7One clarification. Heidegger deals with three kinds of ‘difference’: [1] ontologische Differenz, namely
the difference between BeingMET and entities; [2] transzendentale Differenz, namely the difference
between entities and their ways of being (such a difference will be discussed in section 2.2.2 of chapter 2)
and [3] transzendente Differenz, namely the difference between a normal entity and God. In this thesis,
we will be focused on [1].
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proposes a grammatical argument as well. Consider a proposition such as ‘the wall is’.
The noun ‘wall’ refers to an entity, namely the wall in front of you or behind me. But
what shall we say about ‘is’? If we assume that ‘is’ (namely ‘BeingMET’) refers to an
entity, then the proposition ‘the wall is’ would be nothing more than a simple list of two
entities: the wall and is (namely BeingMET). However, this cannot be the case because,
in an obvious sense, the proposition ‘the wall is’ has a meaning that a list of two entities
(such as the wall and is or BeingMET) does not have. Therefore, Heidegger concludes,
the ‘is’ of the proposition ‘the wall is’ does not refer to any entity because BeingMET is
not an entity. One can hear the thoughts discussed until now in the following passage:
If we painstakingly attend to the language in which we articulate what the principle
of reason [Satz vom Grund ] says as a principle of being, then it becomes clear we
speak of being in an odd manner that is, in truth, inadmissible. We say: being
[BeingMET] and ground/reason [Grund∗] ‘are’ the same. Being [BeingMET] ‘is’
the abyss [Abgrund ]. When we say something ‘is’ and ‘is such and so’, then that
something is, in such an utterance, represented as a being. Only a being ‘is’; the
‘is’ itself -being- ‘is’ not. The wall in front of you and behind me is. It immediately
shows itself to us as something present. But where is its ‘is’? Where should we seek
the presencing of the wall? Probably these questions already run awry (Heidegger,
1957, p.15).
The idea that there is a difference between what is the ontological reason of everything
(in Heidegger’s jargon, BeingMET) and everything else is not something that Heidegger
introduced for the first time. On the contrary, it is an idea that he has inherited from
both the neo-platonic school and the medieval tradition. Heidegger explicitly refers to
Plotinus and his idea that the One, namely the reason in virtue of which all entities
are, is not a simple entity among other entities. Indeed, as Heidegger’s BeingMET, the
One of Plotinus is not an entity either. The One does not have properties, features,
characteristics and forms, otherwise it would be something (namely an entity) with that
property, that feature, that characteristic and that form. According to Plotinus, “when
the soul burns of love for the One, it gets rid of all its forms (. . . ). The soul cannot see
the One if it engages with entities” (cf. Vannini, 2007, p.92). According to Heidegger’s
Phenomenology of Religious Life (1995), the same idea appears in medieval mysticism.
For instance, Saint John of the Cross claims that God (the God in virtue of which all
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entities are because God creates everything out of nothing) does not have properties
because it is not an entity at all. Metaphorically, God is the “dark night” in which
nothing can be seen, perceived or distinguished because there is nothing to be seen,
perceived or distinguished. God is not something (it is not an entity) because God has
no form, shape or feature. This is also the reason why Saint John writes: “when the soul
meets God, it is without form or shape. Forget and abandon all things [all entities]!” (cf.
Vannini, 2007, p.98).8
Finally, Heidegger finds a fascinating synthesis of the neo-platonic ideas and me-
dieval mysticism studying Meister Eckhart’s Sermons: as Heidegger himself claims in his
Doctoral thesis, Eckhart’s ‘experience of life’ [Lebenserfahrung ] shows how God [Gott ] is
purely transcendental, beyond both the world and the ideas. According to Eckhart, there
is an absolute separation [Abgeschiedenheit ] between God’s divine nature [Gottheit ] and
the entities (cf. Vannini, 2007, p.98). He thinks that, in virtue of the difference between
God and all entities, God is nothing, namely God is not an entity or a thing at all.
Like Plotinus, Eckhart writes: “when the soul reaches the One, (. . . ) it finds God as
nothingness” (cf. Vannini, 2007, p.98).9
As Plotinus’ One and Saint John’s God are beyond all entities, because they are not
entities at all, BeingMET is beyond all entities too. BeingMET is not part of the world
[Welt∗] because, according to Heidegger, the world collects only entities and BeingMET
is not an entity. The world is uniquely composed by entities that can be manipulated,
used or broken by human beings, while BeingMET cannot be manipulated, used or
broken because BeingMET is not an entity in the first place. Heidegger’s BeingMET
transcends the world. Since Heidegger’s world is the totality of all entities, BeingMET
is outside the totality of all entities because it is not an entity. BeingMET (namely
the reason in virtue of which everything is, including the world itself) is not part of the
world. Since the world is the totality of all entities and BeingMET is the reason in virtue
of which all entities are, there is a world in virtue of BeingMET. Nevertheless, since
BeingMET is not an entity, BeingMET is not part of the world.
8Concerning the relation between Heidegger and (neo-)platonism, see his courses on Greek philosophy
(cf. Heidegger, 1993) and Plato (cf. Heidegger, 1992). Also, see Cimino (2005) and Narbonne (2001).
Concerning Heidegger and St. John of the Cross, see Heidegger (1995) and Caputo (1986).
9Concerning the relation between Heidegger and Eckhart, see Flaumbaum (1944) and Schürmann
(1973). More generally, concerning the relation between Heidegger and medieval mysticism, see Fumet
(1963), Lewalter (1950) and Perotti (1974).
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2.2 The problem of BeingMET
As it is presented until now, the path taken by Heidegger to grasp the meaning of
BeingMET does not look particularly troubled. To understand why he describes his
philosophical attempts to Mr. Buchner with such hopeless pessimism, it is necessary to
introduce a new element. In the History of the concept of time, Heidegger claims that
intentionality is one of the “decisive discoveries” that he has inherited from phenomenol-
ogy (Heidegger, 1989b, p. 3). Following Brentano and (to a certain extent) Husserl,
Heidegger shares the idea that intentionality is the distinctive way in which the human
mind is directed towards entities. Every time something is perceived or thought, someone
perceives or thinks something, namely an entity. Adrian Moore explains intentionality
in the following way: “for any flash of understanding, there is an object of understand-
ing; for any pang of remorse, an object of remorse; for any hallucination, an object of
hallucination” (Moore, 2012, p.439).
In theWegmarken, Heidegger claims that the word ‘entity’ “means what is put in front
of the perception, the imagination, the judgment, the desire and the intuition. (. . . ) An
entity is what is represented” (Heidegger, 1967, p.28). According to Heidegger, every
time we refer to something with an intentional act (for example, with our thoughts,
imagination or emotional states), this something is an entity. Following Heidegger’s
example, when we either say ‘rose’ or think about a rose, we refer to something (namely
the rose in the garden); when we either say ‘redness’ or think about the redness of the
rose, we refer to something as well (namely the delightful color of roses). Indeed, when “I
am mentioning it [when I am mentioning the redness of the rose], I think about it and I
represent it” (Heidegger, 1967, p.29). As we have mentioned before, every time we think
and say something, something (namely an entity) is thought and said.
As Heidegger claims in The metaphysical foundation of logic: “a thought is always a
thought about something” because “each thought is related to a specific entity which is
in front of us and this entity can be a material object, a geometrical object, or [even]
an historical fact” (Heidegger, 1978, p.13). If we think about something, we think about
a thing, an entity. If we think about an entity, we think about something which is in
virtue of BeingMET. For instance, if we think about Pegasus, we think about an entity
with some properties: in this case, we think about an entity which has, among many
other properties, the property of being winged and the property of being a horse. If we
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think about an entity, then such an entity is an entity (it has the property of being an
entity) in virtue of BeingMET.
Moreover, according to Heidegger, “when we speak – implicitly or explicitly – we
say being [BeingMET]” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 25). On the one hand, we explicitly say
BeingMET when BeingGRA appears in propositions such as ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘the
wall is’. In this case, BeingMET appears evident because it is explicitly part of the
syntactical construction of the propositions in question. For instance, since the sky is
blue, the sky is that entity which is blue. Since it is an entity, the sky is grounded in
BeingMET. On the other hand, we implicitly say BeingMET when, in dealing with
propositions that do not explicitly contain BeingGRA, we still refer to entities that are
‘such and such’. For instance, when we say that ‘the rose perfumes’, we actually say that
an entity (the rose) is such and such (in this case, it is a rose and it perfumes). Once
again, since the rose is that entity which perfumes, the rose is grounded in BeingMET.
Regardless the fact thatBeingMET is explicitly or implicitly stated, “speaking [Die Sage]
makes appear an entity in its being [BeingMET]” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 25). “The power
of words is to make an entity an entity” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 25).
So, “ ‘God is’, ‘the conference is (in the classroom)’, ‘the cup is silvery’ and ‘the book
is mine’ ” (Heidegger, 1966, p. 93).10 All these entities are entities, namely they are
something rather than nothing, because they are grounded in BeingMET. According to
Heidegger, even the world, namely the totality of all entities, is (an entity). Intentional
acts are certainly directed towards very different kinds of entities (God, a conference
venue, the cup of coffee on my desk, the copy of Being and Time in my bag and the
world we are in), but all of them are still directed towards entities: as such, these entities
are entities in virtue of BeingMET, the meaning of which needs to be understood as “the
simple presence [Anwesenheit∗] of an entity, the objecthood of an object” (Heidegger,
10Someone may find it strange that, according to Heidegger, God is something (namely an entity)
rather than nothing, and that God is in virtue of BeingMET. Let me try to explain why, in Heidegger’s
framework, this is not strange at all. According to Heidegger, God, in the Western metaphysical tradition,
is (treated as) an entity. Even though God is characterized as a ‘super-entity’, namely as a powerful,
omniscient and eternal entity, God is still an entity (see Heidegger, 1995; Heidegger, 1967, Chapter 1
and Heidegger, 1957a). This idea is consistent with the interpretation of Heidegger’s metaphysics, given
in the present chapter. Since Heidegger believes that everything we can refer to is an entity and since
we can refer to God, then God is an entity. This is also the reason why, God is something (namely an
entity) and not nothing. Finally, since every entity is in virtue of BeingMET and since God is an entity,
God is in virtue BeingMET too. See also Galimberti, 2011, Chapter 27 and Vannini, 2007.
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1966, p. 101). After Being and Time, Heidegger also starts to use Anwesenheit∗ as a
synonymous of Präsenz and, according to some interpreters (cf. Volpi, 2010; cf. Carman,
2003), this term is read, at least in the phenomenological tradition, as ‘being represented
by a subject’ or ‘being present to the consciousness of a subject’. Whatever we refer to
with an intentional activity is an entity and whatever we refer to is an entity in virtue of
BeingMET. In other words, whatever is represented is an entity; whatever is an entity
is grounded in BeingMET. This is why “thinking is always representing [Vorstellen]
something [namely an entity]” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 31). From the beginning to the end
of his philosophical career, Heidegger explicitly endorsed this position in many different
places (Heidegger 1927; Heidegger 1957b; Heidegger 1966; Heidegger 1967).11
Working with this definition of ‘entity’, Heidegger also claims that it is impossible
to have empty terms because all terms, as all thoughts, refer to something.12 “Speak-
ing and thinking necessarily objectify because they have to posit an entity to express
something” (Heidegger, 1967, p.30). ‘BeingMET’ is not an exception. “The word ‘being’
[‘BeingMET’] cannot be an empty one [either]” (Heidegger, 1966, p.89). Exactly this
realization turns any attempt of speaking about BeingMET into that dangerous and
risky path described by Heidegger to Mr. Buchner. Indeed, BeingMET is supposed to
determine an entity as an entity without being an entity. Nevertheless, in saying that
BeingMET determines an entity as an entity, we represent BeingMET as ‘such and
such’ and this is enough to turn it into what, according to the ontological difference,
BeingMET is not at all, namely an entity.
If it is true that, for any thought, there is an entity that is thought, thinking about
BeingMET means that BeingMET itself is already treated as an entity, namely the en-
tity that we think about in thinking about BeingMET. Even the ontological difference
becomes paradoxical because stating that BeingMET is not an entity makes BeingMET
an entity. In saying that BeingMET is not an entity, we actually state something about
BeingMET, namely the fact that BeingMET is not an entity. The fact that BeingMET
is not an entity turns BeingMET into an entity, namely the entity that is not an entity.
11Heidegger is explicit about the meaning of the word ‘entity’ in his course on Kant. He writes: “God
is an entity because God is, in general, something – an X. In the same way, a number is an entity:
faith and devotion are entities too. (. . . ) Everything that is something and not nothing is an entity”
(Heidegger, 1962, pp. 13).
12Against the interpretation supported by Oliver and Smiley (2013), I have extensively shown that
Heidegger does not accept empty terms in my ‘Better than Zilch?’ (2015a).
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Any statement or thought about BeingMET cannot really be about BeingMET because
this would necessarily imply that BeingMET is an entity while, according to the onto-
logical difference, BeingMET is not. If BeingMET is not an entity, then BeingMET is
something, namely the entity that is not an entity. Any thought turns BeingMET into
an entity.
Consider what we have previously stated at the end of Section 1.1. According to
Heidegger, BeingMET is not part of the world because the world is the totality of all
entities and, according to the ontological difference, BeingMET is not an entity. However,
since everything we refer to is an entity and since we refer to BeingMET as what is not
part of the world, we turn BeingMET into that entity which is not part of the world.
Thus, since BeingMET is that entity that is not part of the world and since the world is
the totality of all entities, BeingMET has to be part of the world too. On the one hand,
BeingMET is not part of the world because, according to the ontological difference,
BeingMET is not an entity. On the other hand, since we refer to BeingMET as what is
not an entity, BeingMET is an entity as well and, as such, it is part of the world. As soon
as we refer to BeingMET, BeingMET is dragged into the world as what BeingMET is
not, namely an entity.
Heidegger is perfectly aware of this problem. Nothing can be neither said of nor
thought about BeingMET, not even that BeingMET can be neither spoken of nor
thought. BeingMET is neither effable nor thinkable. However, BeingMET is exactly
what cannot be grounded in BeingMET because it is not an entity.
The being [BeingMET] of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity. The first philosophical
step in understanding the problem of being [BeingMET] consists in avoiding telling
the myth on tina diegeishai, in not ‘telling a story’, that is, not determining entities
as entities by tracing them back in their origins to another entity – as if being
[BeingMET] had the character of a possible entity (Heidegger, 1927, p.5).
This realization undermines his entire phenomenological project devoted to the under-
standing of the relation between the human being [Dasein∗] and BeingMET. The human
being is supposed to be the only entity which is able to ask the question of BeingMET.
However, asking the question of BeingMET (asking what BeingMET is) is already ask-
ing about something other than BeingMET because the question of BeingMET assumes
that there is something (namely BeingMET) that can be questioned. In order to be
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something, BeingMET has to be an entity, namely that entity which is questioned by
the question of BeingMET. However, according to the ontological difference, BeingMET
is not an entity and, as such, it cannot be that entity which is questioned either. Since
the price of referring to BeingMET is the reification of it and since the question of
BeingMET already refers to BeingMET, the question of BeingMET does not ask about
BeingMET but about something else.13 In Heidegger’s words,
as a seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. The meaning
of being must already therefore be available to us in a certain way. We intimated
that we are always already involved in an understanding of being [BeingMET].
From this grows the explicit question of the meaning of being [BeingMET] and
the tendency towards its concept. We do not know what ‘being’ [‘BeingMET’]
means. But already, when we ask, ‘What is being [BeingMET]?’ we stand in an
understanding of the ‘is’ without being able to determine conceptually what the ‘is’
means (Heidegger, 1927, p.4).
At this point, Heidegger is aware that both speaking and thinking about BeingMET
leads him to face a contradiction. Indeed, by the ontological difference, BeingMET is
taken to be not an entity; however, since an entity is everything we can refer to and
since we are referring to BeingMET right now, BeingMET has to be an entity as well.
Therefore, BeingMET is an entity (because we refer to it) and not an entity (because,
by assumption, it is not). As we have already stated above, BeingMET is not part
of the world because the world is the totality of all entities and BeingMET is not an
entity; nonetheless, BeingMET is part of the world because the world is the totality of
all entities and BeingMET is an entity.
Recently some analytic philosophers have realized that the problem of BeingMET
can be understood as a logical paradox. Adrian Moore, in his The Evolution of Modern
Metaphysics, takes Heidegger’s philosophy to be one of “the most general attempt[s] of
making sense of things” (Moore, 2012, p.1). Since BeingMET is the reason why all
13Following Priest (2006), it is possible to clarify this point and, more generally, the ontological
difference running a comparison with Frege. According to Frege, one needs to distinguish between
objects (the ontological correlate of names) and concepts (the ontological correlate of predicates). The
difference is that concepts are unsaturated (inherently gappy). Frege needs to appeal to this fact to
explain unity of propositions. By analogy, we can say that beings (entities) are objects and BeingMET
is a concept.
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entities are, Moore interprets Heidegger’s BeingMET as the most general attempt of
making sense of every thing. The issue is that, according to Moore, “to make sense of
things at the highest level of generality (. . . ) is to make sense of things in terms of what
it is to make sense of things” (Moore, 2012, p.7). This makes Heidegger’s metaphysics
self-referential because, not only does he aim to make sense of every entity appealing
to BeingMET, but he also wants to make sense of what makes sense of every entity,
namely BeingMET itself. At this point, as it is often the case when self-referentiality
is involved, Heidegger faces a paradox. BeingMET is what makes sense of every entity.
Since, following Moore, Heidegger’s metaphysics is the most general attempt of making
sense of things, Heidegger legitimately aims to make sense of what makes sense as well; in
Heidegger’s case, BeingMET itself. Nonetheless, exactly this self-referential attempt of
making sense of what makes sense triggers the problem because, as we have anticipated,
in talking about BeingMET as something that makes sense of everything, we actually
refer to BeingMET as that entity which makes sense of everything. Thus, BeingMET
is an entity (because it is that thing which makes sense of all things) and not (because,
according to Heidegger’s ontological difference, it is not a thing at all). This is the
contradiction of BeingMET.
The logical structure of the antinomy faced by Heidegger clearly emerges in Priest’s
interpretation. He spells out the problem of BeingMET as a denotational paradox: if
there is something (let’s say X) that we cannot denote, then there is something that
we cannot refer to. However, don’t we denote X as soon as we claim that X cannot be
denoted? In other words, don’t we refer to X as soon as we claim that we cannot refer to
X? To make it clearer, let’s briefly take into consideration a specific instantiation of the
same kind of paradox, namely König’s paradox. Such a paradox is about ordinals, which
are numbers that extend the familiar counting numbers, 0, 1, 2, . . . , beyond the finite.
This means that, after all the finite numbers, there is a next, ω, and then a next, ω + 1,
and so on. As it can be shown by a rigorous mathematical proof, there are many more
ordinals than can be referred to by names of a language with a finite vocabulary, such
as English. Thus, there are ordinals to which we cannot refer. Now, the problem occurs
when, for example, we take into consideration the least ordinal number we cannot refer
to. However, despite the fact that it should be impossible to refer to the least ordinal,
the phrase ‘the least ordinal we cannot refer to’ does refer to something, namely the least
ordinal number. Thus, the paradoxical conclusion is that we cannot refer to the least
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ordinal number but, at the same time, we can.
According to Priest (2015), the problem concerning BeingMET is exactly the same.
Following Heidegger, every time we refer to something, we refer to an entity. Since
BeingMET is not an entity, it follows that it is impossible to refer to it. However, as
in the case of the least ordinal, as soon as we claim that it is impossible to refer to
BeingMET, we do, in fact, refer to it. As with König’s paradox, we cannot refer to the
least ordinal number but, at the same time, we can, so too with Heidegger’s paradox
in which we cannot refer to BeingMET but, at the same time, we can. More formally,
such a paradox can be presented in the following way. According to Priest (2015), an
intuitively correct principle of denotation is the so-called D-schema: ‘a’ denotes x iff
a = x. For instance, ‘Socrates’ denotes Plato’s teacher iff Socrates is Plato’s teacher.
Now, since according to the ontological difference, BeingMET (let’s call it b) is not an
entity, ¬∃x(x = b), it also follows that ∀x(x ≠ b). If ‘n’ is any name, n ≠ b. By the
D-schema and contraposition, ‘n’ does not denote BeingMET. BeingMET has no name.
We cannot refer to BeingMET. Nevertheless, at the same time, we can, can’t we? Don’t
we refer to BeingMET when we claim that ‘BeingMET cannot be referred to’? “One
cannot say anything about the being [BeingMET] of an object (even though one can!)”
(Priest, 2015, p.10).
In both the interpretations discussed above, BeingMET is represented as something
beyond either the possibility of ‘being made sense of’ or the possibility of ‘being re-
ferred to’. According to Moore, BeingMET is beyond the limit of human understanding
(because it is impossible to make sense of it) while, according to Priest, BeingMET is
beyond the limit of expression (because it cannot be expressed) and the limit of cognition
(because it cannot be thought). Nevertheless, for both Moore and Priest, BeingMET is
also represented as something that is not beyond the possibility of ‘being made sense of’
or the possibility of ‘being referred to’ because, as we have seen, we can make sense of
and refer to BeingMET. BeingMET is not beyond the limit of human understanding
(because we can understand it) and it is not beyond the limit of expression (because we
can express it) or the limit of cognition (because we can think about it).
According to Priest, Heidegger’s BeingMET perfectly fits in a broader class of para-
doxes, which share the same following structure: “a certain object must be within a fixed
totality Ω [this is what he calls the ‘Closure Condition’], but must also be without it
[this is what he calls the ‘Transcendental Condition’]” (Priest, 2002, p.245). On the one
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hand, given Heidegger’s metaphysics, the ‘Closure Condition’ is represented by the fact
that BeingMET is within the totality of everything that we can make sense of, express
or think. On the other hand, the ‘Transcendental Condition’ is represented by the fact
that, assuming the ontological difference, it is impossible to make sense of, express and
think about BeingMET. Thus, BeingMET is beyond the boundary of the totality of
what is understandable, expressible or thinkable, but, at the same time, it is not.14
Another way of expressing this paradoxical situation is the following one: as Plotinus’s
One and Saint John’s God, BeingMET is outside the world, namely outside the totality
of all entities (because, according to the ontological difference, it is not an entity). In
this case, the totality Ω is represented by the world (which is characterized by Heidegger
as the totality of all entities) and Priest’s ‘Transcendental Condition’ is represented by
the fact that BeingMET is not part of the world. However, overcoming the position of
Plotinus and Saint John of the Cross, Heidegger’s BeingMET is also within the world
(because, since everything we refer to is an entity and since we refer to BeingMET,
BeingMET is an entity too). The fact that BeingMET is within the world (namely
within the totality Ω) represents Priest’s ‘Closure Condition’.
At this point, the aporia of BeingMET is clearly stated and Heidegger is perfectly
aware that such a contradiction leads his whole metaphysical project to a dead-end. In-
deed, the aim of Heidegger’s metaphysics is to answer the question of BeingMET and,
in order to answer the question of BeingMET, it is necessary to talk and think about
it. However, as we have seen, talking and thinking about BeingMET leads to claiming
something contradictory and this makes any attempt of referring to BeingMET mean-
ingless because any contradictory statement (including the one Heidegger himself claims
about BeingMET) “offends against the fundamental laws of discourse” (Heidegger, 1966,
p.23). According to Heidegger, these fundamental laws are determined by logic, which is
defined as “a set of rules” for a good “way of reasoning” (Heidegger, 1998, p.8). Certainly,
Heidegger has never directly dealt with formal logic but, for our purpose, it is enough to
say that Heidegger thinks that logic is grounded on “two main principles: the principle of
14Priest (2002, p.245) gives also a formal description of the paradox of BeingMET using the Inclosure
Schema as follows. φ(y) is ‘y can be expressed in language’, so that Ω is the totality of things that
can be expressed; ψ(x) is ‘x = Ω’; δ(Ω) is a claim about BeingMET, say that BeingMET is what it is
that makes entities be. Then, by Heidegger’s arguments, we have ¬φ(δ(Ω)): this fact about BeingMET
cannot be expressed; but Heidegger himself shows that φ(δ(Ω)) by expressing this fact.
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non-contradiction and the law of identity” (Heidegger, 1998, p.9).15 During a conference
in Freiburg, Heidegger also added the law of excluded middle (cf. Heidegger, 1994). Nev-
ertheless, among these three laws, Heidegger takes the principle of non-contradiction as
the “fundamental law” (Heidegger, 1966, p.9) that is meant to establish which thoughts
are meaningful and which are not. Thus, not only is it generally the case that “who
ever speaks against logic is suspected, explicitly or implicitly, of arbitrariness” but, more
specifically, “this suspicious counts as an argument and as an objection” because “con-
tradictory propositions always offend the fundamental rule of any possible discourse”
(Heidegger, 1966, p.112). To conclude, since “logic [grounded on the the principle of
non-contradiction] is taken as the tribunal, secure for all eternity” and since “no rational
human being will call into doubt its authority as the first and the last court of ap-
peal” (Heidegger, 1966, p.113), BeingMET, as the whole Heideggerian metaphysics, “is
contradictory and, thus, senseless” (Heidegger, 1966, p.113).
Since Heidegger does not want to give up any of his metaphysical premises and since
he endorses the account of logic previously discussed, he coherently concludes that speak-
ing and thinking about BeingMET is impossible. The only available option is to be silent
about BeingMET because “metaphysical conceptions forbid thinking about the question
of the essence of being [BeingMET]” (Heidegger, 1959, p.73). Metaphysics finds in the
question of BeingMET its end point, its extreme limit. BeingMET remains inacces-
sible for any metaphysical discourse. As Heidegger poetically writes: “The fog of the
world can never reach the light of being [BeingMET]” (Heidegger, 1954, p.49). The
light of BeingMET remains unfathomable. Tragically, Heidegger faces the evidence that
his whole phenomenological project is self-defeating because he tries to speak and think
about what is explicitly established as unspeakable and unthinkable. Then, Heidegger
resigned from his philosophical enterprise and, at least until the well-known methodolog-
ical turn of his thought, he decided to remain silent about BeingMET. Such a turn is
called the Kehre∗ and it took place around the thirties.
15Even though Heidegger is not completely familiar with formal logic, he was fascinated by this subject.
First of all, before starting his studies in theology and philosophy, he dreamt of becaming a mathematician
(cf. Safranski, 1998). Secondly, right after his doctoral studies, Heidegger briefly engaged with formal
logic commenting on Frege’s work (see Heidegger, 2007). For more details about the relation between
Heidegger and mathematics (or logic), see Roubach (2008).
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2.3 BeyngMET
As we have seen, according to Heidegger, both the aporia of BeingMET and the relative
impossibility to make sense of it are based on two main assumptions. [1] On the one
hand, Heidegger believes that the ‘objectifying ’ nature of any intentional activity forbids
us to refer to BeingMET as what simply is not an entity. Indeed, given the assumption
that every time we refer to something we refer to an entity, when we refer to BeingMET
as what is not an entity, we treat BeingMET as an entity as well. Thus, BeingMET is an
entity and not. [2] On the other hand, Heidegger takes the principle of non-contradiction
as the most fundamental rule of thought and, from this second assumption, it follows
that any attempt of referring to BeingMET, in virtue of its contradictory nature, has to
belong to the realm of non-sense.
For the whole trajectory of Heidegger’s thought, the first assumption was never chal-
lenged. Indeed, in the Appendix of Phenomenology and Theology published in 1964, Hei-
degger claims that “every kind of language [or, more generally, every kind of intentional
activity] necessarily objectifies” (Heidegger, 1967, p.28). What about the second assump-
tion, then? Has Heidegger ever thought to abandon the principle of non-contradiction?
Has he ever considered the possibility of giving up the logic? According to the standard
interpretation, the answer is negative. Priest is even surprised about the fact that Hei-
degger has never tried to criticize the principle of non-contradiction. “It is an irony that
a thinker of the acuity of Heidegger, who was so critical in his historical heritage, should
have been blind to the possibility that people had got logic wrong” (Priest, 2002, p.248).
In what follows, we disagree with this interpretation. We show that, after the Kehre∗,
Heidegger challenged the principle of non-contradiction, endorsing dialetheism, namely
the position according to which some contradictions are true.16
InWhat is metaphysics? (1967), Heidegger starts to cast some doubts on the principle
of non-contradiciton. “This [impossibility of referring to BeingMET] is true starting
from the assumption that Logic is the most important thing. (. . . ) However, can the
16Following Priest and Berto (2013), we take dialetheism to be the view according to which there are
dialethias. A dialethia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true. In our case, we
will show that Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting as true (as a dialetheia) that (A) ‘BeingMET
is an entity’ and (¬A) ‘BeingMET is not an entity’. For a short introduction to dialetheism, see also
Priest (2006, pp.4-6) and Priest (2014a, pp. xiv-xvi). For a completely detailed account of dialethesim,
see Priest (2010).
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supremacy of Logic be harmed?” (Heidegger, 1967, p.63). The complete and clear
realization that BeingMET requires us to abandon the principle of non-contradiction
was not formulated immediately after the Kehre∗ and it was developed in years of both
private and public philosophical attempts. The first essay in which Heidegger seems to
endorse a dialetheic solution to the problem of BeingMET – accepting its contradictory
nature – is contained in his Introduction to Metaphysics. He writes:
The word ‘being’ [‘BeingMET’] is indeterminate and (. . . ) and nevertheless we
always understand it as determine. Following logic, this is a contradiction and what
is contradictory cannot be real. Nevertheless, this contradiction - being completely
indeterminate and determinate - is real (Heidegger, 1966, p.88).
On the one hand, Heidegger suggests that the word ‘BeingMET’ refers to something
that does not have any determination (something about which nothing can be either
said or thought because there are no determinations to be said or thought about it).
On the other hand, he also claims that the word ‘BeingMET’ refers to something that
has some determinations (something about which it can be said or thought, at least,
the determination of not having any determinations). BeingMET is indeterminate (it
has no determinations at all) and it is determinate (it has the determination of not
having any determination at all). Most importantly, Heidegger also suggests that such
a contradiction is real. The contradiction of BeingMET is unavoidable and it has to
be accepted as true: according to Heidegger, as a matter of fact, such a contradiction
is part of how reality is, as all the other real things. At this point, it follows that,
since there is, at least, one real contradiction, Heidegger must give up the idea that
contradictions are always meaningless and, thus, impossible to accept. Nevertheless,
even though Heidegger seems to give up the principle of non-contradiction accepting the
contradiction of BeingMET as true, this idea is not consistently presented throughout
the whole extent of his Introduction to Metaphysics. Besides the paragraph taken into
consideration here, there are no other significant metaphysical explanations.
Some years after the publication of Introduction to Metaphysics, the dialetheic solu-
tion to the problem of BeingMET was systematically presented in the Contributions to
Philosophy – a philosophical diary written between 1937 and 1938 but published only
after Heidegger’s death.17 In this posthumous work, Heidegger presents a full defense of
17For a general overview of the Contributions to Philosophy, see Schoenbohm (2001), Schmidt (2001)
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the position according to which BeingMET should be taken to be both an entity and
not an entity. In order to stretch the difference between his old consistent account of
BeingMET and the new inconsistent one, he starts to write being [Sein] (what we have
called BeingMET) as beyng [Seyn]. Following Heidegger, in discussing his dialetheic
position according to which BeingMET is an entity and not an entity, we start writing
BeingMET as BeyngMET too.
In the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger claims that metaphysics needs “a new
beginning” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.3) and this new beginning is represented by the intro-
duction of the ‘event ’ (or the ‘Ereignis∗’) which is “the idea that needs to be thought
as the essential discourse of the truth of beyng [BeyngMET]” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.96).
In this framework, the truth of BeyngMET has to be understood as what is true about
BeyngMET. This is the reason why Heidegger also describes the ‘event’ as the hu-
man being’s appropriation [Er-eignung ] of the truth of BeyngMET. The event itself
“is the thought that reaches beyng [BeyngMET]” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.96). Since the
‘event’ is constituted by the human being’s appropriation of the truth of BeyngMET,
then the event itself is always described as “the space-time ground of the truth of beyng
[BeyngMET]” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.47). If the event is the truth of BeyngMET, and
the truth of BeyngMET is the human being’s appropriation of BeyngMET, then, since
the human being occupies both a space and a temporal region of the world, the truth of
BeyngMET is spatiotemporally given as well.
At this point, even though the contradictory nature of BeyngMET has not been
explicitly accepted yet, a dialetheic solution is definitely implied by this ontological ac-
count. According to the metaphysical premises of Heidegger (premises that are certainly
not rejected in the Contribution of Philosophy), thinking about BeyngMET (or, more
generally, referring to BeyngMET) leads to a contradiction. Now, claiming that the
truth of BeyngMET is the ‘event’, and that the ‘event’ is the human being thinking a
true thought about BeyngMET, seems to suggest that the truth of BeyngMET precisely
consists in thinking something contradictory and true about BeyngMET itself. This po-
sition becomes immediately clear when Heidegger starts to describe the real content of
the ‘event’, namely the content of the thought that thinks BeyngMET. He metaphor-
ically claims: “Dasein∗ not only thinks about beyng [BeyngMET] and entities as two
opposite sides of a river but he also thinks about beyng [BeyngMET] and entities as the
and McNeill (2001).
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same side of the river” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.47). Not only is BeyngMET held as the
complete opposite of entities (because BeyngMET itself is meant not to be an entity at
all), butBeyngMET is also held as something that is not the opposite of entities (because
BeyngMET is an entity as well). This is the reason why, even though the ontological
difference still holds, ensuring the fact that BeyngMET is not an entity, Heidegger thinks
that, “[as] an entity is, beyng [BeyngMET] is” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.58). In other terms,
since BeyngMET makes entities entities and since BeyngMET is not an entity itself,
BeyngMET is not grounded in BeyngMET, otherwise it would be an entity. Neverthe-
less, in Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger thinks that BeyngMET is as well and,
as such, it is grounded in BeyngMET too. This is exactly the contradiction that, in the
Ereignis∗, is taken as true.
In paragraph number 47 entitled ‘The essence of the decision: beyng or not-beyng’,
Heidegger directly challenges the necessity of choosing between the BeyngMET that is
not (an entity) and the BeyngMET that is (an entity). Heidegger wants to question
exactly this ultimatum (this aut-aut): he wants to question the idea that it is necessary
to choose only one of the two options in question because choosing both would mean
to claim something contradictory and, thus, senseless. He provocatively asks: “Where
does this aut-aut come from? Where does the aut-aut between ‘only this’ or ‘only that’
come from? (. . . ) Is there maybe a third possible way?” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.121).
One paragraph later, Heidegger answers that the third possible way is to avoid the
aut-aut claiming that BeyngMET is both an entity and not an entity. As Heidegger
himself writes, the truth of BeyngMET is “the beyng [BeyngMET] of what is not”
(Heidegger, 1989a, p.121). Now, according to the principle of non-contradiction, and
given that BeyngMET is the ground that makes all entities entities, then either what
is not an entity is not grounded in BeyngMET or what is an entity is grounded in
BeyngMET. Nonetheless, Heidegger suggests that it is also the case that something that
is not grounded inBeyngMET (namelyBeyngMET itself) is, at the same time, grounded
in BeyngMET. In the Ereignis∗, what the human being realizes is that, according to the
truth of BeyngMET, since BeyngMET is not an entity, BeyngMET is not grounded in
BeyngMET; however, since BeyngMET is an entity as well, BeyngMET is grounded
in BeyngMET too. It also follows that, since BeyngMET makes entities entities, even
what is not an entity (namely BeyngMET) is an entity too. The truth of BeyngMET
is that BeyngMET itself is an entity and not. Heidegger summarizes this idea in the
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following way:
as ‘beyng’ [‘BeyngMET’] does not simply mean ‘being present there’, ‘not-beyng’
[‘not-BeyngMET’] does not simply mean ‘completely disappearing’ because ’not-
beyng’ is a mode of ’beyng’. This holds for beyng itself which is an entity and, at
the same, it is not. It is affected by the lack of beyng [because BeyngMET is not
grounded in BeyngMET] but, nevertheless, is [because BeyngMET is grounded in
BeyngMET too]. (Heidegger, 1989a, p.121).
According to Heidegger, the principle of non-contradiciton generates this aut-aut,
which forces the human being to choose between two options: either BeyngMET is an
entity or BeyngMET is not an entity. Nevertheless, according to the truth expressed
in the Ereignis∗, the human being realizes that this ultimatum needs to be overcome.
BeyngMET is “nothing more than both these two options together” which are one the
negation of the other (Heidegger, 1989a, p.121). Thus, “beyng [BeyngMET] is what is
not” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.58).
The contradiction expressed in the Ereignis∗ is metaphorically described by Heidegger
as an ‘oscillation’ [Erzitterung∗] between BeyngMET and entities, which is generated by
the human being that thinks about BeyngMET. In thinking about BeyngMET, through
the ontological difference, BeyngMET is held as what is not an entity – this is the first
extreme of the oscillation. However, as we have already discussed, the thought that refers
to BeyngMET as what is not an entity, refers to something. Thus, BeyngMET is held
as an entity too – this is the second extreme of the oscillation. In the first chapter of the
Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger defines this oscillation as the “essence of beyng
[BeyngMET]” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.34). According to Heidegger himself, BeyngMET is
not simply one of the two extremes of the oscillation but BeyngMET is, metaphorically
speaking, the oscillation itself: it is both the two extremes together.
The interpretation according to which the truth of BeyngMET is a contradiction,
which requires us to overcome the principle of non-contradiction, is supported in other
parts of the Contributions to Philosophy. Heidegger is definitely clear about the neces-
sity of abandoning ‘logic’: “the biggest misconception of the truth of beyng [BeyngMET]
consists in a logic of philosophy” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.114) because “beyng [BeyngMET]
is beyond logic” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.114). BeyngMET needs to be “illogical” or “a-
logical” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.114). At this point, the majority of the interpreters have
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thought that Heidegger is suggesting abandoning any philosophical enterprise concerning
BeyngMET: from this point of view, BeyngMET is not something that can be ratio-
nally understood but it must be only mystically experienced. For instance, according
to Caputo, BeyngMET “is without a why; it is the renunciation of concepts and repre-
sentations, of propositions and ratiocinations” (Caputo, 1986, p.191). For this reason,
BeyngMET cannot be the subject matter of a philosophical argument or a rational in-
vestigation. However, if we carefully read Heidegger, we see that this is not true. In
the Contributions to Philosophy, there is no trace of a mystical revelation: neither the
truth of BeyngMET nor the Ereignis∗ are the result of some irrational epiphany. On the
contrary, Heidegger himself points out that being ‘illogical’ or ‘a-logical’ does not mean
rejecting logic tout court, but it means rejecting that specific ‘way of thinking’ grounded
on the principles of non-contradiction, identity, and the law of excluded middle. More
accurately, Heidegger clarifies that what should be abandoned in ‘logic’ is what we have
already defined as the fundamental law, namely the principle of non-contradiction. In-
deed, even though such a principle claims that all contradictions need to be rejected,
according to Heidegger, the contradiction stating that BeyngMET is an entity and not
needs to be taken as true. From here, it does not follow that, because of this con-
tradiction, both philosophy and any rational discourse about BeyngMET need to be
abandoned; it simply follows that it is not possible to reject the truth of BeyngMET
because it is contradictory. As Heidegger writes:
An entity is. Beyng [BeyngMET] is. With the word ‘entity’, we do not simply
refer to what is real, interpreted as what is ‘present’ as an entity of the mind or as
a concrete object (. . . ), but we also refer to what is not an entity as well [namely
BeyngMET]. However, if someone immediately finds here a contradiction because
‘what is not’ cannot be an entity, and if someone takes consistency as the truth of
beyng [BeyngMET], does not think deep enough (Heidegger, 1989a, p.97).
The Contributions to Philosophy is not the only work where Heidegger supports a
dialetheic solution to the problem of BeyngMET. Twenty years after the final draft of
the Contributions to Philosophy, in Identity and Difference (1957a), Heidegger defends
the same idea. However, he abandons the metaphor of the ‘vibration’ and he adopts
the metaphor of the ‘circular movement’. Here Heidegger explicitly links the Ereignis∗
with the ontological difference, which is now named ‘separation’ [Austrag ], namely the
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separation between BeyngMET and entities. He claims that, according to the truth of
BeyngMET, “the separation is a constant circular movement [win Kreisen]”. On the
one hand, the ‘vibration’ was a metaphorical representation of the conceptual movement
between the fact that BeyngMET is not an entity (because of the ontological difference)
and the fact that BeyngMET is an entity (because we refer to it stating the ontological
difference). On the other hand, the ‘circular movement’ is another metaphorical repre-
sentation of the fact that, as soon as we discuss the ‘separation’ between BeyngMET
and entities, BeyngMET turns out not to be separated from the entities at all. This is
because we refer to it exactly in saying that BeyngMET is separated from them. Such
a movement is circular because, starting from the assumption that BeyngMET is not
an entity, we end up concluding that BeyngMET is indeed an entity. However, since
we do not give up the assumption that there is a ‘difference’ or a ‘separation’ between
BeyngMET and entities, we go back in claiming that BeyngMET is not an entity. Nev-
ertheless, once again, in stating that BeyngMET is not an entity, we turn BeyngMET
into an entity. As when running in a circle, we always end up back in the place where we
began. Exactly this “perpetual chasing of being [BeyngMET] and entity” is the reason
why “being [BeyngMET] is disclosed as something that is too” (Heidegger, 1957a, p.14).
Against the interpretation presented here, someone can object that this ‘vibration’
or this ‘oscillation’ does not constitute a real contradiction because it does not seem to
imply that BeyngMET is not an entity and BeyngMET is an entity at the same time.18
Such a ‘vibration’ or ‘oscillation’ can be given in time and, of course, this would make the
contradiction disappear because BeyngMET would be not an entity (let’s say at time t1)
and an entity (let’s say at time t2), but not together in the same instant of time. However,
this is not the case. First of all, this idea cannot be the one endorsed by Heidegger himself,
otherwise there would be no reason, for Heidegger, to accept the contradiction of the event
of BeyngMET. Secondly, as Heidegger himself states in his Contributions to Philosophy
and in a seminar about Hegel’s Science of Logic, Heidegger does not endorse any kind
of Hegelian dialectic where there is the Aufheben of the contradiction – a ‘(dis-)solution’
of the contradiction.19 On the contrary, Heidegger thinks that the two moments of the
18This objection was suggested by Mel Fitting and Stewart Shapiro in private conversation. I thank
them for making me think about this point.
19As we have specified in footnote number 3 about Aristotle, also in this case, it is important to
point out that this is Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel and not necessarily what Hegel really claims.
Some contemporary interpreters think that Hegel’s dialectic removes contradictions (see Berto (2005)
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‘vibration’ or ‘oscillation’, namely the fact that ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ (because
of the ontological difference) and the fact that ‘BeingMET is an entity’ (because we
refer to BeyngMET) are not given in time. He writes that BeyngMET is “situated in
the instant [Augenblick∗] of the fight between either being [BeyngMET] or not-being
[not-BeyngMET, namely entity]” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.57).
It is also important to remark that, as we have previously mentioned, in Identity and
Difference (1957a), Heidegger also claims that all entities are in virtue of the fact that
“each entity is itself” (Heidegger, 1957a, p.28). This means that BeyngMET (interpreted
as being self-identical) still determines entities as entities because all entities are entities
in virtue of the fact that they are exactly what they are. Any entity is that specific
and unique entity that is: the reason for an entity to be an entity is its being identical
to itself. However, from this characterization of BeyngMET, it also follows that, since
BeyngMET is an entity and not an entity, BeyngMET is self-identical and not. In other
terms, BeyngMET is not only contradictory because it has contradictory properties
(BeyngMET is an entity and it is not an entity) but BeyngMET is also both self-
identical (because all entities are self-identical) and not self-identical (because what is
not an entity is not self-identical). In the Ereignis∗, BeyngMET is both an entity and
not. Moreover, if we interpret BeyngMET as being self-identical, then BeyngMET is
both self-identical and not self-identical as well.
To conclude, Heidegger endorses the position according to which there are true contra-
dictions in his History of Being (1998b) too. Here Heidegger claims that a contradiction
does not always show that an argument is wrong and fallacious. He suggests the idea that
a contradictory conclusion is not enough to reject an argument because “a contradiction is
not a rebuttal nor a disproof” (Heidegger, 1998b, p.15). Moreover, since a contradiction
“is not always meant to be false, incorrect or unacceptable” (Heidegger, 1998b, p.13), it
is possible to have contradictions that are not only unavoidable but also true. As we
have seen, an example is the Ereignis∗, which shows that “the contradiction is essentially
a fundamental proposition about beyng [BeyngMET] and its truth” (Heidegger, 1998b,
p.13). What is true about BeyngMET is that BeyngMET itself is an entity and, at the
same time, it is not an entity. Finally, if BeyngMET is interpreted as being self-identical,
then it is also true that BeingMET is self-identical and not self-identical as well.20
and Redding (2007)), while some other interpreters think that Hegel’s dialectic accepts and tolerates
contradictions (see Priest (2010)). Heidegger seems to agree with the first interpreters.
20It may be relevant to specify that the only inconsistency accepted by Heidegger is the inconsis-
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2.4 Nicht
Given the metaphysical framework presented in his Contributions to Philosophy, Hei-
degger intuitively understands that the concept of negation plays a crucial role in the
paradoxical truth of BeyngMET. Since all contradictions are the conjunction of a state-
ment (A) and its negation (¬A), the contradiction of BeyngMET is not an exception.
Indeed, according to the Ereignis∗, namely the event of the truth of BeyngMET, it is
the case that ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ (A) and, at the same time, it is the case that
‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ (¬A). So, in order to make sense of this antinomy, it is
important to understand how negation works. Following Heidegger himself, the contra-
diction of BeyngMET is generally not accepted exactly because “only few people can
really understand the meaning of negation” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.189). In particular, he
points out that negation is generally (mis-)interpreted in two main ways: either it is
understood as “cancellation, dissolution” or it is understood as “rejection” (Heidegger,
1989a, p.189). Nevertheless, even though Heidegger clearly suggests that both these two
accounts of negation turn the contradiction of BeyngMET into something unaccept-
able, he does not give any argument. In what follows, we will try to make sense of this
intuition.
Let’s start examining the first misunderstanding of negation. In this case, the content
of a proposition expressed by ¬A ‘cancels’ or ‘dissolves’ the content of the proposition
expressed by A. Similarly, since the relation is symmetrical, the content of a proposition
expressed by A ‘cancels’ or ‘dissolves’ the content of the proposition expressed by ¬A
as well. From here, it follows that, since A dissolves the content of ¬A and since ¬A
dissolves the content of A, the contradiction (A∧¬A) has no content at all. According to
this account of negation, contradictions are contentless: they simply lack any content.21
tency of BeyngMET. In his Introduction to Metaphysics (1966), he also mentions the square triangle.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish if Heidegger takes the square triangle to be genuinely and truly
inconsistent, as he does in the case of BeyngMET.
21It may look unreasonable that Heidegger refers to such a technical notion of negation. However, since
he has deeply engaged with philosophers that have supported an account of negation as cancellation,
this is not the case. In particular, Aristotle (which was deeply studied by Heidegger) endorsed this
first account of negation. Even though it is fair to point out that this interpretation of Aristotle is not
universally accepted, there is reasonable evidence according to which, not only did Aristotle assume this
account of negation, but he also accepted the so-called Aristotle’s thesis, namely ¬(A→ ¬A) (cf. Routley
and Routley, 1984).
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Moreover, consistent with the idea that contradictions are without any content, the
conjunction ofA and ¬A neither entailsA nor entails ¬A. Ex contradictione nihil sequitur.
At this point, it should be clear why this account of negation cannot be the cor-
rect one to express the truth of BeyngMET. First of all, according to Heidegger, the
Ereignis∗, namely the truth of BeyngMET, is exactly the realization that BeyngMET
is an entity and not an entity. Given this first account of negation, the Eregnis (namely
the conjunction of the statement ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ and its negation) needs to
be contentless because the content of the statement ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ cancels
or dissolves the content of the statement ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ and vice versa.
However, according to Heidegger, this contradiction is not contentless at all; on the con-
trary, exactly because of its contradictory content (namely that BeyngMET is an entity
and not), it represents the unavoidable truth of BeyngMET. Secondly, Heidegger thinks
that the contradiction which states that ‘BeyngMET is an entity and, at the same time,
BeyngMET is not an entity’ entails that ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ and that ‘BeyngMET
is not an entity’. This is particularly evident when he talks about the Ereignis∗. From
the ‘event’ of the truth of BeyngMET, which is exactly the conjunction of a statement
and its negation, Heidegger often infers one of the two conjuncts. For instance, in his
Contribution to Philosophy, Heidegger claims that, since BeyngMET is contradictory
(because BeyngMET is an entity and BeyngMET is not an entity), then BeyngMET
is an entity (cf. Heidegger, 1989a, p.98). Vice versa, since BeyngMET is contradictory
(because BeyngMET is an entity and BeyngMET is not an entity), then BeyngMET
is not an entity (cf. Heidegger, 1989a, p.98). Working with such an account of negation,
this would not be possible.22
The second misunderstanding treats negation as a ‘rejection’. In this second case,
the content of a negated proposition neither disappears nor it is cancelled, but, using
Heidegger’s words, it “is simply ruled out” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.189). This means that
22It may be interesting to recall that negation, interpreted as ‘cancellation’ and ‘dissolution’, naturally
leads towards connexive logic or, more generally, connexivism. This view is known for endorsing the
following two theses. [1] First of all, explicit contradictions do not entail their components. [2] Secondly,
A cannot entail ¬A. This second thesis emerges naturally under the cancellation or dissolution view of
negation, as follows: entailment is inclusion of logical content. So, if A were to entail ¬A, it would include
as part of its content, what ‘cancels’ or ‘dissolves’ it, ¬A, in which event it would entail nothing, having
no content. Finally, since it is not the case that A entails ¬A, Aristotle’s thesis, namely ¬(A → ¬A),
holds as well.
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the statement ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ rejects the statement ‘BeyngMET is an
entity’. The two propositions are, so to speak, incompatible: since the former statement
rejects the latter one, it is impossible that they both hold. In his literary style, Heidegger
also claims that “this [second kind of] negation says only no” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.189).
One possible way of interpreting such an enigmatic expression is that, if it is true that
‘BeyngMET is an entity’, the answer to the question ‘is the sentence ‘BeyngMET is
not an entity’ true?’ needs to be negative. Vice versa, if it is false that ‘BeyngMET
is an entity’, the answer to the question ‘is the sentence ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’
true?’ needs to be positive. Given this preliminary intuition, it is possible to see how
this characterization of negation can resemble the behavior of negation in classical logic.
Indeed, the fact that proposition A rejects ¬A may be also interpreted in the following
way: if proposition A is true, ¬A is false. Vice versa, the fact that proposition ¬A rejects
A, may be interpreted in the following way: if proposition ¬A is true, A is false. Thus,
if it is true that ‘BeyngMET is an entity’, ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ is false only.
Vice versa, if it is true that ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’, ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ is
false only. It should be immediately evident that this second kind of negation cannot
be the right one to express the Ereignis∗ because Heidegger himself wants to claim that
both the propositions ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ and its negation are true. This is what
negation as ‘rejection’ does not allow.
So, what is a possible account of negation that can make sense of the Ereignis∗?
Heidegger thinks that, at least in some cases, negation should both ‘accept’ and ‘reject’
what it negates. In this way, the proposition ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ neither
cancels, dissolves the content of the proposition ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ nor rejects the
possibility that ‘BeyngMET is an entity’. In his words, “[negation] should say yes and no
at the same time” (Heidegger, 1989a, p. 189). Once again, it is possible to interpret this
obscure quotation in the following way. On the one hand, since the sentence ‘BeyngMET
is an entity’ is true (because we refer toBeyngMET ) and since the sentence ‘BeyngMET
is an entity’ is false (because of the ontological difference), the answer to the question
‘is the sentence ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ true?’ needs to be both yes and no. Vice
versa, since the sentence ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ is true (because of the ontological
difference) and since the sentence ‘BeyngMET is not entity’ is false (because we refer to
BeyngMET ), the answer to the question ‘is the sentence ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’
true?’ needs to be both yes and no. Following Heidegger, only this negation can express
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the truth of BeyngMET exactly because it is “the simultaneity of beyng [BeyngMET]
and entities” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.42). Since, in the Ereignis∗, BeyngMET is an entity
and not, this third kind of negation is able to express that ‘BeyngMET is an entity’
and its negation are both true and false. On the other hand, this negation says yes and
no because, according to Heidegger himself, the Ereignis∗ (namely, the contradiction
which states that ‘BeyngMET is an entity and BeyngMET is not an entity’) entails
both its conjuncts, namely it entails that ‘BeyngMET is an entity’ and it entails that
‘BeyngMET is not an entity’. Metaphorically, such a negation expresses that, yes, it is
the case that BeyngMET is an entity and, at the same time, that, no, it is not the case
that BeyngMET is an entity.
The recent development of paraconsistent logic can give us a better understanding of
this intuitive account of negation. Consider Priest’s Logic of Paradox (1979; from now
on, LP ). In this formal system, the classes of true propositions and false propositions
overlap. Given a proposition A, which belongs to the class of true propositions only,
the negation of A belongs to the class of false propositions only. Vice versa, given a
proposition A, which belongs to the class of false propositions only, the negation of A
belongs to the class of true propositions only. However, given a sentence A, which belongs
to the overlap of the class of true propositions with the class of false propositions, the
negation of A belongs to the overlap as well. So, not only is proposition A both true and
false, but its negation (namely, ¬A) is true and false as well. As for Heidegger’s negation,
the negation in LP says ‘yes’ and ‘no’: if proposition A and its negation belong to the
overlap of the class of true propositions with the class of false propositions, the answer
to the question ‘is A true?’ is ‘yes’ (because it belongs to the class of true propositions),
and ‘no’ (because it belongs to the class of false propositions). In the same way, since the
negation of A belongs to the overlap of the class of true propositions with the class of false
propositions, the answer to the question ‘is ¬A true?’ is ‘yes’ (because it belongs to the
class of true propositions), and ‘no’ (because it belongs to the class of false propositions).
As we have already discussed, according to Heidegger’s metaphysics, the proposition
expressing the ontological difference (namely, ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’) belongs
exactly to the intersection of the class of true propositions with the class of false proposi-
tions. ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ is true (because it is assumed as such by Heidegger
himself) and it is false (because, since we refer to BeyngMET, BeyngMET has to be an
entity). In this case, the negation of this proposition belongs to the overlap of the two
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classes as well because it is both true and false. In other terms, if we ask the question ‘is
the sentence ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ true?’, the answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. It
is ‘yes’ because, assuming the ontological difference, BeyngMET is not an entity and it
is ‘no’ because, in virtue of the fact that we refer to it, BeyngMET is an entity as well.
On the other hand, if we ask ‘is the sentence ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ false?’, the
answer is again both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. It is ‘yes’ because, in virtue of the fact that we refer
to BeyngMET, BeyngMET is an entity and it is ‘no’ because, assuming the ontological
difference, BeyngMET is not an entity at all.
2.5 Α᾿λεθήια
Grounded on this last interpretation of negation, Heidegger gives also an account of
truth, which is compatible with a dialetheic solution to the problem of BeyngMET. In
his On the Essence of Truth (1967), Heidegger claims that “truth means what makes a
true thing true” (Heidegger, 1967, p.134). However, following Heidegger, there are two
understandings of truth: the first one is the traditional concept and the second one is
his own. The traditional concept supports the idea that a proposition is true if and only
if there is an ‘accordance’ between what is stated by a proposition and the entity the
proposition is about. Thus, consistently with a vast part of the philosophical tradition,
truth (Heidegger uses the latin expression ‘veritas’) is taken to be the agreement of our
thoughts with the entity that is thought (adaeguatio intellectus ad rem) or the concor-
dance (here, Heidegger uses the Aristotelian Greek expression ὀμοίωσις) of an assertion
(λόγος) with an entity (piρᾶγμα). In Heidegger’s words, something is true when “the mat-
ter is in accord [Die Sache stimmt ] with what actually is” (Heidegger, 1988, p.136). For
instance, the proposition ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Thus, “the
truth is the actual” (Heidegger, 1967, p.134) or, more precisely, a proposition is true if
and only if it is in accordance with the actual. This is the reason why, according to Hei-
degger himself, truth is a synonym of correctness because it is about a proposition being
correct in representing reality as it is. Using Heidegger’s metaphor, truth is the agree-
ment [Ubereinstimmen] between what appears ‘under the light’ and a proposition that
correctly (and, thus, truthfully) describes what appears ‘under the light’. Here, what
is ‘under the light’ is taken to be the thing (res) a proposition is about, or the entity
(piρᾶγμα) an assertion (λόγος) is concerned with. Such an account of truth is the ground
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of that specific way of reasoning which is labelled by Heidegger himself as ‘apophantic’,
namely that specific way of reasoning which is concerned with what appears ‘under’ (apo
- αpiο) the ‘light’ (phainos - ϕαινoς).23
Given this traditional understanding of truth, Heidegger explicitly equates falsity
with un-truth, namely what is not true. If truth is the agreement of a proposition with
reality, “the untruth of the matter signifies the non-agreement [of a proposition with
reality]”; if truth is the accordance with the actual, “the untruth is conceived as a non-
accordance [with the actual]” (Heidegger, 1967, p.138). If the truth is the agreement of
a proposition with what appears ‘under the light’, the untruth is the disagreement of a
proposition with what appears ‘under the light’. Metaphorically, untruth is concerned
with “what is hidden” (Heidegger, 1967, p.138) or “concealed” (Heidegger, 1967, p.138).
Moreover, Heidegger also thinks that, according to this account, truth and untruth are,
as in classical logic, exclusive and exhaustive. If the actual is the truth, then “what is not
actual [namely, the untruth] is always taken to be the opposite of the actual [namely, the
truth]” (Heidegger 1967, p.138). For instance, if the proposition ‘X is golden’ is true, this
means that X is actually golden. In reality, X is golden. Using Heidegger’s metaphor,
the proposition ‘X is golden’ is true if and only if X appears ‘under the light’ as golden,
namely if and only if the entity X appears in reality to have the property of being golden.
Consistently with the traditional concept of truth, this also means that if X is indeed
golden, the negation of the proposition ‘X is golden’ is false (or untrue). “Untruth (. . . )
is completely the opposite of truth” (Heidegger, 1967, p.138). No proposition can be true
and false (or untrue) at the same time. Truth and falsity (or untruth) are incompatible.
It is clear that this account of truth is grounded on the second kind of negation because,
consistently with the idea that truth and falsity (or untruth) are exclusive and exhaustive,
23According to Heidegger, the Western tradition has exclusively developed the apophantic way of
reasoning, which grounds both scientific and technical knowledge. During a conference given in Freiburg
(2002), he points out that all the different branches of science work under the assumption that everything
is an entity only. For instance, biology is concerned with living entities, theology is concerned with divine
entities and mathematics is concerned with mathematical entities. However, all of them are, ultimately,
about entities. In his lectures on Nietzsche (1961), Heidegger also claims that the apophantic way of
reasoning grounds the ‘will to power’ of Dasein∗ because it is possible to have power only at one condition,
namely that there is something (an entity) on which it is possible to have power. As it is claimed in The
question concerning technology (1957b, pp.5-28), technology is the strongest and most powerful form
of the will to power because it is grounded on that apophantic way of reasoning that, considering only
entities, develops the possibility of having power over them.
48 CHAPTER 2. SEIN
the negation of a true proposition must be false and the negation of a false proposition
must be true.
Unfortunately, there is a problem: Heidegger’s metaphysics is incompatible with this
account of truth. First of all, according to Heidegger before the Kehre∗, in the case of
BeyngMET, there is no entity according to which a proposition can be in agreement
with because BeyngMET is not an entity in the first place. There cannot be a truth
about BeyngMET: it is impossible to be correct about BeyngMET because there is
no entity to be correct about. Using Heidegger’s metaphor, since BeyngMET is not an
entity, BeyngMET cannot appear ‘under the light’. If BeyngMET cannot appear ‘under
the light’, no proposition can be in accordance with BeyngMET either: indeed, a propo-
sition can be in accordance only with what appears ‘under the light’, namely with what
is an entity. Therefore, since a proposition is true if and only if it is in accordance with
what appears ‘under the light’, there cannot be any true proposition about BeyngMET.
Secondly, even when, after the Kehre∗, Heidegger endorses the Ereignis∗, namely the idea
that BeyngMET is an entity and not entity, the Ereignis∗ itself becomes incompatible
with this account of truth. Indeed, because BeyngMET is an entity and not, it is both
true and false that BeyngMET is not an entity. However, since according to the tradi-
tional understanding, truth and falsity (or untruth) are exclusive and exhaustive, this is
unacceptable because it would imply that at least a proposition (namely ‘BeyngMET is
not an object’) is both true and false.
At this point, Heidegger tries to revise this notion of truth introducing what, in
ancient Greek, was called Aletheia (Α᾿λεθήια). This new account of “the question of the
essence of truth arises from the question of the truth of essence” (Heidegger, 1967, p.155),
namely the truth of BeyngMET. Even though Aletheia is usually translated with ‘truth’,
Heidegger, following a philological reading, interprets Aletheia as ‘what is not hidden’.
So, truth is still about the accordance between a proposition and reality (or what is
actual); however, this time, truth is not simply characterized as the accordance between
a proposition and what appears ‘under the light’ but it is defined as the accordance
between a proposition and ‘what is not hidden’. As we will see, here, negation (the ‘not’
employed in ‘what is not hidden) plays a crucial role.
As we have already seen, according to Heidegger, reality is not only constituted by
what appears, sic et simpliciter, ‘under the light’: the world (namely the totality of all
entities) is not only composed by entities (piράγματα). There is something hidden, which
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needs to be unconcealed; something that, even if it does not belong to the world, lies
under it as a necessary condition for anything to be. This is BeyngMET. BeyngMET
is hidden because it is not an entity and, thus, it cannot appear ‘under the light’; at the
same time, BeyngMET is not hidden as well because, in the Ereignis∗, it appears ‘under
the light’ as that entity that is not an entity. On the one hand, BeyngMET cannot be
something that simply appears ‘under the light’ because BeyngMET is not an entity:
BeyngMET cannot appear ‘under the light ’ because there is no entity that can appear
(there is no entity that can actually be ‘under the light ’). On the other hand, according
to the truth of BeyngMET, BeyngMET itself is also an entity and, as all the other
entities, it is part of the world. Since BeyngMET is also an entity, BeyngMET itself
can appear ‘under the light ’. The truth of the fact that BeyngMET appears and does
not appear ‘under the light ’ (namely the truth of the fact that BeyngMET is hidden and
not hidden) directly follows from the structure of the Ereignis∗. In an idiosyncratic way,
Heidegger writes:
the event of beyng [BeyngMET], namely the Ereignis∗, supports the truth = the
truth is shown through the event [the Ereignis∗] of beyng [BeyngMET]. (. . . ) The
preliminary question about the truth is, at the same time, the fundamental question
about beyng [BeyngMET]. Beyng [BeyngMET], in its own event [the Ereignis∗],
is essentially the truth (Heidegger, 1989a, p.341).24
As we have already seen, the event of BeyngMET is a ‘vibration’ or an ‘oscillation’ of
BeyngMET itself between its ‘being an entity’ and its ‘not being an entity’. BeyngMET
is what is not: it is that entity that is not an entity. Therefore, BeyngMET is an entity
and it is not an entity. From the fact that BeyngMET is not an entity, it follows
that BeyngMET does not appear at all because there is no entity that can appear;
from the fact that BeyngMET is an entity, it follows that BeyngMET appears as an
entity, namely as that entity that is not an entity. When BeyngMET is hidden (because
BeyngMET is not an entity and, as such, it cannot appear), BeyngMET is not hidden as
well (because it is an entity and, as such, it appears too). Vice versa, when BeyngMET
is not hidden (because BeyngMET is an entity and, as such, it appears), BeyngMET
24The relation between the event and Heidegger’s account truth is better explained in the following
quotation: “the event grounds the truth; the truth is given only through the event” (Heidegger, 1989a,
p.341). Also, “The essence of truth is the being true of Beyng [BeyngMET]”, which the the event.
(Heidegger, 1989a, p.343).
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is hidden as well (because it is not an entity and, as such, it cannot appear). The truth
of BeyngMET, namely the event according to which BeyngMET is an entity and not,
is that BeyngMET is covered and, at the same time, uncovered. BeyngMET is hidden
and, at the same time, not. As Heidegger claims, the truth of BeyngMET “veils and, at
the same time, unveils” BeyngMET (Heidegger, 1967, p.149).
Now, as we have seen, Heidegger believes that a proposition is true if it is in ac-
cordance with what is not hidden (or with what is uncovered) and that a proposition
is false if it is in accordance with what is hidden (or with what is covered). It follows
that, since BeyngMET is not hidden or uncovered (because it is an entity and, as such,
it appears ‘under the light’) and since BeyngMET is hidden or covered (because it is
not an entity and, as such, it does not appear ‘under the light’), a proposition such as
the ontological difference (‘BeyngMET is not an entity’) is both true (because it is in
accordance with what is not hidden or uncovered) and false (because it is in accordance
with what is hidden or covered). Heidegger is explicit about this: “the truth is non-truth
[or the un-truth]. (. . . ) The truth is, at the same time, the un-truth” (Heidegger, 1989a,
p.340).
Abandoning the Heideggerian metaphor, it is easy to see how Aletheia works if we
consider the ontological difference. According to Heidegger, the ontological difference,
namely ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’, is true. However, since we refer to BeyngMET
in saying that BeyngMET is not an entity and since everything we refer to in an entity,
BeyngMET is an entity as well. Moreover, since BeyngMET is an entity, the ontological
difference is false. Thus, the ontological difference is true and false. In other words, the
truth of the ontological difference is its un-truth (cf. Heidegger, 1989a, p. 324) because
what is true about BeyngMET (namely the fact that BeyngMET itself is not an entity)
is false as well.
Heidegger is aware that this new account of truth looks “like a dragging up of forcibly
contrived paradoxes” (Heidegger, 1967, p.149). As BeyngMET is hidden and not hidden
at the same time, the ontological difference is true and false at the same time. However,
it is also the case that this understanding of truth (Aletheia) has to be rejected only
by people that endorse the two wrong accounts of negation previously discussed. In
Heidegger’s words:
[such an account of truth,] paradoxical only for ordinary doxa (opinion), is to be
renounced. But surely for those who know about such matters, the ‘non-’ of the
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primordial non-essence of truth, as untruth, points to the still unexperienced domain
of the truth of Being (not merely of beings) (Heidegger, 1967, p.149).
One possible interpretation of this passage is the following: Heidegger seems to sug-
gest that his account of truth (Aletheia) needs to be neglected if and only if we work
with the two wrong understandings of negation previously discussed, which, according
to Heidegger himself, are wrong. First of all, as we have already seen, these two under-
standings of negation would either cancel out the content of a contradiction or forbid us
to accept contradictions tout court. This idea is incompatible with Heidegger’s account
of BeyngMET because, according to the Ereignis∗, BeyngMET is an entity and not an
entity. Secondly, according to the two common understandings of negation, truth and
falsity are exclusive and exhaustive and, of course, this is not compatible with Heideg-
ger’s Aletheia, where there are propositions (such as the ontological difference) which are
both true and false.
Heidegger himself is explicit in pointing out that the crucial step in accepting Aletheia
as the truth of BeyngMET consists in adopting the third account of negation. On the
one hand, the negation contained in A-letheia, namely the negation contained in ‘what is
not hidden’, should not be interpreted as ‘cancellation’ or ‘dissolution’ because Heidegger
wants to hold the position according to which it is true that BeyngMET itself is hidden
(because it is not an entity and, thus, it cannot appear as such) and not hidden (because
it is an entity and, thus, it appears as such). According to the negation understood as
‘cancellation’ or ‘dissolution’, this contradiction has no content at all. Nevertheless, as we
have seen before, Heidegger holds the view that exactly the content of this contradiction
is true. Secondly, the negation used in A-letheia (namely in ‘what is not hidden’) cannot
be interpreted as ‘rejection’ either because, on the contrary of what classical negation
would allow, from the fact that BeyngMET is not hidden, Heidegger does not want to
infer that BeyngMET is not hidden only and, vice versa, from the fact that BeyngMET
is hidden, Heidegger does not want to infer that BeyngMET is hidden only. Once again,
the Ereignis∗ is that conicidentia oppositorum of ‘being hidden’ and ‘not being hidden’,
which is unacceptable given a classical account of negation. Finally, Heidegger appeals
to the third kind of negation. Since Heidegger’s negation affirms and rejects at the same
time (since it says ‘yes’ and ‘no’), what is ‘not hidden’ (namely BeyngMET itself) is
both hidden and not hidden.
This is also the reason why, according to his account of truth, Heidegger claims that
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“untruth is not plain falsity” (Heidegger, 1967, p.149). Since the negation contained in
‘un-truth’ is Heidegger’s notion of negation, ‘untruth’ both ‘accepts’ and ‘rejects’ truth.
This means that an ‘un-true’ proposition is not true only because it is also false; vice
versa, an ‘un-true’ proposition is not false only because it is also true. What is ‘un-true’
is both true and false. As Heidegger himself claims, “the primordial non-essence of truth,
as un-truth, points to (. . . ) the truth of being [BeyngMET]” (Heidegger, 1967, p.149).
Adopting the concept of Aletheia, the ontological difference is un-true. The proposition
‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ is true (because this is the assumption Heidegger works
with) and it is false (because, as we have seen, BeyngMET is an entity too). The
proposition ‘BeyngMET is not an entity’ is neither true only nor false only. It is both
true and false. In Heidegger’s terminology, it is un-true.
Chapter 3
Außersein
Overview. In this chapter, we run a comparison between Alexius Meinong and Martin Hei-
degger. We show that the ontologies developed by these two philosophers have some important
features in common. We compare Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account
of intentionality. We also show that there are important similarities between Heidegger’s account
of entities and Meinong’s account of objects. Finally, we draw a comparison between Heidegger’s
BeyngMET and Meinong’s Außersein.
Before continuing, I would like to make a short clarification. The present chapter does not
want to fully assimilate Meinong’s view to Heidegger’s view. It simply aims to show that, as
does Heidegger, Meinong faces a denotational paradox in the case of defective objects. It also
suggests that Meinong can adopt a dialetheic solution to the problem represented by defective
objects, following the second Heidegger.
Structure. In Section 2.1, we discuss Meinong’s account of intentionality (2.1.1) and Meinong’s
ontology (2.1.2 and 2.1.3). In Section 2.2, we introduce Heidegger’s account of intentionality
(2.2.1) and Heidegger’s ontology (2.2.2 and 2.2.3). In Section 2.3, we propose a comparison
between Meinong and Heidegger, discussing both their analogies and disanalogies. Finally, in
Section 2.4, we argue that Heidegger’s BeyngMET can be understood as an extreme case of
Meinong’s ontology.
53
54 CHAPTER 3. AUßERSEIN
3.1 Enter Meinong
3.1.1 Meinong’s Intentionalität
According to Meinong, intentionality is that specific feature of cognition which distin-
guishes psychological events from non-psychological events.1 Intentionality is that fun-
damental feature according to which any mental state is always directed towards an
object and, as such, any mental state necessarily requires the object towards which it is
directed. It also follows that whatever can be a target of a mental activity is indeed an
object [Gegenstand ]. As Meinong writes, this account of intentionality is so intuitive that
“no one fails to recognize that psychological events so very commonly have this distinc-
tive ‘character of being directed to something’ [auf etwas Gerichtetsein]” (Meinong, 1904,
p.77). For instance, “knowing is impossible without something being known, (. . . ) judge-
ments and ideas or presentations are impossible without being judgements about and
presentation of something” (Meinong, 1904, p.76). More complex psychological states,
as in the case of emotions and desires, do not constitute an exception: “we are happy
about something and, at least in the majority of cases, do not wish without wishing for
something” (Meinong, 1904, p.77).
According to this intuition, Meinong’s account of intentionality is grounded on two
main components: a mental state directed towards an object and the object towards
which the mental state is directed. Consider the following case: X thinks about Y . Such
an intentional activity is composed of two elements: X’s mental state that is directed to-
wards Y and an intentional object Y towards which the mental state is directed. Meinong
focuses his attention on both of these components, proposing an account of psychological
states and an account of intentional objects. Let’s start with the first one.
Even though Meinong is clearly concerned with what is commonly called intention-
ality [Intentionalität ], he never uses this term. Not only does Meinong endorse the idea
that we can be intentionally directed towards the very same object by different kinds
of mental activities but he also believes that we can have different kinds of intentional
activities directed towards different kinds of objects. Indeed, as we can see from the next
table, according to Meinong, there are two types of mental experience [Erlebnis]: the
intellectual one and the emotional one. The intellectual experience is divided into repre-
1It is common to find this idea in many other philosophers, such as Brentano, Husserl and Sartre.
For more details, see Crane (1998) and chapter 6 of Voltolini (2009).
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sentation [Vorstellung ] and thought [Gedanke], while the emotional experience is divided
into feeling [Gefühl ] and desire [Begehren]. Each type of mental experience has a different
kind of content. Concerning the intellectual experience, the content of a representation is
called objectum [Objekt ] and it is expressed by a noun or an adjective, while the content
of a thought is called objective [Objecktiv ] and it concerns one or more representations.
An objective can be expressed by an independent sentence (for instance, ‘red is a color’),
by a ‘that’-clause (for instance, ‘that red is a color’) or by a nominal phrase (for instance,
‘the colorfulness of red’). Concerning the emotional experience, the content of a feeling
is called dignitative [Dignitativ ] (for instance, ‘the attractiveness of the color red’) and
the content of a desire is called desiderative [Desiderativ ] (for instance, ‘this fruit should
be red’).2
Mental experience [Erlebnis]
Intellectual Emotional
Representation
[Vorstellung]
Thought
[Gedanke]
Feeling
[Gefuhl]
Desire
[Begehren]
Objectum
[Object]
Objective
[Objektiv]
Dignitative
[Dignitativ]
Desiderative
[Desiderativ]
«Red» «Red is a colour»
«The attractiveness
of the colour red»
«This fruit
should be red»
For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to point out that, according to
Meinong, objecta and objectives necessarily involve each other. On the one hand, when-
ever we represent the objectum ‘red’, we think something about it (for instance, we think
that ‘red is a color’ or ‘red is something’). In both cases, in order to represent the ob-
jectum ‘red’, we think about it using objectives. On the other hand, it is not possible to
think about something without any representation at all. For instance, when we think
2Meinong’s ideas about intentionality are highly controversial and there are a lot of different inter-
pretations available on the market. However, the basic features of Meinong’s intentionality presented in
this chapter are commonly accepted as true. For a more detailed discussion about the topic, see Marek
(2001) and Ryle (1973).
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about the objective ‘red is a color’, we employ the representation of the objectum ‘color’
and the representation of objectum ‘red’. As Kalsi points out: “An objective (. . . ) can
only be in virtue of its inferiora, namely the objects [objecta] on which it is based” (Kalsi,
1980, p.122).3 This means that it is possible to have objectives only because they are
grounded on some basic components (namely Kalsi’s inferiora), which are objecta. This
is also the reason why, even though objecta and objectives involve each other, it is neces-
sary to carefully distinguish between them because, according to Meinong, an objective
may be the subject matter of further objectives but an objective is always grounded on
objecta. Consider the following statement: “red is a color’ is a beautiful objective’. In
this case, the subject matter of the objective in question (namely “red is a color’ is a
beautiful objective’) is another objective (namely ‘red is a color’); however, ultimately,
these objectives are grounded in objecta (for instance, ‘red’, ‘color’, ‘objective’).
To conclude, not only there are different kinds of intentional acts but, for each of
these acts, there are different kinds of objects as well. However, objecta, objectives,
dignitatives and desideratives are all intentional objects. They are all Gegenstände.
3.1.2 Meinong’s Gegenstand
Given this account of intentionality, what is an intentional object (namely a Gegenstand)?
What is the metaphysical structure of an intentional object à la Meinong? According to
Meinong, whatever can be experienced in any way is an object. Some objects have being
[Sein] and some objects do not. Moreover, since he admits two different ways or modes
of being (namely existence and subsistence), he is an ontological pluralist. Following
Kris McDaniel (2009), we take ontological pluralism to be the view according to which
different objects can be (or exist) in different ways.4 Meinong holds the following view:
objects that are spatio-temporally located (for instance, the Empire State Building in
New York) both exist and subsist, while objects that still have a certain mode of being
3Someone may have the following question: what does ‘an objective can only be in virtue of its
inferiora’ mean, when some objectives have no being at all? This kind of worry seems to suggest
that, if an objective does not have being, then the objective in question cannot be in virtue of their
inferiora. However, I believe that, according to Meinong, all objectives subsist (as numbers, statements
and propositions), even though they are about objects that do not have being at all. See Meinong, 1917.
4Among neo-meinongians, the pluralistic element concerning being has almost vanished. For instance,
both Priest (2005) and Routley (1980) think that existence has a monistic meaning, while Parsons simply
remains neutral avoiding the issue (cf. 1980, p.10).
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without being spatio-temporal located (for instance, a mathematical object such as a
prime number) subsist only.5 If an object exists, then it necessarily subsists but not all
objects that subsist necessarily exist (cf. Marek, 2013).6 Finally, an object without any
kind of being (for instance, a fictional object such as Sherlock Holmes) neither exists nor
subsists.
Since it is possible to direct psychological activities towards something with being in
the mode of existence (for instance, the computer that I am using right now), then some
intentional objects exist. Since it is possible to direct psychological activities towards
something with being in the mode of subsistence (for instance, a Fourier transformation),
then some intentional objects subsist. Finally, since it is possible to direct psychologi-
cal activities towards something that does not have being at all (for instance, fictional
characters such as Sherlock Holmes or Father Christmas), then some intentional objects
neither exist nor subsist. In this last case, Meinong claims that an object without any
mode of being has non-being [Nichtsein]. As all objects with being, all objects with
non-being (all non-beings, using Marek’s terminology (cf. Marek, 2013, p.12), or non-
entities, using Routley’s terminology (cf. Routely, 1980, p.7)) are welcomed in Meinong’s
ontology.7 Being is treated as a property (the property of being existent or the property
5Among neo-meinongians, the situation is more complicated. For instance, in his Nonexistent Objects
(1980), Parsons works with a naïve understanding of ‘existence’, using “the word ‘exists’ so that it
encompasses exactly those objects that orthodox philosophers hold to exist” (Parsons, 1980, p.11). Zalta
is very close to the definition given by Meinong himself claiming that existing is being located in space
(cf. Zalta, 1988, p.21). Last but not least, Priest, in Towards non-being (2005), suggests the relation
between existence and causal efficacy. However, in paragraph 7.2 of the same book, he also recognizes
a relation between existence and being concrete. Finally, in Not to be (2009), Priest discusses a relation
between existence and being spatio-temporally located.
6In private conversation, both Francesco Berto and Kris McDaniel claimed that Meinong supports
a different view. They claimed that, according to Meinong, existence and subsistence are opposite. In
other words, if something exists, it does not subsist; if something subsists, it does not exist. They are
not wrong about this. However, we should not forget that this is correct for the very early production of
Meinong (for instance, On Assumptions, 1902), while, in the present chapter, I am only concerned with
his late production. This is why, appealing to The Theory of Object and On Possibility and Probability,
I claim that, according to Meinong, everything that exists subsists, while not everything that subsists
exists as well.
7The analogy between Meinong’s intentional objects instantiating non-being and Routley’s non-
entities is proposed by Marek (2013). However, this analogy may be misleading because, as we have
claimed in footnote number 3 of the present chapter, Routley does not endorse any distinction between
existence and subsistence. This means that, according to Routley, there are non-entities (namely objects
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of being subsistent) and this property is instantiated by some objects (existent or subsis-
tent objects) and not by others (objects that neither exist nor subsistent). Non-being is
treated as a property as well and it is instantiated by some objects (objects that neither
exist nor subsist) and not by some other objects (namely existent or subsistent objects).
Among all these objects with and without being, there are all kinds of weird objects:
not only are there my laptop and Father Christmas but, for instance, there are also
impossibilia, which are objects with inconsistent properties such as the square triangle.
As we have already explained, in Meinong’s terms, all these objects are objects because
they can be a target of a mental activity: we can imagine Sherlock Holmes, remember
my computer and we can argue about a square triangle. Of course, Sherlock Holmes, my
laptop and the square triangle are very different objects; still, they are objects. They are
Gegenstände.8
Meinong’s ontology can accommodate such a vast range of objects because it is
grounded on two main principles. [1] First of all, he endorses the Principle of In-
dependence which states that the existence or subsistence of an object is independent
from all the other properties that this object has. In other words, any object has the
properties that this object has regardless its ontological status. As Marek reports: “Such
principle applies, not only to objects which do not exist in fact, but also to objects which
could not exist because they are impossible. Not only is the much heralded gold moun-
tain made of gold, but the round square is as surely round as it is square” (Marek, 2013,
p.12). [2] Secondly, he endorses the Principle of Indifference (also called Principle of
Außersein) according to which “the pure object stands beyond being and non-being”
(Marek, 2013, p.13). This means that both being (namely, having existence or subsis-
tence) and non-being are not part of the object’s nature – they do not represent what
really constitutes the essence of an object. The ontological status of an object does not
instantiating non-being) that, according to Meinong, subsist. For instance, according to Routley (2003),
mathematical objects, such as numbers, are non-entities (namely entities that do not instantiate any
mode of being); nonetheless, according to Meinong, mathematical objects are subsistent entities (which
means that they instantiate a mode of being). The analogy seems to break down.
8It is difficult to establish if Meinong thought that inconsistent objects (such as impossibilia) require
a switch from classical logic to paraconsistent logic. According to Routley (1980), it is possible to
interpret Meinong both in a classical way or in a paraconsistent way. Among neo-meinongians, both
Parsons (1980) and Zalta (1988) have developed a consistent version of Meinongianism, while Priest
(2005) and Routley (1980) have developed a version of Meinongianism which is friendly towards genuinely
inconsistent objects.
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affect what an object is. As Findlay specifies (1963, p.49), from this principle, it does not
follow that an object can neither instantiate being nor non-being because, according to
the law of excluded middle which Meinong seems to subscribe, every object necessarily
has either being or non-being.
From these two principles, it naturally follows a radical denial of the Quinean idea
that there are no true statements about objects instantiating non-being. Since Meinong
develops an ontology which is friendly towards objects instantiating non-being, he also
wants to be able to state true things about them. Meinong aims to have an ontology
where, even though Sherlock Holmes neither exists nor subsists, it is still true that
Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Indeed, according to the characterization principle (CP ),
any object has the properties that it is characterized as having. For any characterization,
an object which satisfies that characterization is in the domain of discourse. Not only
is CP (or, at least, the so-called naïve form of it) regarded as a crucial principle for
Meinong but, in its updated versions, CP is also the main commitment for all the
contemporary developments of Meinongianism (cf. Parsons, 1980; Routley, 1980; Zalta,
1988; Priest, 2005). This is the reason why, since the naïve version of CP was vulnerable
to many different objections, both Meinong and contemporary neo-meinongians have
devoted much efforts to revise it.9 Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present chapter,
it is not necessary to discuss in details all the versions of CP recently developed by
neo-meinongians. It is enough to say that, for all of them, CP ensures that even objects
without being have (at least, in some sense) the properties that they are characterized
as having. As I have claimed in ‘Nonexistent Objects as Truth-Makers: Against Crane’s
Reductionism’ (2016), the fact that all objects (regardless their ontological status) have
the properties that they are described as having is an essential feature of all different
forms of (neo-)Meinongianism.
9Some neo-meinongians (cf. Parsons (1980); Routley (1980)) claim that, distinguishing nuclear and
extra-nuclear properties, CP must be applied to characterizations which contain only nuclear properties.
Some other neo-meinongians (cf. Zalta 1988) claim that there are two different ways of having properties:
encoding and exemplifying. According to them, a nonexistent object encodes all the property it is
characterized as having but does not exemplify them. Finally, another group of neo-meinongians (cf.
Priest 2005; Berto 2013, Chap.6.3) claims that an object has all the properties it is charactered as having
not necessarily in the actual world but in some possible or impossible worlds. In my ‘The Future Perfect
of Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond ’ (forthcomingb), I show that Routley was developing a new
CP similar to the one defended by Priest and Berto. Unfortunately, he died before having the possibility
of publishing his ideas about it.
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According to the Principle of Independence, the properties instantiated by an
object are independent from its ontological status. The properties instantiated by an
object compose the Sosein of the object itself.10 An object has its Sosein and whatever
has a Sosein is an object. If it possible to refer to X, X is an object; if X is an object, X
has properties; if X has properties, X has a Sosein collecting these properties. Moreover,
since being is treated as a property, the Sosein of an object with being contains all
the properties instantiated by that object. Among these properties, there is also being
(namely either being existent or being subsistent). On the contrary, the Sosein of an
object without being contains all the properties instantiated by that object. Among
these properties, there is the property of non-being.
We can schematically explain this idea in the following way. As the table below
shows, an object (represented by the first row from the top) has a Sosein (represented
by the second row in the table). As we can see, in the Sosein, there are properties ([P1]
. . . [Pn]) instantiated by the object in question. Given Meinong, since all objects either
instantiate being or non-being, in the Sosein, there is either Sein, in the mode of exis-
tence or subsistence, or Nichtsein (see the table below, between [P1] and [P4]).
Object [Gegenstand ]
[P1]
[P2]
Sein (Existence or Subsistence) or Nichtsein
[P4]
[Pn]
Outside-Being [Außersein]
Consider my laptop: it is an existent object and, in its Sosein, it has all the properties
that my laptop has (for instance, [P1] being grey, [P2] being metallic, [P4] being old).
10We are aware that the properties contained in the Sosein of an object change according to the CP in
use. For instance, if we work with Parsons’ version of CP , namely the CP applied to characterizations
which contain only nuclear properties, the Sosein contains only nuclear properties too. Since we are
discussing the most basic form of Meinongianism (called naïve Meinongianism), we take Sosein to collect
all the properties that an object instantiates without any restriction or constrain.
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Since my laptop is spatio-temporally located and, thus, it exists, it is also the case that
its Sosein contains that specific mode of being, which is represented by the property of
being existent. Moreover, since existence always implies subsistence, my laptop subsists
too. Secondly, consider a prime number. In the Sosein of this object, there are some
properties too. For instance, there are the properties of [P1] being a number and [P2]
being prime. Moreover, since, following Meinong, mathematical objects subsist but do
not exist, in the Sosein of a prime number, there is the property of being subsistent
too. Finally, consider a trickier example, namely Sherlock Holmes. According to Doyle’s
stories, he is a detective, he is smart and he lives in Baker Street. In a Meinongian
framework, Sherlock Holmes’ Sosein contains all the properties that Sherlock Holmes
has (for instance, [P1] being a detective, [P2] being smart, [P4] being resident in Baker
Street and so on). This last example is unusual because, according to Doyle’s stories,
Sherlock Holmes exists. This means that, following naïve Meinong, in Sherlock Holmes’
Sosein, there must be the property of being existent. However, this is clearly not the case
because there is no such object as an existent Sherlock Holmes. This problem has been
solved by neo-meinongians developing different kinds of CP .11
Even though different neo-meinongians endorse different versions of the character-
ization principle, the interpretation of Meinong’s ontology presented above is widely
accepted. Nevertheless, as we can see from the previous table (third line from the top),
there is a further element in Meinong’s ontology. Indeed, he thinks that all objects have
outside-being [Außersein]. The interpretation of this last element is controversial.
3.1.3 Meinong’s Außersein
Digging into the secondary literature, it is possible to find four different accounts of
Außersein.
[1] The most common account is a deflationary one. People endorsing this stance focus
11For instance, consider Parsons’ CP , according to which, in the Sosein of an object, there are only
nuclear properties. Since, according to Parsons himself, the property of being existent is not a nuclear
property, such a property is not in Sherlock Holmes’ Sosein. Another example is Priest’s CP , according
to which an object has the properties that it is characterized as having, but not necessarily in the actual
world. This means that Sherlock Holmes’ Sosein contains the property of being existent, but in a possible
world. Both strategies are meant to solve the problem faced by naïve Meinong.
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on the Principle of Außersein without discussing what Außersein is.12 Nevertheless,
it is natural to think that any ‘principle of X’ concerns X without being X. As the New-
tonian law of gravity is not gravity but it is about gravity, the principle of Außersein is
not Außersein but it is about Außersein. Even though, the two concepts look intuitively
related, they are still different. Meinong himself is very careful in keeping the two ideas
apart: on the one hand, he talks about a principle which is concerned with the Außersein
of a ‘pure object’ [Der Satz vom Außersein des reinen Gegenstandes]; on the other hand,
he talks about Außersein itself using this expression as a noun-phrase independently
from the principle grounded in it. Moreover, given the Meinongian assumption that ev-
ery time there is an intentional act, this act is directed towards an object, Außersein
has to be an object too. Indeed, Meinong himself talks and thinks about it. Thus, if
one is interested in understanding what this object called Außersein is, the deflationary
account is not helpful.
[2]An alternative approach to outside-being [Außersein] is proposed by Grossman (1973).13
According to him, Außersein, namely what is outside being, is being and non-being. He
starts considering an object A, which has being. He thinks that, following Meinong, we
are committed to say that there is a ‘pure object’ A and a certain objective A* concerning
object A. However, Grossman specifies that, even though the objective A* consists in the
union of A and A’s being, there is no such object as A with its own being: A is nothing
more than A itself (without the addition of A’s being). After that, Grossman invites us
to consider the very same object A but, this time, without being. This means that A
has non-being. Once again, the objective which represents A with non-being (let’s call it
-A*) consists in the union of A and A’s non-being. Nevertheless, there is no such object
as A and its own non-being because, as Grossman has claimed before, A is nothing more
than A itself (without the addition of A’s non-being). In other words, to say that A has
being is not to say that an object called being is a part of A. In the same way, to say that
12As Rapaport (1984), Routley (1980) and Parsons (1980) pointed out, the Meinongian notion of
Außersein has never been taken into great consideration. According to them, Meinong’s Theory of
object is often used to criticize the Quinean intuition according to which everything exists. And this is
the reason why, all neo-meinongians have uniquely focused their attention on the concept of Sein and
Nichtsein.
13As Routley has pointed out in some unpublished notes (Sylvan, Box 23), Grossman’s interpretation
of Außersein is unclear. I agree with Routley. What follows is the best we could do to make sense of it.
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A has non-being is not to say that an object called non-being is part of A. According to
Grossman, “[existence and subsistence] cannot be parts of objects” because, since they
are literally outside being, “there are no such entities [namely objects] as existence and
subsistence. They can [only] be parts of objectives” (Grossman, 1973, p.48). In the same
way, non-being cannot be part of an object because there is no such object as non-being.
Grossman is also clear that ‘being a part of’ means ‘being an ontological constituent
of’ an object. For instance, being red is part of a red object because it constitutes the
redness of the object in question.
To see why Grossman’s interpretation is implausible, let’s start by pointing out that
the expression “there are no such entities [namely objects] as existence and subsistence” is
highly ambiguous. To begin with, it can be interpreted as ‘existence and subsistence are
not entities [namely objects]’. If this is the case, Grossman’s interpretation of Außersein
is incompatible with Meinong’s account of intentionality according to which every time we
refer to something, we refer to an object. Since we can refer to existence and subsistence
(since, for instance, I can say that ‘existence is a property’ and that ‘subsistence is
different from existence’), they have to be objects too. According to Meinong, this is
enough to state that being (in both the modes of existence and subsistence) is an object.
The same holds for non-being. At this point, either Meinong is so naïve as to violate
his own premises or he actually thinks that everything we refer to is an object but that
being (in the mode of existence and substance) and non-being are somehow exceptions.
In the first case, if we believe in the principle of charity, namely the principle according
to which is always better to have interpretations that maximize the rationality of what
the interpreted author thinks or writes, then Grossman’s interpretation does not look
charitable at all. In the second case, according to Grossman, Meinong seems to make an
ad hoc move just to guarantee the fact that, since being and non-being are not objects
themselves, they cannot be part of any object either. Not only is this move unjustified
(Meinong and Grossman do not explicitly propose any argument in favor of it) but it is
difficult to see why, according to Grossman, being (existence or subsistence) and non-
being cannot be part of an object but they can be part of objectives. This interpretation
does not look convincing.
Then, let’s try to examine a second possible reading which interprets the proposition
“there are no such entities [namely objects] as being and subsistence” as ‘entities [namely
objects] like being and subsistence do not have being’. Once again, the same would hold
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for non-being. In Meinongian terms, this means that being and non-being neither exist
nor subsist. In this sense, being and non-being are Außersein – they are literally outside
being. Being and non-being do not have being. This second interpretation cannot be
philosophically accurate because, even assuming that being cannot be part of an object
in virtue of the fact that neither exists nor subsists, then, not only being (which is either
being existent or being subsistent), but also all the other properties (such as being red or
being sweet) should not be part of an object either. According to this view, the properties
being red and being sweet can not be part of a red sweet object and, thus, given Gross-
man’s definition of ‘being part of’, they can not constitute the redness or the sweetness of
this object. This second interpretation, as the previous one, contradicts another funda-
mental assumption of Meinong’s theory of objects according to which objects, regardless
of their ontological status, have the properties that they are characterized as having.14
In Meinongian terms, objects always have a Sosein collecting the properties that these
objects are characterized as having. Once again, this interpretation does not seem correct.
[3] The third account of Außersein is proposed by Lambert in his Meinong and the
Principle of Independence (1983). According to Lambert, Außersein refers to the do-
main of nonexistent objects which is “literally, the domain of objects outside of being”
(1983, p.14). As he points out, such a domain is enormous and, among its denizens, it
comprehends “possible objects such as Pegasus or the golden mountain and also impossi-
ble objects such as the round square” (1983, p.22). In this case, Außersein is understood
as the set of all objects with Sosein that do not contain being: Außersein is taken to
be the set of all objects that do not instantiate either the property of being existent or
the property of being subsistent. Nevertheless, this interpretation also faces some prob-
14According to Grossman, being and not-being are not constitutive part of an object (they are not in
the Sosein of an object) because they neither exist nor subsist. However, since, according to Meinong,
being and not-being are just normal properties, it is plausible to assume that, if being and not-being are
not constitutive part of an object, then all the other properties are not constitutive part of an object
either. This is against Meinong’s Theory of Objects, which claims that an object has the properties that
it is characterized as having. In order to make this point clearer, consider the following example. It is
true that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ because Sherlock Holmes instantiates the property of being a
detective. This means that the property of being a detective is a constitutive part of Sherlock Holmes’
Sosein. Given what we have argued before about Grossman’s interpretation, this cannot be true because,
from his account of Außersein, it follows that no properties can be constitutive part of the Sosein of an
object.
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lems. Since, according to Meinong, all objects have Außersein (cf. Meinong, 1904, p.
83-86; Meinong, 1917, p. 19; Marek, 2013) and even assuming that we can charitably
interpret Meinong’s idea as ‘any object is a member of Außersein’, Meinong immediately
becomes a nihilist. If every object is a member of Außersein and Außersein is the set of
all nonexistent objects, it follows that all objects are nonexistent objects. If we assume
this interpretation of Außersein, we have to accept that there are no existent objects at
all. This conclusion is evidently against Meinong’s ontology according to which, even
though some objects do not exist (even though, in the Sosein of some objects, there is
non-being), some objects exist and some other subsist. In other words, in the Sosein of
some other objects, there is being.
[4] The fourth account interprets Außersein as what makes an object an object. Re-
cently, two philosophers have supported this idea in two similar ways: Jacquette and
Priest.
Let’s start with Jacquette. Following Lambert, in his Alexius Meinong, the Shepherd
of Non-Being (2015), Jacquette thinks that Außersein is a set or a domain of objects.
However, Jacquette disagrees with Lambert, on the idea that Außersein collects nonex-
istent objects because, according to his interpretation, Meinong’s Außersein is not a
notion concerned with ontological issues. “Außersein is not a special kind of Sein [and
it is not a special kind of Nichtsein either]” because “[it] is not a subcategory of the
ontology” (2015, p. 71). Jacquette reads Außersein as the set of all objects regardless of
whether these objects have being or non-being. Außersein is simply “the name Meinong
later gives to what he speaks (. . . ) as the pure object [reiner Gegenstand ] considered
independently of its ontic status” (Jacquette, 2015, p. 71). According to Jacquette, all
objects, only in virtue the fact they instantiate the property of being an object, belong to
Außersein which is “an ontologically neutral referential domain that falls entirely outside
the ontology of existent or subsistent entities, as existed intended objects or intended
objects with being. (. . . ) Außersein as ‘extraontology” ’ (2015, p. 71).
This interpretation is consistent with Meinong’s ontology. Since Meinong himself
claims that all objects have Außersein, but only some objects have being, it is natural
to think that there is a set collecting all objects, whatever their ontological status is.
Jacquette calls this set ‘Außersein’. Nevertheless, someone may be suspicious towards
Jacquette’s interpretation because Meinong never talks about sets or domains. On the
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contrary, he is clear that Außersein is something that all objects have, possess or, so to
speak, instantiate (cf. Meinong 1904). In Meinong’s words, “Außersein seems clearly
predicable to all objects” (Meinong, 1917, p.19). An object does not have, possess or
instantiate a set or a domain but, more correctly, it is a member of a set or it belongs
to a domain. For this reason, it would be more natural to read Außersein as a property
that all objects possess or instantiate. Such an interpretation is delivered by Priest in
his Sein Language (2014c).
Priest interprets Meinong’s idea that any object has Außersein as “any object is
simply an object” (Priest, 2014c, p.439). Thus, Außersein is understood simply as the
property of being an object. If something is an object, it instantiates the property of
being an object – it has Außersein. Meinong himself seems to support this interpretation
claiming that: “even what neither exists nor subsists (. . . ) has still a remnant of a
positional character, [that is] Außersein” (Meinong, 1983, p.12). Here, Meinong suggests
that, regardless of the ontological status of an object, for any object, there is always
something contributing to its ‘positional character’, namely something that makes any
object an object ‘present’ to the consciousness of a subject. This something is Außersein.
Since, according to Meinong, being present to a subject consciousness means being an
(intentional) object, Außersein is what makes an object an object – it is the objecthood
of an object. Moreover, since everything that has properties is an object and having
properties is having a Sosein, then if something has Außersein (if something is an object),
it has properties too (it has a Sosein). Having Außersein is equivalent to having Sosein:
since Außersein is a property, even an object which has only the property of Außersein
would have a Sosein containing, at least, one property, that is the property of being an
object. Priest also adds that “if something is an object it is self-identical (Identitätsein)
and vice versa” (Priest, 2014c, p. 439). Thus, everything that is an object instantiates
some properties (or, at least, the only property of being an object) and everything that
instantiates at least a property has a Sosein. Moreover, everything that is an object
instantiates the property of being an object (namely Außersein) and everything that
instantiates the property of being an object is self-identical. Everything that is an object
has Außersein and it is self-identical.15
15Someone can argue that Priest’s account of Außersein treats Außersein as a third mode of being
and this is explicitly denied by Meinong (for instance, see Grossman (1974)). However, this objection is
wrong because, according to Priest, Außersein is not a mode of being but it is the necessary condition
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Assuming Priest’s account of Außersein, and going beyond what Meinong has explic-
itly claimed, some interesting remarks could follow. Indeed, Außersein is a metaphys-
ically fundamental property, an ur-property. We take an ur-property to be a property
the instantiation of which is entailed by any other property. Consider the property of
being red. This is not an ur-property because its instantiation is not entailed by the
instantiation of the property of being a car. Indeed, we can have cars that are not red.
However, the property of being an object is an ur-property because the instantiation of
any property entails its instantiation. In order, for something, to be red, green, tall or
heavy, this something has to be a thing, namely an object, in the first place. Moreover,
according to Meinong, it is enough for something to have a property in order to be an
object. If something has a Sosein (if something has properties), it is an object. If some-
thing is an object, it trivially has Außersein, namely it trivially has the property of being
an object. From this point of view, Außersein is that ur -property the instantiation of
which is always and necessarily entailed by any other property. In the rest of the present
chapter, we will assume Priest’s interpretation of Außersein.
3.2 Enter Heidegger
3.2.1 Heidegger’s Intentionalität
If Meinong clearly develops a philosophy of psychology and an ontological account of
intentional objects, Heidegger does not have such a clear-cut distinction between these
two aspects of his work. Nevertheless, as I argue in ‘The Recent Engagement between
Analytic Philosophy and Heidegger’s Thought: Metaphysics and Mind’ (forthcominga),
he undoubtedly gives significant contributions to both fields of research. Let’s begin with
the first one.
Even though the expression ‘intentionality’ is largely absent in the Heideggerian cor-
pus, Heidegger is deeply concerned with this topic as well. Indeed, in his History of the
concept of time, he claims that ‘intentionality’ is one of the “decisive discoveries of phe-
nomenology” that he has assumed in developing his own metaphysics (Heidegger, 1989b,
p.3). Since both Meinong and Heidegger started their research from Brentano, their
to have any mode of being. In order to be an existent or a subsistent object, it is necessary to be an
object.
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accounts of intentionality share two main features.16 [1] First of all, as with Meinong,
Heidegger thinks that an intentional activity is always directed towards something. This
is why Heidegger claims that “[intentional] comportments have the structure of directing-
oneself-towards, of being-directed-towards [something]” (Heidegger, 1975, p. 57). [2]
Secondly, Heidegger shares with Meinong the idea that intentionality is a “comport-
ment” which is always “directed towards this whereto: in formal terms, it is related or
referred to an entity” (Heidegger, 1975, p. 62). Then, an intentional activity requires
two relata: a subject’s comportment directed towards an object and the object towards
which the subject’s comportment is directed. Heidegger calls this second relatum ‘entity’
[Gegenstand ].17 As we have explained in chapter 1, according to Heidegger, an entity is
“what[ever] is put in front of the perception, the imagination, the judgement, the desire
and the intuition” (Heidegger, 1967, p.28). Consistently with Meinong, Heidegger thinks
that every time we refer to something with an intentional activity (for example, with our
thoughts, imagination or emotional states), this something is an (intentional) object or,
in Heidegger’s terms, it is an entity. Even more explicitly, in his Metaphysical Foundation
of Logic, Heidegger claims that “a thought is always a thought about something” because
“each thought is related to a specific entity which is in front of us” (Heidegger, 1978,
p.13).18
Even though there are many similarities between Meinong’s and Heidegger’s account
of intentionality, there is also a significant difference. On the contrary of Meinong,
Heidegger believes that intentional activities are not always concerned with only one
single entity. Dasein∗, namely the human being, has the unique feature of being-in-the-
world [Sein-in-der-Welt ] and the world is the totality of all entities. In other terms, the
16For a complete overview of the relation between Heidegger and Brentano, see the first section, second
chapter of Volpi (2010).
17As we have already claimed in the first footnote of the first chapter, Heidegger uses a lot of different
terms to refer to intentional objects (for instance, ‘entity’, ‘object’ and ‘thing’). All these terms have a
phenomenological different meaning. However, in the present work, we treat all these terms as synonyms.
18I am aware that many Heideggerians are not sympathetic with the idea that intentionality is a
relation between a ‘mental state’ and an entity. However, I believe that, even assuming that Heidegger
disagrees on the fact that intentionality is a relation between a mental state and an entity, he himself
undoubtedly agrees on the fact that ‘comportments’ require something which the comportments are
about (for instance, a hammer, a work of art, or even the world). As such, the paradox of BeyngMET
is still there. Another way of rephrasing such a paradox is the following: even though it should be
impossible to have a comportment towards BeyngMET (because BeyngMET is not an thing), we still
have a comportment towards BeyngMET.
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world contains everything that is. When human beings are directed towards an entity
through an intentional activity, they relate to this entity placing it in a network of other
entities.19 For Dasein∗, an entity is always in relation with other entities. In Heidegger’s
words: “For our [intentional] comportments towards entities, we never think a single
entity, and whenever we size up expressively for itself we are taking it out of a contexture
to which it belongs in the real content” (Heidegger, 1975, p. 31).
Thus, as with Meinong, Heidegger thinks that intentionality is still a relation in which
one of the two relata is an entity. Nevertheless, since the subject of these mental com-
portments (namely Heidegger’s Dasein∗) has the very specific feature of dwelling in the
world as a network of entities, sometimes the human being does not direct his inten-
tional activity towards one entity only, but, metaphorically speaking, the human being
inhabits the relation between the entities themselves. Heidegger thinks that an accurate
phenomenology of Dasein∗’s intentional activities can show this fact: in some specific
circumstances, the human beings do not only deal with entities as they are decontextu-
alized entities, but they also dwell in the relation between them and other entities too
– they are in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein]. It is important to point out that, from the
Heideggerian definition of intentionality, it does not follow that an intentional activity
does not require an entity towards which the activity is directed. It simply means that
an intentional activity is not necessarily a binary relation between a mental state and
an entity, but it can also be a relation between a mental state and some (or even all)
entities in the world. In order to have a better understanding of Heidegger’s account of
intentionality, let’s examine the following table.
19This idea is clear in an example proposed by Dreyfus (1990). Consider musicians. When musicians
play a symphony, they do not only intentionally relate to their instruments but to the beauty of the
symphony, their feelings, the other musicians and so on and so forth. In this sense, according to Heideg-
ger, intentionality is a complex phenomena that does not simply concern a relation with an (intentional)
object only.
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Modes of Encounter
Practical Intellectual
Ready-to-hand Unready-to-hand Present-at-hand
Equipment Equipment / Thing Thing
«Hammer» «Broken Hammer»
«The hammer as
an object of study»
As in the case of Meinong, Heidegger divides intentional activities (namely Dasein∗’s
modes of encountering entities) into two main categories: practical and intellectual ac-
tivities. To begin with, he thinks that, in our everyday life, practical activities are repre-
sented by the encounter with a specific kind of entity called a piece of equipment. In this
case, the intentional activity towards such kind of entity is a “telic one” (Heidegger, 1927,
p.42). As “we do not perceive in order to perceive but in order to (. . . ) pave the way in
dealing with something” (Heidegger, 1927, p.42), in the same way, when we encounter a
piece of equipment, we always encounter it for specific tasks. According to Heidegger, we
do not achieve our most primordial relation with a piece of equipment either by thinking
about it or with some detached theoretical research, but rather by skilfully using it. Only
in this way, is a piece of equipment ready-to-hand, namely as it is ready to be used by
the Dasein∗. Consider a hammer. According to Heidegger, “the less we just stare at the
hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does
our [intentional] relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as
that which it is – as a piece of equipment” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 42). Moreover, as many
interpreters have already pointed out (cf. Dreyfus, 1990; Wheeler, 2011), while engaged
in trouble-free hammering, the really skilled carpenter does not (intentionally) engage
with the hammer only. From this point of view, the skilled carpenter dwells in the world.
Dasein∗’s capacity of using equipments in this skillful way (what Heidegger calls ‘circum-
spection’) is not only grounded on the relation between that subject (the carpenter) and
that entity (the hammer). Even though skilled carpenters have probably thought about
the hammer, the relation between a skilled subject using the hammer and the hammer
itself is more complicated than the simple relation between someone thinking about the
hammer and the hammer. Indeed, skilled carpenters are aware of the deep meaning of
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the hammer because they dwell in the network of all entities in which the hammer is
placed, namely the hammer itself and the nail and the work-bench and the beauty of
what the carpenter is building and . . .
The second kind of intentional activity is the intellectual one. When Dasein∗ engages
in scientific practices, when his or her mental states are devoted purely to reflective or
philosophical contemplation, the object of study is abstract from the world, from the
network of entities. It is isolated and treated as a simple entity of study. For this
reason, following Heidegger, the entity (which is now called ‘thing’ [Ding ]) is not ready-
to-hand but it is present-at-hand. Consider a engineer designing a hammer. In this case,
Dasein∗ intentionally relates with the hammer as something that needs to be studied and
theoretically understood. Dasein∗ does not need to place the hammer in the network of
other entities in order to use it properly because Dasein∗ is not interested in using the
hammer at all. In order to project a hammer is not necessary to be a skillful carpenter:
it is not relevant to dwell in the relation between the hammer and the nail and the
work-bench and the beauty of what the carpenter is building and . . . . An abstract
understanding, which isolates the entity from the world, is enough. In this case, the
hammer is present-at-hand.
Finally, according to Heidegger, among the practical intentional activities, there is
also another phenomenological category which represents the intentional activity directed
towards something that is indeed a piece of equipment but it is a broken one. Dasein∗,
realizing that a piece of equipment malfunctions, is still aware that such a piece of
equipment is not a mere thing, namely it is not simply present-at-hand. It has the
potential of being ready-to-hand. Nonetheless, because such a piece of equipment is
broken, it is not fully ready-to-hand either: it cannot be used. As Heidegger writes: “the
presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-
hand whatsoever; a piece of equipment which is present-at-hand is still not just a thing
which occurs somewhere” (Heidegger, 1927, p.35). In this case, Heidegger thinks that a
broken piece of equipment is unready-to-hand. Consider a broken hammer. Since it is a
hammer, it is a piece of equipment; however, it cannot function as a piece of equipment
because it is broken. Thus, when Dasein∗ intentionally relates to a broken hammer,
Dasein∗ understands that the broken hammer is a piece of equipment without being able
to be used as such.20
20I am aware that there are other possible interpretation of Heidegger’s intentionality on the market.
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In conclusion, it is important to specify that, beside the distinctions between different
kinds of entities and different kinds of intentional activities, Heidegger thinks that, given
any intentional act, there is always an entity corresponding to it. Nevertheless, the
question of the ontological nature of these entities remains open. Concerning this worry
and starting with Being and time (1927), Heidegger develops an ontology, which shows
other significant similarities with Meinong’s metaphysics. Let’s discuss them.21
3.2.2 Heidegger’s Gegenstand
Heidegger’s ontology has three main features in common with Meinong’s theory of ob-
jects. [1] First of all, as we have previously introduced, according to both of them, an
object or an entity is everything we can refer to. In Heideggerian terms: “an entity is what
is represented” (Heidegger, 1967, p.29). [2] Secondly, even though Heidegger does not
introduce any distinction between existence and subsistence, he endorses another version
of ontological pluralism according to which there are different modes of existence. For
instance, on the one hand, some entities have Existenz∗. According to Heidegger (1927),
Existenz∗ is a term that is rooted in the existentialist tradition and it refers to a unique
metaphysical attitude proper of Dasein∗ only. Indeed, the human being is the only kind
of entity that can dwell in the world in the way previously described. As we have dis-
cussed in the first chapter, the human being is also the only kind of entity that can ask the
question of BeingMET (or BeyngMET). On the other hand, some other entities exist
in another way: they have Wirklichkeit∗ which refers to the Latin existentia, namely the
property of being material or the property of being real. According to Heidegger, a table
has Wirklichkeit∗ (in the sense that a table instantiates the property of being material or
For instance, see McDaniel forthcoming. However, in this chapter, we just take into consideration the
most common one.
21It is difficult to find a quotation according to which any intentional state requires an intentional
object (or an entity). However, in his Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, Heidegger claims that: “a
thought is always a thought about something” because “each thought is related to a specific entity which
is in front of us” (Heidegger, 1978, p.13). Moreover, many quotations used in chapter 2 seem to suggest
the idea that, when we engage in intentional activities (or comportments), we engage with entities as
well. Heidegger’s definition of entity is also deeply connected with intentionality. For instance, in his
course on Kant, Heidegger claims that an entity is whatever we can think about (see footnote number
9, previous chapter). Finally it is important to specify that the fact that any intentional act requires an
intentional object is hermeneutically powerful, because it seems the only way to explain why Heidegger
thinks that talking and thinking about BeyngMET is actually paradoxical.
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the property of being real) while human beings, even though they are material and real
as tables, have Existenz∗ (in the sense that they instantiate the property of being existent
because they can inhabit the world asking the question of BeingMET or BeyngMET).
[3] The third and last feature in common between Meinong’s ontology and Heidegger’s
ontology is the following one: on the one hand, Meinong thinks that all objects are ob-
jects because they instantiate the property of being an object – such a property is called
Außersein. On the other hand, as we have extensively discussed in chapter 1, Heidegger
believes that all entities are entities simply because they are (because they are objects).
What makes objects objects is BeingMET (or BeyngMET).
Then, as we can see from the following table, the ontological structure of Heidegger’s
entity (represented by the first row from the top) is similar to the Meinongian one. In-
deed, according to Heidegger, an entity has some features (these features are represented
in second row of the table below by [P1], [P2] . . . [Pn]) and these features determine
its mode of being. For instance, in some cases, an entity can be ready-at-hand and, in
some other cases, it can be present-to-hand. In some cases, an entity can enjoy Existenz∗
(namely the property of being existent) and, in some other cases, Wirklichkeit∗ (namely
the property of being material or being real). Finally, all entities, exactly in virtue of
their being entities, have BeingMET (or BeyngMET).
Object [Gegenstand ]
[P1]
[P2]
Existenz or Wirklichkeit or . . .
[P4]
[Pn]
Being [Sein]
Consider the following examples. Once again, take a hammer, which has some specific
features: for instance, it has the feature of [P1] being made out of wood, [P2] being
metallic and it also has the feature of [P3] being a piece of equipment. Due to [P3],
the hammer is a tool (something that is ready to be used by Dasein∗) and, for this
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reason, according to the intentional account previously described, a skilled carpenter can
master it. In this case, the hammer is ready-at-hand. Moreover, since it is real, it is an
existent object too: it enjoys Wirklichkeit∗ (namely the feature of being material or being
real). Now, suppose that the hammer in question is broken. This hammer has exactly
all the features that it had before, but it has also the feature of being broken. Since the
carpenter cannot use it, it cannot be ready-at-hand. Indeed, it is unready-at-hand. This
means that the feature that an object has (namely its properties) determine its mode of
being. Finally, consider a geometrical figure. Take a triangle. According to Heidegger, a
triangle has some features: for instance, it has the feature of [P1] having three sides and
it has the feature of [P2] having three angles. Given these features, the triangle cannot be
used as a piece of equipment: it is simply an object of study, of theoretical contemplation.
Consistently with Heidegger’s account of intentionality, the triangle is not ready-at-hand
but it is present-to-hand. It is not meant to be used, to be manipulated but it is meant
to be studied. It is important to specify that, since a hammer, a broken hammer and
triangle are entities, they are entities because of BeingMET (or BeyngMET).
Even though many scholars have different interpretations of Heidegger’s account of
intentionality and Heidegger’s ontology, the overview presented here is widely accepted.
Nevertheless, as in the case of Meinong’s Außersein, what is more controversial is the
understanding of BeingMET (or BeyngMET) which, according to Heidegger himself, is
the main and more radical component of an entity.
3.2.3 Heidegger’s BeingMET (or BeyngMET)
There are three main accounts of Heidegger’s BeingMET. All these three accounts are
concerned only with the so-called first Heidegger.
[1] The first account, which is also the most famous one, interprets Heidegger’sBeingMET
as the ‘meaning’ [Sinn∗] of entities. Following Dreyfus’s (1990) and Crowell’s interpre-
tation (2001), the difference between entities and the BeingMET of entities is the dif-
ference between entities and their meaning. This is also the reason why Heidegger’s
metaphysics is often interpreted as “an inquiry into meaning [Sinn∗], into the condition
for the appearance of entities [Seiendes]” (Crowell, 2001, pp.119-120).22 In particular,
22The position according to which BeingMET is the meaning of entities is clearly stated by Dreyfus.
However, he often uses the expression ‘intelligibility’ instead of the expression ‘meaning’. Dreyfus:
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following John Haugeland’s interpretation, Dasein∗ understands the BeingMET of en-
tities, namely the meaning of entities, if and only if Dasein∗ is able to “project entities
onto their possibilities” (Haugeland, 2013, p. 196). Hugeland makes the connection be-
tween entities and their BeingMET, namely their meaning, by claiming that “disclosing
the being [BeingMET] of entities involves grasping them in terms of distinction between
what is possible and impossible for them” (Haugeland, 2013, p.196). Expressing the same
idea in a slightly different way, Haugeland claim that “the being [BeingMET] of entities
is effectively determined by relevant modal constrains” (Haugeland 2013, p. 185). For
instance, chess pieces are understood in terms of the moves that are possible for them
and the moves that are not possible for them. In other terms, to be a rook is to be able
to move in straight lines and not to be able to move diagonally. Turning our attention
to a more famous Heideggerian example, Haugeland’s interpretation seems to work for a
piece of equipment as well. On the one hand, to be a hammer is to be something with
which it is possible to pound a nail into wood. On the other hand, to be a hammer
is also to be something with which is impossible to break an atom. From this point of
view, Dasein∗ understands the BeingMET of entities if and only if Dasein∗ is ‘ontically
responsible’ (cf. Haugeland, 2013). “Getting entities right requires a responsiveness to
ostensible impossibilities in the current situation” and, further more, “the response must
be a refusal to accept any current apparent impossibility” (Haugeland, 2013, p.201).
Haugeland gives three examples of impossibilities. [A] If we understand what elec-
tric current is (namely if we understand the BeingMET of the electric current), it is
impossible to believe that something is carrying electric current but, at the same time,
it does not generate a magnetic field; [B] if we understand what a hammer is (namely
if we understand the BeingMET of a hammer), it is impossible to think that something
is a hammer but it breaks when strakes a nail. Finally, [C] if we understand what a
child is (namely if we understand the BeingMET of a child), it is impossible to believe
that a child is, at the same time, at school and at home. In the first case, Haugeland
deals with physical impossibility while, in the second case, he proposes an example of
a (sort of) ready-to-hand impossibility (namely, an impossibility concerning the mode
of being of a piece of equipment). The last example is about logical impossibility: it is
BeingMET “is that on the basis of which beings are already understood. Being [BeingMET] is not
a substance, process, an event, or anything that we normally come across; rather, it is a fundamental
aspect of entities, viz. their intelligibility. (. . . ) Sinn is usually translated as ‘meaning’ but that makes
phrases like ‘the meaning of being’ sound too definitional. We use sense” (Dreyfus, 1990, p.xi-xii).
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logically impossible for an entity to have, at the same time, inconsistent properties (for
instance, being at school and not being at school). In all these cases, facing some kind
of impossibility, Dasein∗ finds something wrong with the entities that she encounters.
Such a recognition should generate, at least in a ‘ontical responsible’ person, a refusal to
accept that something impossible is happening. According to Haugeland, this is exactly
the process, which determines the right meaning of entities.
This understanding of BeingMET faces two main problems. The first worry repre-
sents a minor issue, which is relevant only for Haugeland’s interpretation. As we have
already seen, his modal conception of BeingMET and his conception of responsibility are
heavily grounded on the idea of impossibility and the refusal to accept it. As example
[C] shows, among the many different accounts, Haugeland’s conception of impossibility
seems to rely on the principle of non-contradiction as well. However, this specific inter-
pretation cannot be correct for the whole trajectory of Heidegger’s philosophy: indeed,
as we have argued in chapter 1, the later Heidegger rejects the idea that the principle
of non-contradiction is an absolutely fundamental law for both logic and reality.23 The
second worry is a more substantial one and it is about the identity between BeingMET
[Sein] and meaning [Sinn∗], which does not seem to hold for the Heidegger before the
Kehre∗. In paragraph number 34 of Being and time (1927), he defines ‘meaning’ as that
in terms of which something can be understood. In this context, ‘understanding’ should
not be primarily read as an epistemic activity but, following Haugeland, as an ability
to discover the possibility of entities in terms of their modes of being. However, when
Heidegger claims that the aim of his metaphysical enterprise is to grasp “the meaning
[Sinn∗] of being [BeingMET]” (Heidegger, 1927, p.1), he does not mean that his aim is
to grasp the BeingMET of BeingMET because, as we have discussed in the previous
chapter, according to Heidegger himself, BeingMET cannot have BeingMET.24 More-
23Someone may object that my critique is incorrect because Haugeland is only concerned with the
first Heidegger (namely the Heidegger before the Kehre∗) and the first Heidegger seems to accept the
principle of non-contradiction. This may be correct for the first part of Haugeland’s production but it is
certainly incorrect for his late work. Indeed, as Haugeland himself claims in his Dasein disclosed (2013),
his aim is to extend his modal interpretation of BeingMET to the late Heidegger as well. However, it is
also true that, as we have specified in footnote 18 of chapter 1, the late Heidegger seems to accept only
the contradiction of BeingMET. Therefore, Haugeland may reply that his account of BeingMET holds
for all entities, but BeingMET.
24The situation may be different for the Heidegger after the Kehre∗. Assuming the interpretation
proposed in the chapter 1, BeyngMET (and not BeingMET) is an entity and not. It follows that,
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over, Heidegger suggests that the problem of BeingMET (namely what BeingMET is)
is generated by “the wonder that a world is worlding around us at all, that there are
entities rather than nothing, that entities are and even ourselves are (. . . )” (Heidegger,
1927, p.123). According to Heidegger, the problem is not the meaning of the world or the
meaning of the entities around us but it is the brutal fact that the world and the entities
around us actually are. And this is also what BeingMET and the question of BeingMET
are both concerned with: regardless the meaning of entities, entities are. BeingMET is
exactly concerned with the ontological status of entities that are – it is concerned with
the BeingMET of entities.
[2] The second account is presented by Kris McDaniel. According to McDaniel, the
Heideggerian BeingMET is an analogical term because “it has a generic sense which,
roughly, applies to objects of different sorts in virtue of those objects exemplifying very
different features” (McDaniel, 2009, p.295). An example of this kind of term is the
property of being healthy. Many things can be appropriately considered healthy: the
relationship with my girlfriend is healthy, jogging is healthy and my liver is healthy.
However, all those things are healthy in different ways. A relationship is healthy when
the two partners are happy, jogging is healthy because it brings benefits to the body
and my liver is healthy when it is properly functioning. From this point of view, being
healthy can be understood as the disjunction of being able to bring happiness, being able
to bring health and being able to properly function. Nevertheless, even though these ex-
amples show that, paraphrasing Aristotle, being healthy is said in many ways, it seems
that, among all those meanings, there is also a unifying one. All these different ways
of understanding the property of being healthy seem to have a grounding meaning in
common (cf. McDaniel, 2009, p.294).25
since all entities have BeyngMET, BeyngMET itself has BeyngMET and not. In this sense, accepting
the identity between BeyngMET and meaning, it is possible to claim that BeyngMET has a meaning.
Nevertheless, this is not what the majority of authors supporting the identity between Sein and Sinn
deals with, since they are always primarily concerned with the first Heidegger.
25According to McDaniel, another analogical term is being part of (cf. McDaniel, 2009, p.295-296).
Against Lewis and the idea that begin part of is always univocal, McDaniel defends compositional
pluralism. He believes that there is more than one fundamental relation of part to whole. For instance,
“the fundamental parthood relation that your hand bears to your body is not the fundamental parthood
relation that this region of space-time bears to the whole of space-time” (McDaniel, 2009, p. 296).
McDaniel discussed and defended compositional pluralism in his ‘Modal Realism with Overlap’ (2004)
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McDaniel grounds the idea thatBeingMET is an analogical term on the evidence that
Heidegger develops an extremely detailed phenomenology of entities, which includes the
possibility of different modes of being. For instance, as we have seen, “Heidegger reserves
the term Existenz∗ for the kind of being had by entities like you and me [namely human
beings]” (McDaniel, 2009, p.296) while other ways of being include readiness-to-hand,
unreadiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand (cf. McDaniel, 2009, p.296-297). According
to these examples, McDaniel seems to be right in claiming that Heidegger gives different
phenomenological accounts of different kinds of entities. As Heidegger himself states,
“there is a multiplicity of modi existendi’ ’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.151).
However, given the interpretation defended in chapter 1, someone may move two
objections. [A] First of all, the examples discussed above do not necessarily show that
there are different kinds of BeingMET. In other words, from the fact that different
entities are given to us in phenomenological different ways, it does not necessarily follow
that BeingMET itself is given in different ways. If the interpretation of McDaniel is
correct, the meaning of BeingMET in Heidegger’s metaphysics has to be understood as
a disjunction whose disjuncts include Existenz∗, ready-to-hand, present-at-hand, unready-
to-hand and all the other possible modes of being. Nevertheless, those examples simply
show that entities with “a specific content” (Heidegger, 1978, p.151) and “a defined quid-
dity” (Heidegger, 1978, p.151) can be phenomenologically given to us in different ways.
From this point of view, it may be the case that entities are different not because they
enjoy different kinds of BeingMET but because they have specific features which make
them phenomenologically distinguishable. Consider a hammer. Using Heidegger’s jargon,
someone may say that it is only because some specific entities are pieces of equipment
that they can hold different and distinct modes of being (a piece of equipment). Never-
theless, it is not BeingMET that has a different meaning but it is the entity (in this case,
the hammer) that has different features. What makes a hammer a different entity than
a mathematical theorem is not the BeingMET of the hammer but the feature of ‘ham-
mering’ which is exclusively proper to the hammer. Heidegger: “The hammering itself
uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of entity which a piece
of equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call ‘readiness-
to-hand ” ’ (Heidegger, 1927, p.98). The hammering itself delivers the phenomenological
features that characterize the hammer – not a different BeingMET. Even though the
and ‘Compositional Pluralism and Composition as Identity’ (2014).
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BeingMET of a hammer is exactly the same BeingMET of a mathematical theory, the
former is different from the latter because of the hammer’s features (what Heidegger calls
‘the hammering itself’). The lack of this specific feature makes a mathematical theorem
not ready-to-hand and not particularly helpful in driving a nail either.
[B] The second issue is the following one: according to the ontological difference
endorsed by Heidegger, BeingMET is not an entity. “The being [BeingMET] of entities
is not an entity” (Heidegger, 1927, p.6). At this point, someone may say that, since
BeingMET is not an entity, these different ways of being cannot be modes of BeingMET
itself. Given the interpretation defended in chapter 1, if BeingMET has different modes,
then BeingMET is something, namely that entity which has different modes.26 However,
according to Heidegger himself, BeingMET is not an entity and, as such, BeingMET
cannot be that entity which has different modes of being either.27
[3] Finally, let’s discuss the third interpretation of BeingMET. This last interpreta-
26Let me develop this thought in more details. According to my interpretation, Heidegger thinks that
everything we can think about is an entity. Heidegger also thinks that BeingMET is not an entity. If we
support the view according to which Heidegger thinks that BeingMET can be given in different ways,
then we turn BeingMET into that thing (aka entity) which is thought as something given in different
ways. This is not possible because, according to Heidegger, since BeingMET is not an entity, BeingMET
cannot be that entity which is given in different ways either. This may lead us to think that, according
to Heidegger, entities (and not BeingMET!) are given in different ways. According to my interpretation,
this argument works only for the first Heidegger, namely for the period in which he does not endorse any
form of dialehteism about BeingMET. The situation is different when Heidegger endorses the position
according to which BeyngMET is an entity and not. In this second case, BeyngMET both can and
cannot be given in different ways. It cannot be given in different ways because only entities can be given
in different ways and BeingMET is not an entity. It can be given in different ways because it is an entity
as well.
27McDaniel could reply that these objections (especially objection [B]) presuppose a strong account of
intentionality which, according to McDaniel himself, Heidegger does not buy. McDaniel would be right
in thinking so. However, the remarks presented here do not want to show that McDaniel’s interpretation
faces some issues: it only wants to show that, given what we have said in chapter 1, it is difficult to merge
his interpretation of BeingMET as an analogical term with our interpretation of the second Heidegger.
It may be also interesting to notice that the so-called second Heidegger is unsure about the analogical
nature of BeingMET and he openly asks: “does being [BeingMET] have such a vast range of meanings
in virtue of its content transmitted to the single sentences and to the single [semantic] sphere it refers to?
(. . . ) Does being [BeingMET] hide in itself all those meanings?” (Heidegger, 1966, p.100). Heidegger
does not clearly answer. Finally, the analogical nature of BeingMET, which is clearly present in Being
and Time, disappears in Contribution to Philosophy (1989a).
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tion, which we take to be the correct one, was recently supported by Priest (2014a; 2014c;
2015). As we have already claimed, according to Heidegger, the meaning of BeingMET
“is only circumscribed by the presence, the appearance [Anwesenheit∗]” of an entity (Hei-
degger, 1966, p.101). BeingMET is not concerned with any specific property, attribute
or feature of an entity but it simply concerns the “objecthood of an object or the quid-
ditas of a quid ” (Heidegger, 1978, p.151). “Being [BeingMET] is what makes an entity
an entity” (Heidegger, 1927, p.82). As for Meinong’s Außersein, Heidegger’s BeingMET
is the property of being an object of an object. To be an object, an entity, precisely
is to instantiate Außersein and BeingMET. Moreover, as with Meinong’s Außersein,
Heidegger’s BeingMET is an ur-property (or, being more faithful to the Heideggerian
jargon, an ur-feature). As discussed above, we take an ur-property to be a property
the instantiation of which is entailed by any other property. According to Heidegger
himself, BeingMET is entailed by any other property (or feature) because, in order to
be an entity with some features (for instance, being ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand or
present-at-hand), an entity needs to be an entity. As such, it needs to be grounded in
BeingMET. Thus, according to Heidegger, BeingMET is prior to any other property or
feature, including the modes of being of each entity. BeingMET is the conditio sine qua
non of having other features besides the fact of simply being an object. As claimed in
chapter 1, we assume this last interpretation of BeingMET.
3.3 A summary of the comparison
Describing Meinong’s and Heidegger’s accounts of both intentionality and intentional
objects, it seems evident that these two philosophers have a lot in common. However,
before proceeding to discuss the major difference between them, let’s summarize the
analogies.
First of all, we have shown that, according to Meinong and Heidegger, intentionality
is always a relation which occurs between a subject’s mental state directed towards an ob-
ject and the object towards which the subject’s mental state is directed. As we have seen,
an intentional activity always has the feature of being directed toward something and,
consequently, given an intentional activity, there is always an object or an entity towards
which such an intentional activity is directed. Secondly, both Meinong and Heidegger
think that there are different kinds of intentionality and that, for each kind of intentional
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activity, there is a specific kind of intentional object or entity. Indeed, both Meinong and
Heidegger think that there are two kinds of intentional activities. They agree that the
first kind is an intellectual one (namely, a rational, philosophical, scientific and reflexive
activity) but they disagree on the nature of the second activity. For Meinong, what
is not an intellectual activity, it is an emotional one while, for Heidegger, it is simply
practical. Moreover, for each one of these two categories, they also introduce different
subcategories and, for each of these subcategories, there is a corresponding intentional
object. For instance, Meinong thinks that the proper intentional object corresponding
to a representation is an objectum but not an objective which is only the proper object
of a thought. In the same way, Heidegger thinks that the entity corresponding to an
intellectual activity is a thing but not a piece of equipment which is only proper of a
practical activity.
Given similar accounts of intentionality, it is likely that there are similar accounts of
intentional objects too. Nevertheless, in comparing Meinong’s and Heidegger’s positions,
it is necessary to be careful because some terms can be misleading. On the one hand,
Meinong thinks that any object has some properties and that the collection of these
properties is called Sosein. On the other hand, Heidegger thinks that an entity has some
specific features as well but, consistently with his account of intentionality, he also thinks
that these features determine the ‘modes of being’ of the entity itself. For instance, if an
entity X has the feature of being a piece of equipment, the mode of being of this entity
(namely, the way in which Dasein∗ phenomenologically encounters it) is ready-to-hand.
On the contrary, if the same object X has the feature of being a thing, the mode of being
of this entity is present-at-hand. Moreover, for both Meinong and Heidegger, there are
different ways of existing. Nevertheless, they disagree about how objects or entities can
exist in different ways. As we have already seen, the former believes that an object can
exist (namely, it occupies a spatio-temporal region of the world) or simply subsist, while
the latter draws a distinction between different kinds of existence grounded, not only
on ontological, but also existential remarks. Indeed, only Dasein∗ can enjoy Existenz∗
(only Dasein∗ can instantiate the property of being existent because only Dasein∗ can
ask the question of BeingMET) while everything else that is material or real, such as
a table or a chair, simply has Wirklichkeit∗ (it simply instantiates the property of being
material or being real). Finally, they both think that there is something in virtue of
which an object is an object. In Meinong’s terminology, the property of being an object
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is called Außersein while, in Heidegger’s terminology, it is called BeingMET. Since
it is important to remove any ambiguity, it is necessary to specify that what Meinong
calls Sein (namely, existence and subsistence) corresponds to what Heidegger calls either
Existenz∗ or Wirklichkeit∗ while what Heidegger calls BeingMET corresponds to what
Meinong calls Außersein.
3.4 Heidegger as a special case of Meinong’s ontology
As we have already discussed in 1.1 and 1.3, Meinong thinks that everything has Außer-
sein and that, taking Außersein to be the property of being an object, everything is an
object. This means that, not only are my computer, Sherlock Holmes and the square
triangle objects, but also that Außersein is an object as well. Indeed, Außersein is that
intentional object to which we refer when we refer to the property of being an object.
It is that object characterized as the objecthood of an object. Only at this point, we
face a deep disagreement between Meinong and Heidegger. Indeed, while the former
thinks that everything is an object, the latter believes that everything is an entity but
BeingMET is not. As we have seen, only after the Kehre∗, Heidegger claims that there
is something, namely BeyngMET, that is an object and not. If Meinong thinks that
Außersein (namely, the objecthood of an object) is an object itself (namely, that object
characterized as the objecthood of an object), Heidegger (before the Kehre∗) believes that
BeingMET (which is the analogous to Meingong’s Außersein) is not an entity at all. The
difference between BeingMET and entities is called ontological difference.
As we have discussed in the first chapter, Heidegger is aware that such an account
of BeingMET leads to two main problems. [1] In the first place, since every “mental
comportment (. . . ) is related and requires an object” (Heidegger, 1993, p.35) and since
the actions of speaking and thinking are specific instantiations of mental comportments,
it is impossible to speak and think about BeingMET. [2] In the second place, as we
have seen, it seems that Heidegger himself faces a contradiction. First, he assumes that
BeingMET is not an entity and, second, he states that an entity is whatever we can
refer to with an intentional activity. It should follow that it is not possible to refer to
BeingMET at all. However, since we do refer to BeingMET, it seems exactly that the
statement according to which we cannot refer to BeingMET refers to BeingMET as
something to which we cannot refer. In saying that we cannot refer to BeingMET, we
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do refer to it. And that is Heidegger’s contradiction.
Meinong does not directly face this kind of troubles because, according to his ontology,
everything is an object including what makes all objects objects, that is the objecthood of
all objects. Meinong does not endorse any ontological difference between the objecthood
of an object and the object itself: he simply treats Außersein (which is the equivalent
of the Heideggerian BeingMET ) as a normal object among other objects. If Heidegger
is careful in not ascribing any BeingMET to BeingMET, Meinong does not have any
problem in claiming that Außersein, in virtue of its being an object, has Außersein. Since
Außersein is an object, then it has the property of being an object.
Having said this, it is still true that, even without the endorsement of any ontological
difference, Heidegger’s BeingMET can represent a limit case in Meinong’s ontology.
Indeed, since Meinong shares with Heidegger the idea that any intentional activity is
directed towards an object, this means that, if we think about BeingMET, BeingMET
is supposed to be an object as well. Moreover, since, according to Meinong, every time
we refer to an object, we refer to something which has the properties that it is described
as having, and given naïve CP , it is legitimate to think about BeingMET as something
that is not an object.
Not only can Meinong’s ontology accommodate Heidegger’s BeingMET but it also
faces the same worries. [1] In the first place, as in the Heideggerian framework, given that
BeingMET is not an object, it immediately becomes ineffable as well. Since objectives are
always about objects, it is necessary to have objects in the first place in order to be able
to express something (namely an objective) about them. It also follows that something
that is not an object necessarily becomes ineffable because there are no objectives that
can be about it. Since it is impossible to have an objective without having an object and
since BeingMET is not an object, then it is impossible to have an objective about it. It is
ineffable.28 [2] Secondly, since BeingMET is not an object and since every time we refer
to something we refer to an object, then it should not be possible to refer to BeingMET.
Nevertheless, exactly when we claim that it is not possible to refer to BeingMET in
28Someone can object that my argument about the ineffability of BeingMET in the meinongian frame-
work is invalid because, according to Meinong, objectives are grounded in objecta and not in objects
understood as Gegenstand. However, since both objectives and objecta are objects (understood as
Gegenstand), it is impossible to have an objective about BeingMET because BeingMET is not an
object (understood as Gegenstand) and, therefore, it is not an objectum either.
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virtue of its not being an object, we refer to BeingMET turning it into what it is not,
namely an object. In other words, if Meinong is right in claiming that everything that
instantiates, at least, a property is an object, then BeingMET should not instantiate any
property at all. However, when we claim that BeingMET is not an object, we actually
state that it instantiates, at least, the property of not having properties and exactly this
property belongs to the description that characterizes it. In BeingMET’s Sosein, there
is, at least, the property of not having properties.29
Given that everything we can predicate something of is an object and given that
BeingMET is not object, then nothing is predicable of it. But, of course, we already
predicate something about BeingMET, namely that nothing is predicable of it. As in
Heidegger’s metaphysics, this looks like an antinomy.
In his late production, Meinong himself presents a case which is similar to the Hei-
deggerian one. In the second chapter of his On Emotional Presentation (1917), Meinong
claims that there are some objects, which are ‘defective’ in the sense that they lack
Außersein (cf. Kalsi, 1980). Since Außersein is the property of being an object, defective
objects are not objects. Meinong is highly unclear about what defective objects are,
but, given his own definition, BeingMET can be rightly considered one of them. Since
a defective object is something that lacks Außersein, namely something that is not an
object, and since BeingMET is not an object either, BeingMET can be considered a
defective object.
According to the interpretation presented in the secondary literature, defective objects
force Meinong to face a radical choice. On the one hand, he can abandon the idea that
whatever we refer to is an object: in this way, he can accept the idea that, even though
we refer to BeingMET, BeingMET is not necessarily an object.30 On the other hand,
Meinong can abandon the idea that there is something like a defective object: in this
way, he can accept the idea that every time we refer to something we refer to an object
29In BeingMET’s Sosein, there are also other properties. For instance, according to what we have
claimed in chapter 1, BeingMET is the ground of all entities. It follows that, in BeingMET’s Sosein,
there is the property of being the ground of all entities.
30In the more recent debate, this idea was supported by Kalsi (1980). According to Kalsi, a thought or
an expression which fails to denote anyGegenstand is a thought or an expression which denotes a defective
object. We may rephrase Kalsi’s idea as follows: ‘to denote a defective object’ is only a pleonastic way of
expressing referential/denotation-failure. There is no metaphysical/ontological significance in defective
objects.
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because BeingMET is an object too. In this second case, Meinong abandons the idea
that there is something that is not an object.31 In both cases, these two options do not
seem satisfactory because they give up some fundamental aspects of Meinong’s theory. If
we embrace the first option, we give up one of the most crucial idea of Meinong, namely
a strong account of intentionality. If we embrace the second option, we give up the
intuitive idea that, since we can refer to something that is not an object, something is
not an object. Nevertheless, if we follow the interpretation of the late Heidegger given
in chapter 1, there is also a third possibility.
As Heidegger, Meinong can simply accept the inconsistent nature of BeingMET. In
this sense, following Heidegger, Meinong can solve the problem moving from BeingMET
to BeyngMET – accepting its inconsistent nature. Here, we take inconsistent objects
to be objects that instantiate inconsistent properties. For instance, the square triangle
instantiates the property of being square and the property of not being square (exactly
in virtue of its being a triangle). In this case, the Sosein of a square triangle, as in
the case of all the other inconsistent objects we can think about, contains inconsistent
properties. If this is the case, it can be possible to deal with BeingMET (and, in
general, defective objects) in a similar way. Since, as we have seen, BeingMET is not
an object (because it is characterized as such) and it is an object (because we can refer
to it), BeingMET needs to instantiate inconsistent properties, namely the properties of
being an object and the property of not being an object. Having said that, BeingMET
is metaphysically inconsistent in a peculiar way. Indeed, BeingMET is not simply an
object with inconsistent properties (as all the other inconsistent objects are) but it is,
at the same time, an object and not an object. BeingMET has Außersein (namely, it
instantiates the property of being an object) and, at the same time, it does not have
Außersein (namely it does not instantiate the property of being an object).
As we have previously argued, BeingMET is contradictory in a different and more
radical way than ‘normal’ inconsistent objects because Außersein is an ur-property. We
have defined an ur-property as the property the instantiation of which is entailed by any
other property. Indeed, all inconsistent objects instantiate inconsistent properties. As
31In the more recent debate, this idea was supported by Rapaport (1982). According to Rapaport, a
defective object is, indeed, an object which has one special feature: it is not well-founded with respect to
its intentional relation – its aboutness. Self-reference and loop of intentional relation are good examples
of such non-well-foundedness.
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such, they all have a Sosein – a Sosein containing inconsistent properties. BeingMET
is different because BeingMET both has a Sosein and does not. Since BeingMET is
an object and not an object, BeingMET instantiates the property of being an object
and it instantiates the property of not being an object. In other words, BeingMET
has Außersein and it does not have Außersein. Since, as we have argued in Section
2.1.3, having Außersein is having a Sosein, it follows that BeingMET has a Sosein
(because it is an object and all objects have both a Sosein and Außersein) and it does
not have a Sosein (because it is not an object and what is not an object does not have a
Sosein and Außersein). Moreover, BeingMET is also self-identical and not self-identical.
Following Priest, Außersein is interpreted as the property of being an object and the
property of being an object is interpreted as the property of being-self-identical. Now,
since BeingMET has Außersein (because it is an object) and it does not have Außersein
(because it is not an object), BeingMET instantiates the property of being self-identical
and not.
To conclude, Heidegger’s BeingMET is an extreme case of Meinong’s ontology for the
following reason. According to Meinong, everything we can refer to with an intentional
activity is an object: Sherlock Holmes, my laptop, the number three, a unicorn and
the square triangle are all objects (only). However, Heidegger’s BeingMET shows that
Meinong’s framework can accommodate also something that is an object and not an
object as well. It is possible to have an object which is, so to speak, inside the totality
of all objects and outside the totality of all objects. As we have discussed at the end of
chapter 1 and using Heidegger’s jargon, we can rephrase this idea as follows: BeingMET
is inside and outside the world (Welt∗), namely the totality of everything that is.32
32To conclude the present chapter, I would like to make it clear that, even though both Meinong’s
Außersein and Heidegger’s BeingMET are interpreted as the objecthood of an object, there is a sub-
stantial difference between the two. The difference is that Heidegger’s BeingMET is transcendental
and, thus, completely different than all the other entities and properties or features of entities. As I
have already specified in the first paragraph of section 3.4, Meinong’s Außersein is, on the contrary,
not different from other entities or properties – it is just an entity among other entities, and a property
among other properties.
Chapter 4
Nichtsein
Overview. In this third chapter, we show that Heidegger’s BeyngMET is identical to nothing-
ness. Both of them are entities and not entities. As such, according to the Ereignis∗, they belong
to the totality of entities (that is Heidegger’s world) and not. Continuing the comparison started
in chapter 2, we also show that some neo-meinongians (such as Routley, Priest and Jacquette)
have recently proposed some interesting accounts of nothingness as well. Finally, merging both
Heideggerian and the neo-meinongian approach to nothingness and BeyngMET, we present a
paraconsistent mereological system which is able to deliver a formal explanation of the metaphys-
ical idea presented. Such a model also shows that it is possible to have an inconsistent account
nothingness without falling into logical triviality.
Structure. In Section 3.1, we argue that BeyngMET is identical to nothingness. In Sec-
tion 3.2, we see how some neo-meinongian accommodate the idea that there is something that
is not an object (such as BeyngMET and nothingness). In Section 3.3, using both Heidegge-
rian and neo-meinongian metaphysics, we develop a mereological theory that can reflect all the
inconsistent metaphysical feature of BeyngMET and nothingness. In Section 3.4, we present
the paraconsistent logic employed by our mereological system, namely the weak relevant logic
(DKQ). In Section 3.5, we present the proofs of the theorems discussed in the previous part of
the chapter. In Section 3.6, we present some models which show that our mereological system
is not logically trivial.
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4.1 Heidegger and nothingness
As we have discussed in chapter 1 and footnote number 23 of chapter 2, Heidegger’s
BeyngMET has a lot of features: for instance, BeyngMET is the the ground of every-
thing that is, BeyngMET is the feature of being an object of an object and, according to
the ontological difference, BeyngMET is not an entity. Following Heidegger, after the
Kehre∗, BeyngMET is an entity as well. Heidegger thinks that, among all these features,
BeyngMET has also the feature of being identical to nothing. He does not mean that
BeyngMET is not identical to anything, but he means that BeyngMET is identical to
something, namely nothing. Indeed, according to Heidegger, ‘nothing‘ refers to a thing
and, as such, it is a substantive.
This position may strike contemporary philosophers as an obvious mistake. It is
easy to suppose that Heidegger is simply confused because, as Carnap clarified, ‘nothing’
is a quantifier phrase, and not a noun phrase.1 However, Heidegger is not confused
at all. On the contrary, he is well aware that ‘nothing’ can be used as a quantifier,
but he does not rule out the possibility of using ‘nothing’ as a noun phrase too. In The
Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, he writes that “ ‘Thinking about nothing’ is ambiguous.
First of all, it can mean ‘not to think” ’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.3) In this first case, nothing
is used as a quantifier: ‘thinking about nothing’ is understood as ‘thinking about no
thing’. Nevertheless, Heidegger also writes that: “secondly, ‘thinking about nothing’ can
mean ‘thinking about nothingness’, which nonetheless means to think ‘something’. In
thinking of nothingness, or in the endeavor to think ‘it’, I am thoughtfully related to
nothingness, and this is what thinking is about” (Heidegger, 1978, p.3). In this second
case, nothingness is used as term which refer to something: ‘thinking about nothing’ is
understood as ‘thinking about a thing’ called nothingness. From now on, we will use the
term ‘nothing’ for the quantifier phrase and we will use the term ‘nothingness’ for the
noun phrase.2 At this point, even assuming that Heidegger is entitled to use nothingness
1Carnap does not simply hold the position that nothing is a quantifier phrase but he also holds
the position according to which nothing can only be a quantifier phrase. He famously writes: “The
construction of the sentence (1) [‘We seek the Nothing’] is simply based on the mistake of employing the
word ‘nothing’ as a noun, because it is customary in ordinary language to use it in this form in order
to construct a negative existential statement . . . In a correct language, on the other hand, it is not a
particular name, but a certain logical form of the sentence the serves this purpose” (Carnap, 1959, p.70).
2During a private conversation, Chris Mortensen accepted the possibility that the term ‘nothing(ness)’
refers to something. However, he raised an interesting issue, asking me how we know when ‘nothing’ is
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as a noun phrase, two problems remain open. [1] What does Heidegger refer to when he
refers to nothingness? [2] Why is BeyngMET identical to nothingness?
[1] Let’s start addressing the first question. According to Heidegger, nothingness is
“the negation of the totality of all entities” (Heidegger, 1967, p.63). This means that,
if something is an entity, this something is not nothingness. In his Contribution to
Philosophy (1989a), Heidegger proposes an interesting metaphor. Take the world, which
is understood as the totality of all entities, and subtract from the world all entities. Of
course, this is not enough to characterize nothingness as the negation of the totality of
all entities, because something (that is an entity) is still left: what is left is an world,
empty of any entity. Therefore, in order to obtain nothingness, it is necessary to remove
the empty world too. Only at this point, we obtain nothingness. Moreover, from this
characterization of nothingness, it also follows that nothingness itself is taken to be “the
pure non-entity” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 63). If nothingness is the removal of all entities,
nothingness is not an entity itself because, otherwise, it would be the presence of, at
least, one entity, namely itself. As Heidegger claims: “nothingness is not a thing; it is
not an entity” (Heidegger, 1967, p.71). Therefore, when Heidegger refers to nothingness,
he refers to something that is not an entity.
[2] Let’s continue discussing the second question. Both the first and the second Hei-
degger is explicit in claiming that BeyngMET is identical to nothingness. In agreement
with Hegel, Heidegger claims that
Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same. This proposition of Hegel is
correct. Being and the Nothingness do belong together, not because both –from the
point of view of the Hegelian concept of thought– agree in their indeterminateness
and in immediacy, but rather because Being itself is essentially finite and reveals
itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is held our into the nothing (Hei-
degger, 1967, p.75)
used as a quantifier and when ‘nothing’ is used as a noun phrase. Unfortunately, I do not have a definite
answer. My hypothesis is that we understand it only through the context. As Chris himself pointed out,
when I blame my girlfriend because there is nothing in the fridge, I clearly do not mean to blame her
because there is a scary metaphysical entity that gives me angst.
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The same idea is defended in The Question of Being :
Only because the question ‘What is Metaphysics?’ thinks from the beginning of the
climbing above, the transcendence, the Being of being, can it think of the negative of
being, of that nothingness which just as originally is identical with Being (Heidegger,
1967, p.)
It is not easy to understand why Heidegger thinks that BeyngMET and nothingness
are identical. However, in some of his later works, he seems to support the following
argument.
[P1] BeyngMET is what it is that makes entities be
[P2] Nothingness is what it is that makes entities be
[C] Therefore, BeyngMET is nothingness
The first premise is true by definition. On the one hand, as we discussed in chapter 1,
BeyngMET is characterized as the ground of all entities because BeyngMET makes all
entities entities. All entities are entities (namely they are something and not nothing)
in virtue of BeyngMET. On the other hand, BeyngMET is understood as the being
an entity of an entity. Entities are entities exactly because they are something and not
nothing – because they have BeyngMET, which makes them to be. It is more difficult
to understand why the second premise is true. Heidegger seems to argue in the following
way: nothingness makes entities be because an entity is (and can only be) in virtue of the
fact that it is not nothing. In other words, an entity is something and not nothing because
it stands out against nothingness. From this point of view, the necessary condition to
have entities is to have nothingness too because, if there were no nothingness, entities
could not stand against it. If there was no nothing, there could be no entities either.
Finally, given the first premise and the second premise, the conclusion follows validly.3
3As Kris McDaniel pointed out in private conversation, the argument presented by Heidegger is valid
if and only if what makes entities be is unique. However, Heidegger seems to be able to argue for
the uniqueness of what makes entities be in the following way. Assuming the ontological difference,
Heidegger believes that what makes entities be (namely BeingMET) is not itself an entity. If there is
something other than BeingMET that makes entities be, then BeingMET and the something else that
makes entities be are different. If they are different, they are two. If they are two, they are two different
things (aka entities). However, this is not possible, because BeingMET is not a thing (aka entity) in the
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From the characterization of nothingness discussed above and from the fact that
nothingness and BeyngMET are identical, two important consequences follow. First of
all, since nothingness is identical to BeyngMET and since nothingness is the result of
removing all entities from the totality of all entities (namely, from Heidegger’s world),
BeyngMET is what remains after removing all entities from the world as well.
Secondly, since nothingness and BeyngMET are identical, in talking and thinking
about nothingness, Heidegger faces the same paradox of BeyngMET. Since nothingness
is not an entity and since every time we refer to something we refer to an entity, it should
be impossible to refer to nothingness. However, we do refer to nothingness in saying that,
for instance, nothingness is not an entity. Moreover, since nothingness is not an entity
and since every time we refer to something we refer to an entity, as soon as we claim that
nothingness is not an entity, we turn nothingness into what nothingness is not. As in
the case of BeyngMET, it seems impossible to either think or speak about nothingness
without facing a contradiction. Nothingness is not an entity (because it is characterized
as such) and it is an entity (because we refer to nothingness and whatever we refer to is
an entity). The paradox of BeyngMET is the same paradox of nothingness.4
As we have discussed in chapter 1, the early Heidegger (namely the Heidegger before
the Kehre∗) thinks that, exactly because referring to BeyngMET leads us to face a con-
tradiction, talking and thinking about BeyngMET is meaningless. Of course, the same
position holds for nothingness too. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, he states that “he
who speaks of nothingness does not know what he is doing. In speaking of nothingness,
he makes it into something. (. . . ) He contradicts himself. But a contradictory discourse
offends against the fundamental rule of discourse” (Heidegger, 1966, p.23). Since “noth-
ingness is illogical”, “nothingness is contradictory and, thus, senseless” (Heidegger, 196,
p. 113). Nevertheless, after the Kehre∗, Heidegger changes his mind claiming that the
first place. Similar arguments can be found in Contribution to Philosophy (1989a, Paragraph 146). Of
course, I am not endorsing this argument. I am just trying to show that Heidegger may have a reason
to endorse the uniqueness of what makes entities be.
4Heidegger points out that even the question of nothingness (namely, what is nothingness?), exactly
like the question of BeyngMET (namely, what is BeyngMET?), is irreparably compromised because,
when we ask what nothingness is, we assume that nothingness is an entity of which it is possible to
ask something. However, since nothingness is not an entity, nothingness cannot be that entity of which
we ask about. Heidegger explains this idea in the following way: “What is nothingness? Our very first
approach to the question has something unusual about it. In our asking, we posit the nothing [namely
nothingness] (. . . ) as a being. But that is exactly what it is distinguished from” (Heidegger, 1967, p.62)
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truth of BeyngMET is the Ereignis∗, namely the event in which BeyngMET is revealed
as what is both an entity and not an entity. Heidegger is aware that, if BeyngMET is
identical to nothingness, the Ereignis∗ is also the event in which nothingness is revealed
as what is an entity and what is not an entity. On the one hand, BeyngMET is out-
side the world (namely outside the totality of all entities) because BeyngMET is not an
entity, and, at the same time, it is inside the world (because BeyngMET is an entity
as well). On the other hand, since nothingness is identical to BeyngMET, nothingness
itself is both outside the world (because it is not an entity) and inside the world (because
it is an entity). It is also important to remember that the late Heidegger thinks that
BeyngMET can be understood as the property of being self-identical : all entities are
self-identical because all entities are entities. This means that, in the Ereignis∗, since
BeyngMET is an entity and not an entity, BeyngMET is self-identical (because all enti-
ties are self-identical, including BeyngMET) and not self-identical (because BeyngMET
is not an entity and, as such, it is not self-identical either). Finally, since nothingness is
identical to BeyngMET, nothingness is both self-identical and not self-identical as well.
The late Heidegger thinks that nothingness and BeyngMET are both entities and
not entities. They are both part of the totality of all entities because they are entities
and, at the same time, they are not part of the totality of all entities because they
are not entities. Moreover, nothingness and BeyngMET are both self-identical and
not. According to Heidegger, the Ereignis∗, namely the event in which Dasein∗ reaches
the truth of nothingness and BeyngMET, is exactly the realization that nothingness
and BeyngMET are contradictory. On the one hand, nothingness and BeyngMET are
outside the world (the totality of everything that is) because nothingness andBeyngMET
are the result of removing all entities from the world. As such, they are not entities either
because, otherwise, nothingness and BeyngMET would not be the result of removing all
entities but the presence of, at least, one entity, namely themselves. On the other hand,
nothingness and BeyngMET are inside the world (the totality of everything that is)
because we refer to them and everything we refer to is an entity, including nothingness
and BeyngMET.
In what follows, we see how the current debate in neo-meinongianism can help us
to have a better metaphysical understanding of Heidegger’s notions of nothingness and
BeyngMET. Moreover, we provide a mereological system that can formally make sense
of these ideas. We discuss the formal structure of Heidegger’s Ereignis∗ and we show
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that, even though such a structure is inconsistent, it is not logically trivial.
4.2 Neo-Meinongianism and nothingness
As we have shown in chapter 2, the problem of Heidegger can be framed in Meinong’s
terms as well. Nevertheless, beside some cryptic remarks about the so-called defective
objects (namely objects without Außersein), Meinong himself does not give any clear
account of what a ‘non-entity’ (such as Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET) is. On
the contrary, a recent debate about nothingness (namely about what is not an object)
has taken place among neo-meinongians. More specifically, in the current debate, it is
possible to find three neo-meinongian characterizations of nothingness.
[1] The first characterization is proposed by Graham Priest. He grounds his account
on the intuition according to which nothingness is “ absolutely nothing : the absence of
everything” (Priest 2014b, p. 151). From this intuition, it also follows that, because
nothingness “is the absence of all things”, nothingness itself “is nothing. It is no thing,
no object” (Priest 2014b, p. 151). Priest tries to do justice to this idea, characterizing
nothingness as the mereological sum of everything that is contained in the empty set.
First of all, since Priest (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) takes being an object as being self-identical,
he thinks that what is not an object is not self-identical. Secondly, working under the
assumption that the empty set contains not self-identical elements, it follows that the
empty set contains no thing at all. Because the empty set contains non-self-identical
elements and what is not self-identical is not an object, the empty set is indeed empty.
This is also the reason why, if we try to collect what is contained in the empty set, we
get no things at all – the absolute absence of everything, namely nothingness. Therefore,
Priest takes nothingness to be the mereological sum of everything that is contained in
the empty set. Fusing no things, he gets nothingness.
[2] The second characterization (which is very similar to the first one) is proposed by
Richard Routley. While Priest infers the non-objecthood of nothingness from the idea that
nothingness is the absence of everything, Routley (appealing to the naïve CP ) directly
characterizes nothingness as that which is not an object in the first place. He thinks that
nothingness is not something and that something is not nothingness. Consistently with
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this idea, in his unpublished work, Richard Routley claims that “nothingness is not an
item” (Sylvan, Box23). In Routley’s terminology, ‘item’ is a synonym of ‘object’ or ‘en-
tity’. Unfortunately, there is no further characterization of nothingness because Routley
has never had the possibility to work out the details of this idea due to his premature
death. Note that, even though both Priest and Routley reach the conclusion that noth-
ingness is not an object, they understand objecthood in a somewhat different way. While
Priest takes, as we have seen, being an object as being self-identical, Routley takes being
an object as being describable (Sylvan, Box23). Consequently, since nothingness is not
an object and whatever is describable is an object, then “nothingness is undescriable”
(Sylvan, Box23).
[3] Finally, the third and last characterization is proposed by Dale Jacquette (2013;
2015). He follows the intuition according to which nothingness is simply that object that
we refer to (because we do refer to it right now!) when, sitting around a table, we discuss
Sartre’s le Neant or, during a philosophical conference, we try to answer the following
question: why is there something and not nothing? Thus, he takes nothingness as in-
tendable. But he also claims that it is nothing more than this. It has “no predicational
frills” (Jacquette, 2013, p. 108), since if it had such a frill as being a cat, then it would
no longer be nothingness, but something which is a cat. Consequently, nothingness is
something which has only a minimal property required for it to be intendable. Jacquette
characterizes nothingness as an object with only one (constitutive) property, that is the
property of being-intendable and nothing more.
Given these three different ways of describing nothingness, some important consequences
follow. First of all, working with a meinongian account of intentionality, the first two
characterizations of nothingness (namely [1] and [2]) directly lead to the same paradox
faced by Heidegger. Since every time we refer to something, we refer to an object, then,
in saying that nothingness is not an object, we refer to nothingness turning it into its
opposite, namely an object. According to these definitions, nothingness is not an ob-
ject, but, at the same time, since we refer to it, nothingness is an object as well. For
some philosophers, this contradiction is certainly unacceptable. However, this is not the
case for Priest and Routley: as the late Heidegger accepts the contraction implied by
BeyngMET, they accept the contradiction implied by nothingness. According to Rout-
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ley, since “for whatever is not an item is thereby an item”, nothingness is an item and not
an item as well. (Sylvan, Box23). According to Priest, nothingness “is the most strange,
contradictory thing. It both is and is not an object; it both is and is not something”
(Priest 2014b, p. 151). Both Priest and Routley share the idea that, in Heidegger’s
jargon, nothingness (as BeyngMET) reveals itself as what is an entity and not an entity.
Secondly, contrary to Priest and Routley, Jacquette does not need to buy any incon-
sistency because, as we have already outlined, he simply characterizes nothingness as
that which is an object – an object whose (constitutive) property is only the property
of being intendable and nothing more. Consequently, he avoids any paradoxical situation
à la Heidegger. As such, it cannot be used to explain the account of nothingness and
BeyngMET defended by Heidegger after the Kehre∗.5
4.3 Nothingness as an inconsistent object
After discussing which neo-meinongian accounts of nothingness are compatible with the
Heideggerian one, we propose our own account, which reflects the Heideggerian idea that
both nothingness and BeyngMET are entities and not. Such an account is grounded on
the conditional claim that, if we assume the Heideggerian (and the Meinongian) thesis
about intentionality according to which everything we refer to is an object, then both
nothingness andBeyngMET, characterized as the absence of everything (or characterized
as being not an object), are contradictory (namely they are objects and not objects).
Starting from the idea that nothingness and BeyngMET are not entities or objects,
Heidegger faces the same paradox that the neo-meinongians Priest and Routley have
dealt with. Since nothingness and BeyngMET are not entities and since, according
to Heidegger, everything we can think about (refer to) is an entity, nothingness and
BeyngMET are entities as well. Nothingness andBeyngMET are entities and not entities
at the same time. Thus, they are inconsistent entities.
Nevertheless, in order to formally describe Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET,
we start our investigation from a characterization of nothingness and BeingMET that
5It is important to remark that, if our aim is to characterize something that is not an object,
Jacquette’s strategy fails. Indeed, according to him, nothingness is an object – more precisely, it is
an object with only one property, namely the property of being intendable and nothing more. There are
no doubts that Jacquette’s nothingness is a weird object: most objects have more properties than the
only property of being intendable and nothing more. However, Jaquette’s nothingness is still an object.
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is different than the one presented by Priest and Routley. On the one hand, as with
Priest, we follow the intuition according to which nothingness and BeyngMET are the
absence of all entities. As Heidegger himself has claimed, nothingness and BeyngMET
are what we get when, given Heidegger’s world (namely the domain of all entities), we
remove from it every entity. What is left is exactly no thing at all – nothingness and,
thus, BeyngMET. It follows that, as we have already anticipated, nothingness and
BeyngMET are not things because, otherwise, they would be the presence of something,
namely themselves. On the other hand, diverging from Priest but following Heidegger, we
do not take nothingness and BeyngMET to be the mereological sum of everything that
is contained in the empty set, but we characterize them as the complement of totality,
which is exactly what we get when we have no objects at all. As Heidegger’s world,
the totality is what fuses (or collects) all entities together. Such a characterization of
nothingness and BeyngMET perfectly fits the Heideggerian one: according to Heidegger,
both nothingness and BeyngMET are the result of emptying the world and, as we have
already discussed in the previous chapters, Heidegger takes the world to be the totality
of all entities.
At this point, someone may have some methodological concerns. Indeed, why and
how did we move from Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET to mereological no-
tions such us ‘fusion’, ‘complement’ and ‘totality’? The answer is straightforward. Let’s
start saying that, if we work under the Heideggerian assumption that ‘nothingness’ and
‘BeyngMET’ are terms which refer to something, nothingness and BeyngMET them-
selves are something which require a metaphysical explanation. In other words, we have
moved from Heidegger’s ontology to nothingness and BeyngMET because exactly this
ontology is the conditio sine qua non to even start to be worried about something like
nothingness and BeyngMET. Indeed, only because of the assumptions of Heidegger’s
philosophy, are we able to investigate what nothingness and BeyngMET are and how
nothingness and BeyngMET are characterized. Having said that, our characterization
of nothingness and BeyngMET also employs some notions that seem to naturally belong
to a mereological framework and, as such, this requires a formal explanation too. Since
nothingness and BeyngMET are the absence of all things, nothingness and BeyngMET
do not have any ‘part ’: they are perfectly empty. What is perfectly empty is the oppo-
site of the ‘totality ’, which, on the contrary, is perfectly full because it ‘fuses’ everything.
From this point of view, it is natural to take nothingness and BeyngMET as the ‘com-
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plement ’ of the totality. This is how we have moved from nothingness and BeyngMET
to mereological concepts.
According to Heidegger’s characterization of nothingness and BeyngMET, if we sub-
tract each object from the totality of all objects, what is left is no thing at all – nothing,
indeed. Since, according to Heidegger, nothingness is identical to BeyngMET, what is
left is BeyngMET too. Then, consistently with Heidegger’s understanding of what an
object is, let’s define the totality (or, in Heidegger’s jargon, the world) as the mereological
sum of all objects. As we have already discussed in the Section 2.2.2, according to Hei-
degger, the totality sums up objects that exist (namely objects that have Existenz∗, such
as human beings), objects that are material or real (namely objects that have Sachheit∗,
such as the Empire State Building) and objects that neither exist nor are material or
real (namely abstract objects, such as prime numbers).
At this point, let’s note two important considerations. First of all, such a universal
mereological sum collects all intentional objects regardless of their ontological status:
everything (literally everything!) is collected in the totality. This is crucial because, if
this is not the case, the complement of the totality would still have as its parts some
nonexistent objects such as Pegasus and Sherlock Holmes. However, this is not possible
because nothingness and BeyngMET are not things (or objects) and, as such, they do
not have any object as their part, not even nonexistent things like Pegasus and Sherlock
Holmes. Secondly, given the metaphysics previously introduced, since it is possible to
refer to the complement of the totality, the complement of the totality becomes an object
as well. If this is the case, then the complement of the totality has to be a part of
the totality too. From this point of view, the complement of the totality represents
Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET because it is the absence of all objects and it
is not an object itself. However, since everything we refer to is an object and since we
refer to the complement of the totality as well, then the complement of the totality is
an object too. Since the totality collects all objects (since, in Heidegger’s terms, the
world contains everything that is), the complement of the totality is part of the totality
too. As we have seen in chapter 1, this idea is described by Heidegger as the Ereignis∗,
namely the event of the truth of nothingness and BeyngMET. According to this event,
nothingness and BeyngMET (namely the complement of the totality) are not part of the
world (which is the totality) because they are not entities. However, at the same time,
nothingness and BeyngMET are part of the world because they are entities too.
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In what follows, we present a mereological system which formally explains Heidegger’s
Ereignis∗. This mereological system (called PM + (∗)) introduces a complement of
the totality which has all the metaphysical features previously ascribed to Heidegger’s
nothingness and BeyngMET. As we will see later on, in PM + (∗), the complement of
the totality is not identical to the least upper bound of the non-self-identicals. However,
only the complement of the totality can represent Heidegger’s nothingness orBeyngMET.
because we assume that another property of Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET is
the property of being disjointed from the totality. Indeed, according to the ontological
difference, since nothingness and BeyngMET are not entities at all, both nothingness
and BeyngMET do not have any part in common with the world (with the totality
collecting all entities). Now, since the least upper bound of the non-self-identicals is not
disjoint from the totality in PM + (∗), only the complement of the totality can represent
Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET exactly in virtue of its being disjointed from
the totality. 6
4.4 Paraconsistent mereology
In this section, we try to do justice to the metaphysical story presented above, developing
two theories of mereology which include the complement of the totality. To begin with,
we discuss some of the basic notions employed in our formal systems.
First of all, let us fix the notion of totality. The totality (or Heidegger’s world) is the
sum of all objects. Then, what is an object? Following Heidegger, we assume that, if it
is possible to refer to x, x is an object. However, mereology lacks such an intentional
vocabulary. In order to accommodate this lack, we simply appeal to Heidegger’s account
ofBeyngMET according to which being an object is defined as being self-identical.7 Given
such a definition of objecthood, the totality is defined as the sum of the self-identicals.
Secondly, let us cast some light on the notion of the complement of the totality. In
standard mereology, the complement of an object x is defined as the sum of all objects
disjoint from x: we adopt this standard definition of complement. Intuitively speaking,
the complement of x is the remainder of the subtraction of x from the totality. Follow-
6The following technicalities are the extension of a co-authored work with Naoya Fujikawa.
7Heidegger’s understanding of BeyngMET as being self-identical is discussed in the first chapter. For
more details, see Section 1.1, point [3].
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ing Heidegger, if we subtract everything from the totality, what is left is nothingness or
BeyngMET. Thus, the complement of the totality is a good candidate for a mereological
implementation of nothingness and BeyngMET characterized as the absence of every-
thing. So far, the story is straightforward. But a twist is required here. In mereology,
an object has its complement if and only if something is not its part. Therefore, the to-
tality has its complement if and only if something is not a part of the totality. However,
the totality is the sum of every objects and, thus, everything is its part. Therefore, in
classical mereology (and in any other mereology whose base logic is not paraconsistent),
nothing is not a part of the totality, and the totality doesn’t have a complement. To
obtain the complement of the totality, we take two nonstandard steps. First, we assume
that something is not a part of the totality (even though it is). Second, to accommodate
the contradiction raised by this assumption, we adopt a paraconsistent logic as the basic
logic of our theories.
4.4.1 Empty objects, classic mereology and Weber and Cotnoir’s sys-
tem
Let’s begin by explaining the reason why Weber and Cotonir’s mereological system gives
us an appropriate background to develop a formal theory of Heidegger’s nothingness and
BeyngMET, understood as the complement of the totality.
[1] The first reason is concerned with the broader philosophical aim of Weber and Cot-
noir’s system, which is, somehow, similar to ours. In their ‘Inconsistent Boundaries’
(2015), Weber and Cotnoir try to give an account of empty objects. As they have pointed
out, empty objects are often described through the inevitable usage of the empty set;
nonetheless, ∅ (however it is defined) is still something and, as such, “this is no more
mysterious than the number zero” (Weber and Cotnoir, 2015, p.1273). Weber and Cot-
noir aim for something more radical than an object (an empty set) which is empty of any
element: they want an empty object which is genuinely, undoubtably empty of any thing,
including itself. They aim at “an empty object, which is nothing” (Weber and Cotnoir,
2015, p.1279). Now, the Heideggerian characterization of nothingness and BeyngMET
presented above perfectly fits the aim of Weber and Cotnoir’s system. Since they take
empty objects to be nothing at all, Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET are the
empty objects par excellence. What is more empty than something that is not an object
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at all? What is more empty than nothingness itself? We have decided to work in the
framework introduced by Weber and Cotnoir because, according to Heidegger’s char-
acterization, nothingness and BeyngMET are just a particularly extreme version of an
empty object. The reason why Weber and Cotnoir did not discuss nothingness as well
will be clear later on.
[2] The second reason why we have decided to engage with Weber and Cotnoir’s mere-
ology is concerned with purely technical issues. As we have claimed before, the late
Heidegger (namely the Heidegger after the Kehre∗) endorses the idea that nothingness
and BeyngMET are inconsistent because they are characterized as both an object and
not an object. This means that, as in the case of Weber and Cotnoir’s ‘Inconsistent
Boundaries’ (2015), a paraconsistent mereology is necessarily required. However, to see
why this system is particularly suitable for our purposes, we need to start discussing
mereology in more detail. Let’s begin with a brief introduction to classical mereology.
Following Weber and Cotnoir (2015), we do not start taking into consideration the stan-
dard presentations of ‘general extensional mereology’ (GEM) in Casati and Varzi (1999),
or that of ‘classical extensional mereology’ (CEM) in Simons (1987), but an equivalent
non-standard axiomatization proposed by Hovda (2009, Part 4). Weber and Cotnoir
made this choice because, as they claim (2015), Hovda’s axiom system is the best one, if
we want to go from a classical setting to a paraconsistent one. Such an axiomatization
is composed of three main parts. The first part is the axiomatization of classical logic
(let’s call them HM0) with identity =, and with ⊃ the material conditional. The second
part is a set of definitions. In Hodva’s mereological system, Parthood, ≤, is taken to be
primitive. Moreover, two objects overlap when they have at least one part in common
and two objects are disjoint when they do not have any part in common. [a] Overlap
and [b] Disjoint are formally defined in the following way
(1) a. x ● y =df ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)
b. x
⇌
y =df ¬x ● y
Finally, Fusion, namely the mereological sum of two or more parts, is taken to be the≤-least upper bounds of the parts that are fused together. Formally, it is expressed in the
following way:
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(2) lub(x,A) =df ∀y(A ⊃ y ≤ x) ∧ (∀w∀y(A ⊃ y ≤ w) ⊃ x ≤ w)
This means that a lub of the As is just an object that has all the As as parts (i.e. an
upper bound), and it is part of any other upper bound of the As (i.e. least). The third
and last part is an axiomatization of classical mereology presented as follows:
HM1 ∀x(x ≤ x)
HM2 ∀x∀y((x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x) ⊃ x = y)
HM3 ∀x∀y∀z((x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z) ⊃ x ≤ z)
HM4 ∀x(∃y(y /≤ x) ⊃ ∃z(z ⇌ x ∧ ∀y((y ⇌ x ⊃ y ≤ z) ∧ (y ⇌ z ⊃ y ≤ x))))
HM5 ∃xA ⊃ ∃zlub(z,A)
HM6 ∃x∃y(y ≠ x) ⊃ ¬∃x∀y(x ≤ y)
From axiom HM1, HM2 and HM3, it follows that Parthood is reflexive, antisim-
metric and transitive; thus, it is partial order. From axiom HM4, it follows that, given
an object x, there is an other object, x, namely the complement of x, made up of all
and only the objects that do not overlap x. However, from HM4, it also follows that, if
the object x is the totality (namely the mereological sum of everything), then x does not
have a complement. According to axiom HM5, given some arbitrary objects As, there is
always a fusion collecting these objects As. Finally, since axiom HM6 claims that there
is nothing which is a part of everything, there are no empty objects.
For both Weber and Cotnoir’s aim and ours, Hovda’s mereological system presented
here is unsatisfactory because it is based on classical logic (HM0). On the one hand,
in their paper, Weber and Cotnoir give an inconsistent account of boundaries and, on
the other hand, we propose an inconsistent account of Heidegger’s nothingness and
BeyngMET. In both cases, a paraconsistent logic is required in order not to fall into
logical triviality. Thus, in order to obtain a paraconsistent mereological system which
is able to deal with contradictions without any logical explosion, Weber and Cotnoir
presents the following revision of HM0 - HM6. Call this new paraconsistent system
PM. The language of PM is the standard first-order language with identity, a two place
predicate which represents the parthood relation, ≤, and a sentential constant, t. PM
consists of the following axioms:
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PM0 Axioms of the weak relevant logic DKQ
PM1 ∀x(x ≤ x)
PM2 ∀x∀y((x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)↔ x = y)
PM3 ∀x∀y∀z((x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z)→ x ≤ z)
PM4 ∀x(∃y(y /≤ x)↦ ∃z(z ⇌ x ∧ ∀y((y ⇌ x→ y ≤ z) ∧ (y ⇌ z → y ≤ x))))
PM5 ∃xA↦ ∃zlub(z,A)
PM6 ∃x∃y(y ≠ x)↦ ¬∃x∀y(x ≤ y)
PM7 ∀x∀y(x ≤ y ↦ ∀z(z ● x→ z ● y))
PM0 refers to the axiomatization of DKQ, which appears in Appendix 1. For the
moment, it is enough to mention that DKQ is a weak relevant logic which has been
used to develop, for instance, paraconsistent set theory (cf. Priest, 2006). One feature
of this logic is that → is a relevant conditional, which is detachable and contraposable.
In the application proposed by Cotnoir and Weber, this logic has also an enthymematic
conditional, ↦, which is defined by using a t-constant. The t-constant is a constant which
satisfies (3) for any A.8
(3) A ⊣⊢ t→ A
↦ is defined as follows:
(4) A↦ B =df A ∧ t→ B
↦ is detachable but not contraposable.
By using the enthymematic conditionals, fusion, ≤-least upper bound, is defined as
follows.
(5) lub(x,A) =df ∀y(A↦ y ≤ x) ∧ (∀w∀y(A↦ y ≤ w)↦ x ≤ w)
8In Weber and Cotnoir (2015), it is not explicit why they introduce the enthymematic conditional.
However, it is clear that such a conditional it is introduced to be able to problem the non-triviality of
their axiomatic system. Without the enthymematic conditional, the non-triviality proof of PM does not
work.
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The notions of overlap and disjoint are defined in the same way as (1).
So, PM1 - PM7 axiomatize Weber and Cotnoir’s paraconsistent mereology. As
in the case of HM1 - HM7, from axiom PM1 (which is Reflexivity), PM2 (which is
Antisimmetry) and PM3 (which is Transitivity), it follows that parthood is partial order.
According to PM5, given some arbitrary objects As, there is always a fusion collecting
these objects As while, according to PM6, nothing is a part of everything. Finally, PM7
claims that, if an object (let’s call it x) is a part of another object (let’s call it y), then
all the parts that overlap with x overlap with y as well. PM7 is a theorem of classical
mereology, which nonetheless fails to be provable in this paraconsistent mereological
system. For our purpose, the problem is that, even though PM4 gives De Morgan
complements, x for every x except the totality. Therefore, as in the case of HM4, the
totality does not have any complement. Since we define Heidegger’s nothingness and
BeyngMET as the complement of the totality, a complement of the totality is required.
For this reason, in the following sections, on the basis of Weber and Cotnoir’s system, we
explore two theories of mereology which have the complement of the totality, comparing
them with Heidegger’s account of nothingness and BeyngMET.
4.4.2 PM+(∗)
Let us call our first theory PM+(∗). As stated above, PM+(∗) is based on PM in Weber
and Cotnoir (2015): it consists of all axioms of PM and the following axiom, which claims
that something is outside the totality.
(∗) ∃x∃y(x /≤ y ∧ lub(y, z = z))
Now, it is easy to see that (∗) immediately introduces an inconsistency in the sys-
tem. Indeed, since everything is collected in the totality and since this axiom stipulates
that there is something outside the totality, PM+(∗) already contains an inconsistency.
Moreover, in our theory, (∗) allows us to introduce the complement of any x, including
the totality. Let us write the ≤-least upper bound of A as lub[x∣A].9 Then, lub[x∣x = x]
is the totality, since, given PM1 and PM2, everything is self-identical. The complement
of x is defined as follows:
(6) x =df lub[y∣y ⇌ x]
9That is, ‘lub[x∣A]’ is the term which uniquely satisfies lub(x,A).
104 CHAPTER 4. NICHTSEIN
Given this definition, lub[x∣x = x], that is, the complement of the totality, is legitimately
introduced in PM+(∗). The definite description ‘lub[x∣A]’ is licensed if and only if
something uniquely satisfies lub(x,A). The uniqueness of ≤-least upper bound is already
proven by Weber and Cotnoir (see Weber and Cotnoir, 2015, p. 1280). Given PM5, to
show that something is a ≤-least upper bound of As, it is enough to show that something
satisfies A. Now, from (∗), something is not a part of lub[x∣x = x]. This and PM4 entail
that something is disjoint from lub[x∣x = x], that is, something satisfies the defining
condition of lub[x∣x = x]. Thus, we have it.
At this point, it is worthwhile to mention Weber and Cotnoir’s argument against the
complement of the Totality. Suppose that  is an absurdity constant such that for any
A, → A. Taking the complement of the totality as lub[x∣], they deny the complement
of the totality, since ‘nothing satisfies’  ‘on pain of triviality’ (Weber and Cotnoir, 2015,
p. 1283). Our theories reflect this consideration to the extent that they lack lub[x∣]:
because PM+(∗) and PM+(∗)+(∗∗), which is introduced in section 3.3.5, are non-trivial
(see Appendix 3), nothing satisfies  and, thus, there is nothing which is the lub[x∣]
there. However, this doesn’t mean that PM+(∗) lacks the complement of the totality
defined as lub[x∣x = x]. Indeed, their non-triviality shows that x ⇌ lub[x∣x = x] is not
absurd in them: it is not a theorem that for any A, x
⇌
lub[x∣x = x]→ A.
Now we have the totality and its complement in mereology. Let us next see how
they behave in PM+(∗). In particular, in the next section, we examine some theorems
concerning lub[x∣x = x] in PM+(∗) and show that they adequately reflects metaphysical
considerations about Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET.
4.4.3 Theorems of PM+(∗)
The first set of theorems of PM+(∗) is (7) (proofs of (7)s are found in Appendix 1).
(7) a. ∀x(x ≤ lub[x∣x = x])
b. ∀x(lub[x∣x = x] ≤ x)
c. ∀x(x /≤ lub[x∣x = x])
d. lub[x∣x = x] ⇌ lub[x∣x = x]
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It is possible to interpret the (7)s in two ways. The first interpretation is purely
concerned with mereology. From this point of view, we can say that (7a) and (7b) shows
that, as it is expected, the Totality is the top element and that its complement is the
bottom element. In particular, (7b) also shows that the complement of the Totality is
a null entity: in mereology, the bottom is a null entity in the sense that, summing up
the null entity with any object x, we always obtain x.10 Finally, (7d) says that the
complement of the totality is disjoint from the totality.
The second interpretation makes use of Heidegger’s metaphysics. Indeed, the (7)s
reflect some features of Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET. On the one hand,
(7a) shows that Heidegger’s world (namely the totality of all entities) collects everything
that is (an entity). On the other hand, (7c) shows that nothingness and BeyngMET
do not have any part and, therefore, Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET are com-
pletely empty. They are not entities at all. Moreover, exactly because nothingness and
BeyngMET are not entities, according to (7b), they can be part of everything. As we
have previously explained, since nothingness and BeyngMET are non-entities (cf. Hei-
degger,1967), if we sum them up with an entity x, we just obtain x. Finally, according
to (7d), since nothingness and BeyngMET are not entities, they are both disjoint from
the totality of all entities. Following the interpretation given in the first chapter, as
Plotinus’ One and Saint John’s God, Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET are both
beyond the world or, so to speak, completely outside from the world (understood as the
totality of all objects). This first set of theorems captures the features of nothingness
and BeyngMET when they are simply considered not entities.
The second set of theorems of PM+(∗) consists of the negations of (7) (proofs of (8)s
are found in Appendix 1 as well).
(8) a. ¬∀x(x ≤ lub[x∣x = x])
b. ¬∀x(lub[x∣x = x] ≤ x)
c. ¬∀x(x /≤ lub[x∣x = x])
d. ¬lub[x∣x = x] ⇌ lub[x∣x = x]
10This is because x ≤ y iff x⊔y = y, where ⊔ is the binary sum operation defined as lub[z ∶ z = x∨z = y]
(see Weber and Cotnoir, 2015, p. 1281).
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Once again, it is possible to interpret the (8)s in two ways. Let’s start with the
interpretation that is purely concerned with mereological aspects. (8a) shows that there
is something that is not part of the totality of all objects. (8b) claims that is not the
case that the complement of the totality is part of every object and (8c) shows that
the complement of the totality is not perfectly empty. Finally, according to (8d), the
complement of the totality is not disjoint from the totality.
The (8)s reflect some features of Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET as well.
According to (8a), there is something that is not part of Heidegger’s world (understood as
the totality of all entities): indeed, Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET are entities
(because everything we refer to is an entity and we refer to nothingness and BeyngMET);
nonetheless, nothingness and BeyngMET do not belong to Heidegger’s world (under-
stood as the totality of all entities) because they are characterized as something that is
not an entity and, as such, they do not belong to the totality of all entities. (8c) shows
that nothingness and BeyngMET are not perfectly empty and, as such, they are entities.
Finally, (8d) claims that, exactly because both Heidegger’s nothingness and BeyngMET
are entities, they are not disjoint from the world (from the totality of all objects). This
second set of theorems captures the features of nothingness and BeyngMET when they
are considered as entities or, using Heidegger’s expression, as something that are.
Finally, in the present context, the complement of the totality (namely nothingness
and BeyngMET) is self-identical and not self-identical (proofs are in Appendix 2).
(9) a. lub[x∣x = x] = lub[x∣x = x]
b. lub[x∣x = x] ≠ lub[x∣x = x]
From an Heideggerian point of view, these last results make sense as well. Indeed,
as we have already seen, we take the complement of the totality to be nothingness
and BeyngMET. Following Heidegger’s account of BeyngMET, we also interpret the
property of being self-identical as the property of being an object. At this point, since,
according to the Ereignis∗, nothingness and BeyngMET are entities and not entities,
both nothingness and BeyngMET (represented as the complement of the totality) are
self-identical (because they are entities) and not self-identical (because they are not
entities). This is what is shown in (9).
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In this way, PM+(∗) contains not a few contradictions. Someone may worry that
PM+(∗) is trivial in the sense that everything is true in it. However, PM+(∗) is not
trivial. We show the non-triviality of PM+(∗) in Appendix 2.
What follows is a summary of what we have done until now. The present theorems
show some formal features of how the complement of the totality and the totality be-
have in this mereological system. As we have already stated, we regard the complement
of the totality in mereology as a formal implementation of Heidegger’s nothingness and
BeyngMET, given his characterization of nothingness and BeyngMET as the absence
of everything. We have also shown that the formal features of the complement of the
totality mach Heidegger’s account of nothingness and BeyngMET. Let’s recapitulate
why this is actually the case.
To begin with, recall that, according to Heidegger, we adopt the following character-
ization of objecthood and non-objecthood.
(10) a. x is an object if and only if x is self-identical
b. x is not an object if and only if x is not self-identical
Given this, (9) means that the complement of the totality (namely nothingness and
BeyngMET) is not an object (because it is not self-identical) and, at the same time,
it is an object (because it is self-identical). According to the late Heidegger, the truth
of nothingness and BeyngMET (namely the Ereignis∗) shows that both nothingness
and BeyngMET have exactly these elusive features. As we have seen in chapter 1,
the Ereignis∗ is Dasein∗’s realization that nothingness and BeyngMET are not objects
and objects. On the one hand, they are not objects because Heidegger endorses the
ontological difference. According to the ontological difference, BeyngMET is not an
object and, since nothingness and BeyngMET are identical, nothingness is not an object
either. On the other hand, they are objects because everything we refer to is an object and
we refer to nothingness and BeyngMET. Moreover, from the fact that nothingness and
BeyngMET are not objects, (7b), (7c) and (7d) follow; from the fact that nothingness
and BeyngMET are object, (8b), (8c) and (8d) follow.
First, consider the (7)s and, in particular, (7c). As we have seen, nothingness and
BeyngMET should have no parts, either existent or nonexistent. Since nothingness
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and BeyngMET are not an object, how could they have some (existent or nonexistent)
objects as its part at all? Indeed, as (7c) shows, no object is a part of nothingness and
BeyngMET, since they are characterized as the absence of all objects. Neither the Eiffel
tower nor Sherlock Holmes is a part of nothingness and BeyngMET, since nothingness
and BeyngMET are partly a result of removing them. (7d) and (7b) reflect the features
of nothingness and BeyngMET which immediately follow from this. Since nothingness
and BeyngMET do not have any part, then they do not have any common part with
anything, including the totality, that is, (7d). Since nothingness and BeyngMET don’t
have any part, they are a null thing. Now, it is natural to think that, if we fuse a null
thing, which has no part at all, to something, nothing will actually change as when we
sum zero with any other number.
Now, consider the (8)s. They reflects the features of nothingness and BeyngMET
which follows from the fact that they are objects. Even though Heidegger’s nothing-
ness and BeyngMET are objects, nothingness and BeyngMET have no object as their
parts. Therefore, nothingness and BeyngMET are not parts of themselves ((8b)). Since
nothingness and BeyngMET are objects too, and every object has itself as its part, noth-
ingness and BeyngMET have themselves as their parts ((8c)). From this, it immediately
follows that nothingness and the totality has nothingness as their common part ((8d)),
and thus they overlap with each other. Since nothingness and BeyngMET are identical,
the same hold for BeyngMET.
4.5 Appendix 1: logic
The language is that of first order logic with identity and membership. The usual short-
hand is used: A ∨B for ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B); A↔ B for (A→ B) ∧ (B → A); ∃ is ¬∀¬.
Axioms. All instances of the following schemata are theorems:
I A→ A
IIa A ∧B → A
IIb A ∧B → B
III A ∧ (B ∨C)→ (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧C) [distribution]
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IV (A→ B) ∧ (B → C)→ (A→ C) [conjunctive syllogism]
V (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ B ∧C)
VI (A→ B)↔ (¬B → ¬A) [constraposition]
VII A↔ ¬¬A [double negation elimination]
VIII A ∨ ¬A [excluded middle]
IX (∀x)A→ A(aÒ x)
X (∀x)(A→ B)→ (A→ (∀x)B) [with x to free in A]
XI (∀x)(A ∨B)→ A ∨ (∀x)B) [with x to free in A]
[VIII] implies the law of non-contradiction, ¬(A ∧ ¬A).
Rules. The following rules are validity preserving:
I A,B ⊢ A ∧B [adjunction]
II A,A→ B ⊢ B [modus ponens]
III A ⊢ (∀x)A [universal generalization]
IV A→ B,C → B ⊢ (B → C)→ (A→ B) [hypothetical syllogism]
V x = y ⊢ A(x)↔ A(y) [substitution]
4.6 Appendix 2: proofs of theorems
proof of (7) (7a) immediately follows from that ∀x(x = x) and ∀x(x = x ↦ x ≤
lub[x∣x = x]). ◻
For (7b), take any x. Let us first consider the case where ∃y(y /≤ x).11 In this
case, from PM4, we have the complement of x, x. From (7a), x ≤ lub[x∣x = x]. Since∀x(x ≤ y ↦ y ≤ x) and ∀x(x = x) (Weber and Contoir, 2015, p. 1282), lub[x∣x = x] ≤ x
holds. Second consider the case where ¬∃y(y /≤ x). This is equivalent to ∀y(y ≤ x),
11Here we appeal to argument by cases, which is valid in DKQ. See Weber and Cotnoir (2015) p. 1289.
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thus it immediately follows that lub[x∣x = x] ≤ x. In both cases, lub[x∣x = x] ≤ x holds.
Therefore we have (7c). ◻
(7c) is shown as follows. Take any x. Suppose that x ≤ lub[x∣x = x]. Since ∀x(x ≤
y ↦ y ≤ x) and ∀x(x = x), lub[x∣x = x] ≤ x. From (7a), x ≤ lub[x∣x = x]. From PM2, we
have x = lub[x∣x = x]. Let us call this (i). Again since ∀x(x = x), x = lub[x∣x = x] holds.
Call this (ii). From (i) and (7a), x ≤ x. From this and PM7, we have ∀z(z ● x → z ● x).
Therefore x ● x → x ● x. Since ∀x(¬x ● x) (Weber and Cotnoir, 2015, p. 1281), ¬x ● x,
that is, ∀y(y /≤ x∨y /≤ x) (note that → is contrapositive). Therefore we have x /≤ x∨x /≤ x,
and thus x /≤ x. From this and (ii), we have x /≤ lub[x∣x = x]. Now x ≤ lub[x∣x = x] ⊢
x /≤ lub[x∣x = x] holds. From this x /≤ lub[x∣x = x] follows (Weber and Cotnoir, 2015, p.
1289). Therefore ∀x(x /≤ lub[x∣x = x]).◻
(7d), that is, ∀x(x /≤ lub[x∣x = x] ∨ x /≤ lub[x∣x = x]), immediately follows from (7c).◻
proof of (8) (8a) immediately follows from (∗) which delivers ∃x(x /≤ lub[x∣x = x]). ◻
For (8b). From (7c), it follows that lub[x∣x = x] /≤ lub[x∣x = x]. This entails that∃x(lub[x∣x = x] /≤ x) which is equivalent to (8b). ◻
For (8c). PM1 entails that lub[x∣x = x] ≤ lub[x∣x = x], and thus ∃x(x ≤ lub[x∣x = x]),
which is equivalent to (8c). ◻
(8d), that is, lub[x∣x = x] ● lub[x∣x = x]. follows from (7a) and that lub[x∣x = x] ≤
lub[x∣x = x]. ◻
proof of (9) (9a) immediately follows from PM1 and PM2. ◻
(9b) immediately follows from (7c) and PM2. ◻
4.7 Appendix 3: Nontriviality of PM+(∗)
Someone could worry that PM+(∗), exactly in virtue of the fact that they are contradic-
tory, fall into logical triviality. In this Appendix, we will present a model which shows
that this is not the case. To show that PM+(∗) is not trivial, we adopt the same strategy
as in the proof of non-triviality of PM presented in Appendix 2 of Weber and Cotnoir
(2015). In particular, our proofs use the fact that DKQ is sound with respect to the
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standard three valued semantics of the paraconsistent logic RM3. The set of values of
RM3 is {t, f, b}: t is true, f is false and b is both true and false. t and b are its designated
values. The truth functions for connectives are defined as follows.
¬
t f
b b
f t
∧ t b f
t t b f
b b b f
f f f f
∨ t b f
t t t t
b t b b
f t b f
→ t b f
t t f f
b t b f
f t t t
Given the fact and semantics of RM3, to prove non-triviality of PM+(∗), it is enough to
show that all the axioms of PM+(∗) take either the value t or the value b in some RM3
interpretations for them, and that PM+(∗) have at least one formula which takes the
value f there.
Before showing the non-triviality of our theory, let us make a general remark on the
treatment of quantifiers: If the domain is finite, universal quantifiers can be treated as
conjunctions and particular quantifiers will be treated as disjunctions (see Weber and
Cotnoir, 2015, p.1291). In particular, in cases where the domain consists of 1 and 0 (as
is in our models defined below), ∃x(φx) takes the same value as φ(1)∨φ(0); and ∀x(φx)
takes the same value as φ(1)∧φ(0). Given the truth function for ∨, to prove that ∃x(φx)
is designated, it is enough to show that either φ(1) or φ(0) is designated. In the same
way, to prove that ∀x(φ) is designated, it is enough to show that both φ(1) and φ(0)
are designated.
Let’s start discussing the non-triviality of PM+(∗). To show this, we use exactly the
same model as one in the proof of non-triviality for PM given by Weber and Cotnoir
(2015) in Appendix 2. Let’s call this model MPM+(∗). MPM+(∗) = ⟨D,V ⟩ is defined as
follows: the domain of interpretation D is {0,1}. V (≤) and V (=) are as described in
table (b) and table (c).
The truth table (b) describes the behavior of parthood. For instance, V (1 ≤ 1) = V (0 ≤
0) = b,12 which means that 1 is part of itself and 1 is not part of itself, and 0 is part of
itself and 0 is not part of itself; V (1 ≤ 0) = f , which means that 1 is not part of 0. The
truth table (c) describes the behavior of identity. For instance, V (0 = 1) = V (1 = 0) = f ,
which means that 0 and 1 are not identical. The graph (a) represents MPM+(∗) visually:
0 and 1 are the elements of the model, the solid arrow indicates what is part of what:
12For simplicity, we use ‘0’ and ‘1’ as terms in the theory for 0 and 1 respectively.
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1
0
(a)
≤ 0 1
0 b t
1 f b
(b)
= 0 1
0 b f
1 f b
(c)
x→ y means x is part of y. The dashed arrow indicates what is not part of what: x⇢ y
means x is not part of y. For instance, looking at the graph, it is easy to see that, in
MPM+(∗), 0 is part of itself (represented by a solid arrow from 0 to 0) and 0 is not part
of itself (represented by a dashed arrow from 0 to 0).
Let’s now show the non-triviality of PM+(∗) using MPM+(∗). Recall that the ax-
iomatic system proposed by Weber and Cotnoir, namely PM, has exactly the same ax-
ioms of PM+(∗) with the exception of (∗). Since Weber and Cotnoir have already shown
that all axioms of PM are designated in their model and since their model is the same
one used here, in order to show the non-triviality of PM+(∗), it is enough to check that
(∗), which is repeted below, is designated.
(∗) ∃x∃y(x /≤ y ∧ lub(y, z = z))
Now, the proof goes as follows. Since the domain is the finite set {0,1}, (∗) takes
the same value as the disjunction (1 /≤ 1 ∧ lub(1, z = z)) ∨ (1 /≤ 0 ∧ lub(0, z = z)) ∨ (0 /≤
1 ∧ lub(1, z = z)) ∨ (0 /≤ 0 ∧ lub(0, z = z)). Given the truth function for ∨, if one of these
disjuncts is designated, then the whole disjunction, and thus (*), is designated. Here we
show that the first disjunct, 1 /≤ 1 ∧ lub(1, z = z) takes the value b. The first conjunct
of this takes b (this is obvious from the model). The second conjunct, lub(1, z = z),
takes value b, which is shown as follows. Given the definition of lub, lub(1, z = z) is
rephrased as ∀y(y = y ↦ y ≤ 1) ∧ ∀z(∀y(y = y ↦ y ≤ z) ↦ 1 ≤ z). Let’s start considering∀y(y = y ↦ y ≤ 1). Since the enthymematic conditional is defined as A↦ B =df A∧t→ B,
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∀y(y = y ↦ y ≤ 1) is rephrased as ∀y(y = y∧ t→ y ≤ 1). Now, we consider all the possible
values of y as follows:
• V (1 = 1 ∧ t→ 1 ≤ 1) = b
• V (0 = 0 ∧ t→ 0 ≤ 1) = t
Since universal quantifier is treated as conjunction, this means that
V (∀y(y = y ∧ t→ y ≤ 1)) = b (4.1)
Let’s continue by examining ∀y(∀z(z = z ↦ z ≤ y) ↦ 1 ≤ y). This is rephrased as∀y(((∀z(z = z ∧ t)→ z ≤ y)∧ t)→ 1 ≤ y). (4.2) considers all the possible values of z with
y having value 1, and (4.3) considers all the possible values of z with y having value 0.
V ((((1 = 1 ∧ t)→ 1 ≤ 1) ∧ ((0 = 0 ∧ t)→ 0 ≤ 1) ∧ t)→ 1 ≤ 1) = b (4.2)
V ((((1 = 1 ∧ t)→ 1 ≤ 0) ∧ ((0 = 0 ∧ t)→ 0 ≤ 0) ∧ t)→ 1 ≤ 0) = t (4.3)
Since universal quantifier is treated as conjunction, this means that
V (∀y(((∀z(z = z ∧ t)→ z ≤ y) ∧ t)→ 1 ≤ y)) = b (4.4)
(4.1) and (4.4) show that lub(1, z = z) takes value b. Since 1 ≤ 1 takes value b, 1 ≤
1 ∧ lub(1, z = z) takes value b. Therefore, (*) is designated.
The last step to show that PM+(∗) is not trivial consists in showing that there is
at least one formula which takes value f , which is already done by Weber and Cotnoir
(2015). However, it is worthwhile here to add one example of invalid formula in PM+(*),
that is lub[x∣x = x] = lub[x∣x ≠ x]. Indeed, lub[x∣x = x] = lub[x∣x ≠ x] takes f and thus
it is not a theorem of PM+(∗). It is easy to see this. First, lub(1, x ≠ x), lub(1, x = x),
lub(0, x ⇌ 1) are designated and, thus, lub[x∣x ≠ x] is 1 and lub[x∣x = x] is 0. Moreover,
0 = 1 takes f . Therefore, lub[x∣x = x] = lub[x∣x ≠ x] takes value f .
One last quick remark. From this non-triviality proof, it is easy to see that PM+(∗)
does not accommodate Priest’s intuition according to which nothingness is the mereo-
logical sum of what is not self-identical. Indeed, as we have shown, in PM+(∗), it is not
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the case that the least upper bound of the non-self-identicals is identical to the comple-
ment of the least upper bound of the self-identicals (that is, in our model, nothingness).
However, PM+(∗) can include Priest’s idea with the addition of a new axiom. This
axiom, call it (∗∗), is the following one: lub[x∣x = x] = lub[x∣x ≠ x]. We call PM+(∗)
with the addition of (∗∗), PM+(∗)+(∗∗). As in the case of PM+(∗), it is possible to
show the non triviality of PM+(∗)+(∗∗). In what follows, we will simply sketch the
model according to which PM+(∗)+(∗∗) is not trivial. Call this model MPM+(∗)+(∗∗).
MPM+(∗)+(∗∗) = ⟨D,V ⟩ is defined as follows: the domain of interpretation D is {0,1}.
V (≤) and V (=) are as described in table (b) and table (c).
1
0
(a)
≤ 0 1
0 b b
1 f t
(b)
= 0 1
0 b f
1 f t
(c)
Figure 4.2
The truth table (b) describes the behavior of parthood: for instance, V (0 ≤ 0) = b,
which means that 0 is part of itself and 0 is not part of itself. V (1 ≤ 0) = f , which
means that 1 is not part of 0. The truth table (c) describes the behavior of identity: for
instance, V (0 = 1) = V (1 = 0) = f , which means that 0 is not identical to 1 and 1 is not
identical to 0. The graph (a) represents MPM+(∗)+(∗∗) visually: as in the graph used for
MPM+(∗), 0 and 1 are the elements of the model, the solid arrow indicates what is part
of what: x → y means x is part of y. The dashed arrow indicates what is not part of
what: x ⇢ y means x is not part of y. For instance, looking at the graph, it is easy to
see that, in MPM+(∗)+(∗∗), 0 is part of 1 (represented by a solid arrow from 0 to 1) and,
at the same time, 0 is not part of 1 (represented by a dashed arrow from 0 to 1).
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Now, due to the large amount of calculations, we will not go through all the necessary
steps: calculations are left to the readers. However, given MPM+(∗)+(∗∗), all the axioms
ofMPM+(∗) hold. Moreover, (∗∗) holds as well because the least upper bound of the self-
identicals takes value 1 and the least upper bound of the non-self-identicals takes value 0.
Since the complement of the least upper bound of the self-identical takes value 0 as well,
this means that the least upper bound of the non-self-identical (Priest’s nothingness) and
the complement of the least upper bound of the self-identicals (Heidegger’s nothingness)
are identical. In this sense, Priest’s intuition can be incorporated in the mereological
system presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Grundsein
Overview. As we have already discussed in the first chapter, BeyngMET is an entity and not
an entity. Moreover, all entities are in virtue of BeyngMET. In other words, BeyngMET is the
ground of all entities because it makes all entities entities. In this fourth and final chapter, we
try to develop a grounding theory that explains how BeyngMET can ground everything that
is. Since, according to Heidegger’s Ereignis∗, BeyngMET has inconsistent features (because
BeyngMET is an entity and not an entity), the grounding theory presented here has inconsis-
tent features as well.
Structure. In Section 4.1, we introduce Heidegger’s concept of ground and we focus our
attention on the ontological ground, as it is understood before the Kehre∗. In Section 4.2,
we present Heidegger’s idea according to which BeingMET is the ground of every entity and
BeingMET is itself ungrounded. We also discuss its relation with the Principle of Sufficient
Reasons (PSR), and we describe its structural properties. Finally, we show that these structural
properties are the same ones that characterize a particularly strong form of foundationalism.
In Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, we consider ontological ground as it is understood after the
Kehre∗. We show how Heidegger’s foundationalism should be revised in order to do justice to
the fact that BeyngMET is an entity and not an entity. Thus, we introduce two forms of para-
foundationalism, which is an inconsistent version of foundationalism. In Section 4.5, using
para-foundationalism, we try to give an interpretation of one of the most obscure concepts of the
so-called late Heidegger, namely the last God. Finally, in Section 4.6, we propose two formal
models that show how, working in a paraconsistent setting, para-foundationalism does not lead
to logical triviality.
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5.1 BeingMET: the ontological ground
During the last months of 1928, while Heidegger was writing his well known lecture
entitled What is metaphysics?, another manuscript was sitting on his desk. Its title was
On the essence of Ground. Heidegger was aware that, even though the notion of ground
was “bound up with [so many] central questions of metaphysics” (Heidegger, 1998, p.81),
its meaning [Sinn∗] was never properly understood. So, this second essay was meant to
answer the following question: what does ground [Grund∗] mean?
Heidegger proposes two complementary characterizations of the notion of ground.
On the one hand, appealing to Aristotle, he takes it to be “the first” thing or the “be-
ginning” on which what is grounded depends: these expressions seem to suggest that
there is a hierarchical structure of elements in which the primary ones behave as basis
for the secondary ones. In this sense, the ground is the “cause” which metaphysically
and logically determines what is grounded in it (cf. Bliss and Priest, forthcoming; cf.
Corkum, 2013). On the other hand, appealing to Leibniz, Heidegger takes ground to be
the “reason” for something to be how and what it is: something obtains because of its
ground or something holds in virtue of its ground.
According to Heidegger, grounding is not unitary; there is no single dependence
relation in play. Indeed, he discusses three examples of different kinds of grounding:
the first two types of ground are concerned with the reason why some entities are the
entities that they are (for instance, in Heidegger’s jargon, why some entities are pieces of
equipment) while the last one is concerned with the reason why all entities simply are. In
other terms, the first two types are about the ontic ground (a ground which exclusively
deals with specific kinds of entities) while the last one is about the ontological ground (a
ground which deals only with entities as entities). Since, in what follows, we will focus
on the latter kind of ground, let’s describe it in more detail.
The ontological ground, namely what Heidegger labels as the ground of something, is
“the primary” one (Heidegger, 1967, p.125) because it is not concerned with one specific
kind of entity but with entities in general. According to Heidegger, everything we can
refer to (everything we can think about, speak about or reason about) is an entity.
“Such grounding of things lies ‘at the ground’ of all comportment toward beings, and in
such a way that (. . . ) beings become manifest in themselves (as the beings they are)”
(Heidegger, 1967, p.125). “[Such grounding] makes possible the manifestation of beings in
5.1. BEINGMET: THE ONTOLOGICAL GROUND 119
themselves” (Heidegger, 1967, p.124). Exactly the entities manifested in themselves are
grounded in the ontological ground - namely entities simply as entities, as things that are.
For instance, since we can think about a hammer, a number, the redness of the rose, the
idea of the infinite, and even God, they are all entities and, as such, they are grounded
in BeingMET (or, according to the second Heidegger, in BeyngMET), which makes
them be. According to Heidegger, the ontological ground is exactly the BeingMET (or
BeyngMET) of all entities that are. It also follows that, “grounding something means
making possible the why-question in general. (. . . ) Why is this in this way and not
otherwise? Why this and not that? Why something at all and not nothing? ” (Heidegger,
1967, p.125). We can ask why a number (which is an entity) has this property or that
property, only because there is a number (an entity) in the first place, and there is a
number (an entity) in the first place if and only if the ontological ground makes that
number an entity. We can worry why there is something (the hammer, the redness of
the rose, the idea of the infinite) and not nothing, exactly because there is something
and not nothing at all. However, there is something if and only if something is grounded
in a ground which makes that something something. In other words, BeingMET (or
BeyngMET) is ‘the reason’ why any entity is an entity. In order to ask something about
entities, entities are needed. Therefore, BeingMET (or BeyngMET) is needed as well
because BeingMET (or BeingMET) makes entities entities. Since the ontological ground
is the ground in virtue of which entities are entities and since, according to Heidegger,
what makes entities entities is BeingMET (or BeyngMET), then the ground in virtue
of which entities are entities is BeingMET (or BeyngMET) itself. Entities are because
of BeingMET (or BeyngMET). BeingMET (or BeyngMET) grounds entities. The
ground, understood as the ontological ground, is BeingMET (BeyngMET) itself.
As Heidegger points out, this kind of ground is metaphysically more fundamental
than all the others. Indeed, the ontic grounds are the reason why a specific kind of entity
(namely a piece of equipment) is that specific kind of entity, while the ontological ground
is the reason for any entity to simply be an entity. It is the reason why everything is. For
instance, according to Heidegger’s phenomenology, a piece of equipment is grounded in
the fact that it can be used to pursue specific tasks or to plan future activities; however,
in order to be something that can be used to engage in present or future activities,
it needs to be an entity. More generally, it needs to be. It needs to be grounded in
BeingMET (or BeingMET). The ground, understood as the ontological ground, is more
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radical than all the other kinds of ground because it is metaphysically prior: it is the
conditio sine qua non for anything else. According to the ontology presented in Being and
Time (1927), any piece of equipment, in order to be a piece of equipment, is grounded
in the possibility of being used by Dasein∗ (by a human being); however, in order to be
grounded in the possibility of being used, it has to be an entity and, in order to be an
entity, it has to be grounded in BeingMET (or BeyngMET). The fact that, for example,
a hammer is a piece of equipment is primarily grounded in the fact that a hammer is
an entity. Without being grounded in BeingMET (or BeyngMET), a hammer, as any
other piece of equipment, cannot be that specific entity, which is a piece of equipment. In
this sense, any ontic truth (namely, any truth concerning entities) is primarily grounded
in an ontological truth (namely, a truth concerning what makes any entity an entity).
Heidegger: “Yet because such grounding of something prevails from the outset throughout
all becoming-manifest of beings [ontic truth], all ontic discovery and disclosing must in
its way be a grounding of something [ontological truth]” (Heidegger, 1967, p.125).
In the secondary literature, Heidegger’s discussion about the ontological ground is
often interpreted as the mystical element of his philosophy. The ontological ground,
namely BeingMET (or BeyngMET), is not something we can logically think about or
rationally discuss – it has to be perceived, experienced without turning it into the subject
matter of philosophy. As Caputo claims, “Heidegger’s grounding is without a why; it is the
renunciation of concepts and representations, of propositions and ratiocinations about
Being [BeingMET or BeyngMET]” (Caputo, 1986, p191). In what follows, we give
an alternative interpretation revealing the philosophical argument that can rationally
do justice to Heidegger’s understudying of the ontological ground. In Section 4.2, we
discuss Heidegger’s account of grounding before the Kehre∗ and, thus, as we have already
explained in chapter 1, we are concerned with BeingMET. From Section 4.3 to the
end of the present chapter, we discuss how Heidegger should revise his grounding theory
according to the dialetheic solution to the problem of BeingMET presented in chapter
1. Thus, we are concerned with BeyngMET.
5.2 BeingMET: foundationalism
As we have already discussed above, the ontological ground constitutes the relation
between BeingMET and all entities. Since BeingMET determines entities as enti-
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ties, BeingMET ontologically grounds all entities. If something is not grounded in
BeingMET, it is not an entity. More explicitly, this metaphysical dependence relation
between BeingMET and all entities can be spelled out in the following way:
(Gr): x grounds y if and only if x makes y an entity.
However, since BeingMET is what makes all entities entities and since nothing else
makes all entities entities, BeingMET is the only ground for all entities as such. The
foundational element that makes all entities entities (namely being itself) is unique.
Therefore, (Gr) can be reformulated as:
(Gr′): b grounds y if and only if b makes y an entity.
where b isBeingMET and y can be any entity. Nevertheless, as we have already discussed,
Heidegger not only holds the belief that any entity is an entity in virtue of BeingMET, he
also thinks that, according to the so-called ontological difference [ontologische Differenz ],
BeingMET itself is not an entity. BeingMET is not an entity and, exactly because of
this, Heidegger claims that the ground, understood as the ontological ground, is tran-
scendental. Since BeingMET grounds all entities, BeingMET is the ground on which
all entities are grounded. Because of the ontological difference, BeingMET is transcen-
dental in the sense that it is beyond entities – beyond the world (namely the totality of
entities). So, if BeingMET is the ground of all entities and BeingMET is transcendental,
the ground of all entities is transcendental. Heidegger: “Ground belongs to the essence
of being [BeingMET] and being [BeingMET] (not beings!) is given only in transcen-
dence” (Heidegger, 1967, p.128). Thus, “such grounding prevails transcendentally from
the outset throughout all becoming-manifest of beings” (Heidegger, 1967, p.125).
From these observations, two important consequences follow. First of all, given (Gr′)
and the ontological difference, BeingMET is ungrounded. If every entity, in order to
be an entity, needs to be grounded in BeingMET and BeingMET is not an entity,
then BeingMET is neither grounded in something other than BeingMET itself nor is
it self-grounded; otherwise it would be an entity. Therefore, BeingMET is simply un-
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grounded.1 In Heidegger’s jargon, BeingMET is the “abyssal ground” (Heidegger, 1967,
p.130). BeingMET is the “abyss of the ground” (Heidegger, 1967, p.130) because, since
being grounded means being an entity, and since BeingMET is not an entity, BeingMET
is ungrounded. Nevertheless, BeingMET grounds everything else. In a footnote of On
the essence of ground, this idea is clearly stated: “Where does the necessity lie for ground-
ing? In the abyss of, in the non-ground ” (Heidegger, 1967, p.83). BeingMET lies on the
abyss because it is the non-ground: it does not have a foundation. Metaphorically, there
is no thing (no ground) that supports (grounds) BeingMET. In other words: “Being
[BeingMET] is intrinsically ground-like, what gives ground, presences as the ground, has
the character of ground. [However,] the ground-like is groundless; what grounds does not
need any ground” (Heidegger, 1936, p. 170). Because BeingMET is not an object, “being
[BeingMET] is the rejection of the rule of such grounding; it renounces all grounding. It
is abyssal (ab-grounding)” (Heidegger, 1985, p. 170).
The second consequence is that the so-called Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
does not unrestrictedly hold. Heidegger takes (PSR) to be that “fundamental princi-
ple [Grundsatz ]” according to which “nothing is without reason (nihil est sine ratione)”
(Heidegger, 1967, p.83) or, transcribing it positively, “every entity has a reason (omne
ens habit rationem)” (Heidegger, 1967, p.83). Moreover, Heidegger thinks that having a
reason means being in virtue of something, being because of something or, more generally,
being grounded in something. From this point of view, the fundamental principle [Grund-
satz ] is a principle about what is fundamental [Der Satz von Grund ]. “The fundamental
principle is a principle about the ground [Der Satz von Grund ist ein Grundsatz ]” (Hei-
degger, 1967, p.83). If this is the case, (PSR) can be also read as “nothing is without a
ground” or “everything is with a ground”. Now, having said so, it is easy to see why Hei-
degger’s metaphysics leads to a constrained version of (PSR). Indeed, since every entity
1Following McDaniel (2015) and Priest (2015), someone may object that, in Heidegger, it is not
the case that BeingMET is ungrounded because BeingMET always depends on entities. As Heidegger
himself writes: “if we think of the matter just a bit more rigorously, (. . . ) we see that Being [BeingMET]
means always and everywhere: the Being [BeingMET] of beings” (Heidegger, 1957a, p.61). However, the
kind of dependence or grounding relation in place here cannot be the dependence or grounding relation
discussed in this chapter. Indeed, (Gr) is only that kind of (ontological) dependence or grounding relation
that makes all entities entities. Since, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical trajectory,
Heidegger always endorsed the position according to which BeingMET is not an entity, BeingMET
cannot be grounded (in the sense of (Gr)) in entities. If it is the case that BeingMET depends on
entities, such dependence relation is not a (Gr) one.
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is grounded in BeingMET, every entity has a reason to be something (and not nothing).
However, since BeingMET is not an entity, BeingMET is ungrounded. This means that
it is not true that everything has a reason (understood as ground) and, consequently, it
is not the case that (PSR) holds unrestrictedly. Indeed, according to Heidegger himself,
every entity has a reason but not BeingMET. Since BeingMET is ungrounded, “the
principle of [sufficient] reason (or ground) is valid for beings [entities]” (Heidegger, 1967,
p.128). (PSR) holds for entities but not for BeingMET. Everything is grounded in
BeingMET (which is why every entity has a reason to be) but BeingMET remains the
‘groundless ground’ of everything that is (cf. Braver, 2013).
Even though, given the contemporary analytic debate, the position described until
now may seem weird and obscure, it could be easily categorized as a kind of founda-
tionalism. Following Bliss and Priest (forthcoming), we take foundationalism to be the
view according to which everything grounds out in foundational elements. An element
is a foundational one (let’s call it FEx) if there is no y on which x depends, other
than perhaps itself. Such an elements can be formally described in the following way:∀y(x → y ⊃ x = y). We read x → y as x depends on y (and not as a connective, as we
did in Chapter 3!). Since BeingMET behaves as a foundational element because there is
no element on which BeingMET depends, Heidegger’s metaphysics is a foundationalist
one. However, Heidegger also endorses a particularly strong form of foundationalism
in which there is only one foundational element, which is BeingMET, and everything
depends upon this unique fundamentalium. Taking b as BeingMET, we can formally
express this thought in the following way: ∃b(FEb∧∀y(y ≠ b ⊃ y → b). On the one hand,
BeingMET is unique because there is only one BeingMET which grounds all entities.
On the other hand, BeingMET is not grounded in anything else and is not self-grounded
either; otherwise it would be an entity.
It is also possible to precisely describe Heidegger’s foundationalism appealing to its
structural properties. For simplicity, let’s consider the following graph, which describes
the grounding relation between BeingMET (represented by the node labeled b) and one
entity only (represented by the node labeled e). The solid arrows indicate what depends
on what, while the dashed arrows indicate where there is no dependence relation.
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e
b
As we can see from the graph, entity e depends on BeingMET but it does not depend
on itself. Moreover, BeingMET does not depend on entity e and it does not depend on
itself either. BeingMET does not depend on anything at all. From this simplified picture,
the structural properties of Heidegger’s foundationalism should be clear.2 First of all,
Heidegger’s foundationalism endorses anti-reflexivity or [AR], according to which noth-
ing depends on itself. Formally, this structural property is expressed in the following way:
[AR]: ∀x¬ x→ x.
Since neither entity e nor BeingMET depend on themselves, nothing depends on itself.
More generally, since every entity depends on BeingMET (and only on BeingMET!),
and BeingMET does not depend on anything (not even on itself), nothing depends on
itself. Secondly, it endorses anti-symmetry or [AS], according to which no things depend
on each other. Formally, it is expressed as:
[AS]: ∀x∀y(x→ y ⊃ ¬y → x).
Once again, consider the graph. Entity e depends on BeingMET but BeingMET does
not depend on entity e. Since there are only two elements and since neither of them
depend on each other, nothing depends on each other. Of course, [AS] does not rule out
the possibility that something depends on itself because, as the formula shows, x could
be y. Nevertheless, according to the graph presented above, this is not the case. Since
2The structural properties discussed and used in this chapter are introduced by Bliss and Priest in
their Metaphysical Dependence, East and West (forthcoming).
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[AR] holds, no things depend on each other, not even on themselves. More generally,
let’s recall that, in Heidegger’s metaphysics, we deal with entities and BeingMET only.
Entities depend on BeingMET in order to be entities, but BeingMET does not depend
on entities. Moreover, since BeingMET does not depend on anything, it does not depend
on itself either. Thus, no things depend on each other. Finally, Heidegger’s foundation-
alism endorses the negation of extendability or [¬E], according to which something does
not depend on anything. Formally,
[¬E]: ∃x∀y(x→ y ⊃ x = y).
As we can easily see looking at the graph, BeingMET does not depend on entity e
and it does not depend on itself either. Thus, BeingMET does not depend on anything.
According to Heidegger, there is an element that does not depend on anything; this
element is BeingMET. It does not depend on anything because, since everything that
depends on BeingMET is an entity and BeingMET is not an entity, BeingMET does
not even depend on itself. Once again, BeingMET is the ungrounded ground or the
groundless ground. Using a poetic expression borrowed from Angelus Silesius’ Cheru-
binic Wanderer, Heidegger claims that: “The rose is without a wherefor [warum] - it
blooms because it blooms” (Angelus Silesius, 1989, p.23). Asking for the ultimate reason
of the rose is useless because there is no ultimate reason for its blooming. Of course,
the rose has some reasons to be what the rose actually is; however, the rose, as all the
other entities, is without an ultimate reason. Its reason, namely BeingMET, does not
have any reason. Since all entities are in virtue of BeingMET and since BeingMET is
not in virtue of anything, all entities are not in virtue of anything either. This does not
mean that entities do not have any ground at all. It simply means that all entities rest
on a ground which is ungrounded. The ground on which every entity relies is, indeed, an
abyss. The rose, as with all the rest, is ultimately groundless.
5.3 BeyngMET: para-foundationalism 1.0
At this point, the problem discussed in chapter 1 emerges again. The issue in question
does not directly concern the foundationalist thesis according to which the rose, with all
the other entities, is grounded in an ungrounded fundamentalium; on the contrary, it is
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about the fundamentalium itself. The problem concerns BeingMET and it is easy to see
why.
As we know, Heidegger’s metaphysics works under two main assumptions. First of
all, BeingMET is not an entity. Secondly, an entity is whatever we can refer to. It
follows that it should be impossible to refer to BeingMET; otherwise BeingMET would
be an entity. Nevertheless, we did refer to BeingMET describing it as such and such. For
instance, we have argued in favor of the idea that BeingMET is the ungrounded ground
of every entity. However, since BeingMET is not an entity at all, BeingMET cannot be
the ungrounded ground either. BeingMET can be neither thought nor spoken. The price
paid for doing so is that, referring to it, BeingMET itself would be turned into exactly
what BeingMET is not, namely an entity. Therefore, BeingMET is ineffable: whatever
is the grounding structure which has BeingMET as a foundational element, nothing can
be said about it. BeingMET, the ground, cannot be discussed, argued for or discovered.
“The essence of ground cannot even be sought [or] let alone found” (Heidegger, 1967,
p.127).
The situation is even more complicated than this, though. Indeed, not only do the two
assumptions endorsed by Heidegger lead to the ineffability of the ground, but they also
lead to an aporia. This is actually the case because, exactly in saying that BeingMET is
ineffable, we say something about it. In other terms, exactly in saying that BeingMET
is not an entity, BeingMET is an entity because we refer to it. Heidegger’s assumptions
imply that BeingMET is an entity and not an entity – a contradiction. According
to the interpretation presented in chapter 1, the late Heidegger (namely the Heidegger
after the Kehre∗) accepts such a contradiction endorsing the position according to which
BeingMET is an entity and not an entity. As we have already explained, in order
to distinguish between the consistent and the inconsistent account of the fundamental
element, Heidegger calls the latter one ‘BeyngMET’. More specifically, Heidegger’s
Ereignis∗ (the Event) is exactly the realization that the “[BeyngMET] is affected by
the lack of beyng [BeingMET] but, nevertheless, is” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.121). This
is also the reason why the late Heidegger claims that “the contradiction is essentially a
fundamental proposition about beyng [BeyngMET] and its truth” (Heidegger, 1998b,
p.13). At this point a question becomes relevant: how does the position of Heidegger
after the Kehre∗ affect his account of grounding?
It is natural to think that the switch from a consistent account of the foundational
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element (call it BeingMET) to an inconsistent account of the foundational element (call
it BeyngMET) would imply a switch from a consistent account of grounding to an incon-
sistent account of grounding. And this is what happens. Let’s recall that BeyngMET
is an entity and not an entity. As we have already seen, from the fact that BeyngMET
is not an entity, it follows that BeyngMET grounds all entities but BeyngMET itself is
ungrounded. From the fact that BeyngMET is an entity, it follows that, in virtue of its
being an entity, BeyngMET needs to be grounded. Since BeyngMET is the ontological
ground that makes every entity an entity, then BeyngMET grounds itself. Thus, since
BeyngMET is both an entity and not, BeyngMET depends on itself and, at the same
time, it does not depend on anything. BeyngMET is grounded and ungrounded at the
same time. This is shown in the following graph:
e
b
Once again, BeyngMET is represented by the node labeled b and the entity grounded
in BeyngMET is represented by the node labeled e. The solid arrows indicate what de-
pends on what, while the dashed arrows indicate where there is no dependence relation.
As we can see, entity e depends on BeyngMET and it does not depend on itself. More-
over, BeyngMET does not depend on entity e but it both depends and not on itself.
Now, let’s have a look at the structural properties that this new inconsistent ground-
ing structure has. From the fact that BeyngMET is not an entity, everything previously
stated still holds. Since all entities depend on BeyngMET and BeyngMET does not de-
pend on anything (not even on itself), nothing depends on itself. Therefore, [AR] holds.
Since all entities depend on BeyngMET (and only on BeyngMET) but BeyngMET
neither depends on all entities nor depends on itself, no things depend mutually on
each other. Therefore, [AS] holds. Finally, from the fact that all entities depend on
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BeyngMET but BeyngMET does not depend on anything else, it follows that something
does not depend on anything else. Therefore, [¬E] holds. However, in contrast with the
dependence relation grounded in the consistent foundational element (BeingMET), this
new approach has more structural properties than the ones described until now. Indeed,
given the fact that BeyngMET is an entity as well, two other structural properties hold.
First of all, since BeyngMET is (also) an entity and since BeyngMET is the only foun-
dational element that makes all entities entities, something depends on itself, namely
BeyngMET. BeyngMET makes itself an entity. The structural property according to
which something depends on itself is the negation of the anti-reflexivity property ([¬AR])
and it is formalized in the following way:
[¬AR]: ∃x x→ x
Secondly, since BeyngMET is (also) an entity and BeyngMET is the only foundational
element which makes all entities entities, the negation of [AS] holds as well. We formally
describe this as:
[¬AS]: ∃x∃y(x→ y ∧ y → x).
Strictly speaking, [¬AS] says that some things depend on each other, without ruling
out the possibility that some things depend on themselves. Now, [¬AS] would be incom-
patible with the fact that there are things depending on themselves if and only if [AR]
holds. However, this is not the case with Heidegger because, as we have seen, according
to him, both [AR] and [¬AR] hold. Therefore, [¬AS] holds because BeyngMET does
depend on itself: it is self-grounded. At this point, it is easy to see why the inconsistency
of the foundational element BeyngMET spreads to the structure of the grounding de-
pendence. Since BeyngMET is an entity and not an entity, the grounding dependence
relation has an inconsistent characterization as well: both [AR] and [¬AR], and [AS]
and [¬AS] hold.
On the one hand, BeyngMET’s theory of grounding remains a foundationalist one,
as in the case of BeingMET. Since we follow Bliss and Priest (forthcoming) in defining
foundationalism as the theory which includes foundational elements (FEx) and since
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BeyngMET behaves as a foundational element, this new account of grounding can be
seen as a particularly extreme version of foundationalism. On the other hand, such a
foundationalist approach is inconsistent because it has inconsistent structural properties:
it endorses [AR] and its negation [¬AR], and [AS] and its negation [¬AS]. We call this
inconsistent form of foundationalism, para-foundationalism.
5.4 BeyngMET: para-fondationalist 2.0
Heidegger’s foundationalist approach is very different from the para-foundationalist one:
as we have seen, the former is a consistent theory and it uses a consistent foundational
element (BeingMET) while the latter is an inconsistent theory and it uses an inconsis-
tent foundational element (BeyngMET). However, these two grounding theories have
something in common. Both of them take the foundational element (BeingMET and
BeyngMET) to be what determines entities as entities. Nevertheless, as we have already
seen in both chapter 1 and chapter 2, in the very late period of Heidegger’s philosophy,
he starts to characterize the foundational element in a slightly different way, equating
BeyngMET with being self-identical. Let’s recall that, in his Identity and difference
(1957a), Heidegger claims that all entities are entities in virtue of the fact that “each
entity is itself” (Heidegger, 1957a, p.28). Now, BeyngMET (interpreted as being self-
identical) still determines entities as entities because all entities are entities in virtue of
the fact that they are exactly what they are. Any entity is that specific and unique entity
that is: the reason for an entity to be an entity is its being identical to itself. However, if
we work with this new understanding of BeyngMET, we have a new (and more extreme)
form of para-foundationalism. Let’s see why.
First of all, if BeyngMET determines all entities as entities, and if BeyngMET is
being self-identical, since all entities are entities, all entities are self-identical. Secondly,
according to the inconsistent account of the foundational element, since BeyngMET
is an entity and not an entity, BeyngMET is self-identical and not. Moreover, be-
cause in Heidegger’s metaphysics, everything is an entity only, with the exception of
BeyngMET (which is an entity and not), everything is self-identical only with the excep-
tion of BeyngMET (which is self-identical and not). Now, given this framework, all the
structural properties previously attributed to para-foundationalism hold. BeyngMET
grounds all entities and, because BeyngMET itself is not an entity, it is ungrounded.
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From here, [AR] holds. [AS] holds as well because, if all entities depend on BeyngMET
and BeyngMET does not depend on any entity (not even on itself), no elements depend
on each other. However, since BeyngMET is also an entity, BeyngMET depends on
itself and, thus, both [¬AR] and [¬AS] hold too. Finally, [¬E] holds because, since
BeyngMET is not an entity and it is ungrounded, something (namely BeyngMET) does
not depend on anything else. In other words, the negation of Extendability holds because,
since BeyngMET is ungrounded, it is not the case that everything depends on anything
else. Indeed, BeyngMET itself does not.
Until here, everything is exactly the same as in the para-foundationalist case previ-
ously described. However, if we look carefully at the definition of [E], we will see that,
when BeyngMET is understood as a synonym of being self identical, this structural prop-
erty holds as well. So, consider [E], which is defined in the following way:
[E]: ∀x∃y(y ≠ x ∧ x→ y).
Now, this structural property says that everything depends on something else. It is
important to underline that, according to [E], all entities depend on something which
is not themselves (and this is guaranteed by the first conjunct of the formula, that is
y ≠ x). Exactly for this reason, in both foundationalism and para-foundationalism, the
negation of [E] holds. According to foundationalism, BeingMET is simply ungrounded
and this means that it is not the case that everything depends on something else. Indeed,
BeingMET does not. According to para-foundationalism, the negation of [E] holds be-
cause BeyngMET is both ungrounded and self-grounded. This means that it is still not
the case that everything depends on something else. In other words, BeyngMET does
not depend on anything else (in virtue of its being ungrounded) and it depends on itself (in
virtue of its being self-grounded). In both cases, the negation of [E] holds because there
is something that does not depend on anything else, namely BeyngMET. However, the
situation changes if BeyngMET (or what determines entities as entities) is interpreted
as being self-identical. In this case, BeyngMET itself is self-identical (because it is an
entity) and not-self-identical (because it is not an entity). Now, on the one hand, since
BeyngMET is self-identical, the negation of [E] holds; even though BeyngMET depends
on itself, it is not true that everything depends on something else. On the other hand,
since BeyngMET is not self-identical as well, [E] holds. From the fact BeyngMET is not
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self-identical, it follows that BeyngMET grounds something other than itself. In other
words, if BeyngMET is self-identical (as in the case of Heidegger’s foundationalism and
the previous version of para-foundationalism), extendability does not hold because the
first conjunct of the formula for [E] (namely y ≠ x) is not satisfied. On the contrary,
if BeyngMET is both self-identical and not self-identical (as discussed in the present
Section), the first conjunct of the formula for [E] is both satisfied and not. Therefore,
both [E] and [¬E] hold.
Let’s sum up. On the one hand, when the foundational element (BeyngMET)
is just characterized as what determines entities as entities, we have a form of para-
foundationalism in which [AR] and its negation, and [AS] and its negation, hold.
Moreover, [E] holds but not [¬E]. On the other hand, when the foundational element
(BeyngMET) is understood as being self-identical, we have a particularly extreme form
of para-foundationalism. Such a new form is stronger than the previous one for two main
reasons. First of all, it has more inconsistent structural features: beside the features of
the previous version of para-foundationalism, it has also the structural property [E] and
its negation. Secondly, it is more radical than the previous form of para-foundationalism
because it is inconsistent on that specific structural property, namely [E], the negation of
which was meant to characterize all forms of foundationalism.3 This second form of para-
foundationalism shows that all forms of foundationalism do not have [E], even though,
in some extreme forms, both [E] and its negation hold. Finally, from both forms of para-
foundationalism also follows a new consideration about Heidegger’s account of (PSR). In
the case of BeingMET , Heidegger has correctly claimed that (PSR) cannot unrestrict-
edly hold. As we have seen, if we interpret the principle ‘nothing is without a reason’
as ‘nothing is without a ground’, there is, at least an element, namely BeingMET, for
which (PSR) does not hold: indeed, BeingMET is ungrounded. BeingMET is without
any reason. However, according to both forms of para-foundationalism, this is not the
case anymore. As we have seen, since BeyngMET is inconsistent, it is both ungrounded
and self-grounded. On the one hand, because BeyngMET is ungrounded, it is without
any reason. Therefore, (PSR) fails. On the other hand, because BeyngMET is grounded
(or, more precisely, self-grounded), it has a reason (namely itself). Since all entities
3This is true because if we have the structural property [E], it follows that it is impossible to have
foundational elements. Since foundationalism is characterized as the view according to which there are
foundational elements, [E] is incompatible with foundationalism.
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are grounded in BeyngMET and BeyngMET is both ungrounded and self-grounded, all
entities have a reason in BeyngMET, and BeyngMET has its reason in itself. Even
though something (namely BeyngMET) both has a reason and not, it is still true that
everything has a reason. Therefore, (PSR) holds.
5.5 BeingMET as the last God
Before concluding, it may be interesting to point out that the present discussion about
BeingMET (with its entailed foundationalism) and BeyngMET (with its entailed para-
foudationalism) can help us to have some new insights into one of the most enigmatic
figures of Heidegger’s philosophy, that is the last God.
Very often, at least in the Western philosophical tradition, the ground of all entities
(or the reason why human beings, trees, sun sets, stars, planets and everything else
are) goes under the name of God. For instance, according to Aquinas, “God wills the
existence of all things” (cf. Lovejoy, 2001, p.319) while, according to Leibniz, God is
the Perfection Prior, which generates the world as a necessary logical consequence of his
essential nature (cf. Lovejoy, 2001, p.319). Schelling believes that God is that eternal
realization [Realwerden] or Genesis of the world (cf. Lovejoy, 2001, p.320) while Meister
Eckhart (who highly influenced Heidegger) thinks that God is the ground [Grund∗] of
everything. Even though, in all these cases, God is thought of as the universal ground,
Heidegger has never borrowed any term from theology. His conception of the universal
ground always goes under the name of ‘BeingMET ’ or ‘BeyngMET’. The reason for his
divorce from the theological tradition is clearly explained in Phenomenology and Theology
(1967). Since Heidegger holds the idea that the ground of every entity is not an entity
itself, he thinks that God cannot be such a universal ground because, in the theological
framework, God is treated as an entity, namely as something that is. God is what wills,
generates or realizes every thing; god is the ground of all entities. Of course, God is
not a normal entity among entities. For instance, God is eternal and normal entities are
not. Even more simply, God is the ground of all entities while a normal entity (such
as a table) is not. So, even though God is often conceptualized as a super-ens, God is
still thought of as an ens. Since we refer to God, God is an entity, and this is why we
can pray to Yahweh, we can make war in the name of Christ, and we can distinguish
what is wrong from what is right following the commandments of Allah. We refer to
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God because, in the first place, God is treated as an entity. Such an account of God
is incompatible with the Heideggerian assumption that the ground of everything is not
an entity and, from this, also follows the necessity of separating God (the super-ens)
from BeingMET (or BeyngMET), which is not an ens. Therefore, “BeingMET [or
BeyngMET] is not God” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.303). In Heidegger’s jargon, we could say
that theology is ultimately an onto-theology, namely the study of the divine element as
an entity. “Both ontology [the study of entities] and theology are ‘-logy ’ [or sciences]
because they are concerned with the attempt at explaining entities” (Heidegger, 1967,
p.225). This is also the reason why Heidegger claims that theology is just like any other
kind of science: it deals with God as an ‘object of study’ while the ground of all entities is
not an object at all. Therefore, God is inappropriate as a characterization of BeingMET
(or BeyngMET).
Having said that, the approach proposed by Heidegger in Phenomenology and The-
ology (1967) does not seem to hold for the whole trajectory of his philosophy. Indeed,
in Contributions to Philosophy (1989a), Heidegger himself returns to theology accepting
what he calls the last God. Unfortunately, he does not give any clear account of what
the last God really is. On the one hand, we know that it is not simply “another God [der
Letzte Gott ]” because it is “different from both the old traditional Gods and the Chris-
tian God” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.394). The last God is characterized, using Hölderlin’s
expression, as the “closest one” but, at the same time, “the most difficult to understand”
(Heidegger, 1989a, p.396). On the other hand, we also know that the last God is tightly
connected with the idea of BeyngMET because “the truth of beyng [BeyngMET] is the
truth of the last God ” (Heidegger, 1989a, p.396). Since Heidegger never rejected his con-
demnation of theology, at this point, some questions look inevitable: how can Heidegger
hold the position that ‘God’ cannot be another name to refer to BeyngMET, believing,
at the same time, that the last God is actually a synonym of BeyngMET? And, if so,
what is the difference between the traditional account of God and the last God? These
questions remain unanswered.
One possible way of making sense of the thoughts expressed in Contributions to Phi-
losophy (1989a) is to appeal to para-foundationalism. The last God may be interpreted
as the dialetheic foundational element that we have called BeyngMET. If this is the
case, since BeyngMET (or the last God) is not an entity, Heidegger can still maintain
his previous critique against theology. On the other hand, since BeyngMET is also an
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entity, it is actually possible to refer to it as God because, consistently with the theo-
logical tradition, God is that entity in virtue of which everything is. From this point
of view, the last God is the “closest one” (Heidegger, 1989a, 396) because it is an entity
and the world of human beings is constituted by entities. Entities are the things we are
most familiar with. Nonetheless, the last God is also “the most difficult to understand”
(Heidegger, 1989a, p.396) because it is not an entity as well and, as we have seen, what
is not an entity leads to an aporia, which is accepted as true in the para-foundationalist
view. So, “the closest proximity to the last God is the event of (. . . ) its rejection”
(Heidegger, 1989a, p.402). The last God is phenomenologically present when it is not
or, more precisely, it is present when it is absent. It is present and it is not. On the
one hand, it is present as all the other entities are: the last God is present to the mind
of the people thinking or speculating about it and, thus, referring to it. On the other
hand, the last God is not present as well: since it is not an entity and everything that
is phenomenologically present is an entity, the last God cannot be phenomenologically
present. So, if it is true that ‘only a God can save us’ (cf. Safranski, 1998), given Hei-
degger’s metaphysics, this God has to be the last one. It has to be the God that grounds
everything including itself without being grounded at all.
5.6 Technical Appendix
Someone could worry that the two inconsistent theories of grounding, exactly in virtue of
the fact that they are contradictory, fall into logical triviality. The following two models
(one for each kind of para-foundationalism) show that this is not the case. These models
are set up using a first-order interpretation for the paraconsistent logic LP (Priest, 1979).
For a full and detailed description of this interpretation see Appendix 3 of chapter 3. In
order to show that para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism 2.0 are not trivial,
we adopt the following strategy. First of all, we confirm that all the structural properties
of para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism 2.0 hold in the relative models.
This means that these structural properties take either value t (true) or value b (both
true and false). Secondly, we show that there is at least one sentence which takes value
f (false).
Let’s start discussing the model of para-foundationalism 1.0. To define such a
model MPF1.0 = ⟨D,V ⟩, let the domain of interpretation D be {e, b}. As in the graphs
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presented above, e represents an entity and b represents BeyngMET. V (→) and V (=)
are as described in table (b) and table (c). As we can see in the picture below, comparing
the graph (a), which represents para-foundationalism 1.0, and table (b), entity e does
not depend on itself (e → e is false) and BeyngMET b does not depend on entity e
either (b → e is false). However, entity e depends on BeyngMET (e → b is true) and
BeyngMET both depends and does not depend on itself (b → b is both true and false).
Moreover, as it is clear comparing the graph (a) and table (b), identity behaves in a
consistent way. Thus, both entity e and BeyngMET are self-identical (e = e and b = b
are true) and BeyngMET is not identical to entity e (b = e is false).
e
b
(a)
→ e b
e f t
b f b
(b)
= e b
e t f
b f t
(c)
At this point, it is easy to show that, in our model, the structural properties of para-
foundationalism 1.0 (namely, [AR],[¬AR], [AS], [¬AS], [¬E]) hold, taking either value
t or value b. Let’s see. For Anti-Reflexivity ([AR]: ∀x¬ x → x), we consider all the
possible values of x:
• V ¬(e→ e) = t
• V ¬(b→ b) = b
As it is clearly understandable looking at graph (a), it is true that entity e does not
depend on itself and it is both true and false that BeyngMET depends on itself. In all
cases, [AR] holds. For the negation of Anti-Reflexivity ([¬ AR]: ∃x(x→ x)), it is enough
to consider one value of x for which [¬ AR] holds. As we have already noticed from graph
(a), BeyngMET depends on itself and it does not depend on itself. Thus, V (b→ b) takes
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value b. For Anti-Symmetry ([AS]: ∀x∀y(x→ y ⊃ ¬y → x)), we consider all the possible
values of x and y:
• V (e→ b ⊃ ¬b→ e) = t
• V (b→ e ⊃ ¬e→ b) = t
• V (e→ e ⊃ ¬e→ e) = t
• V (b→ b ⊃ ¬b→ b) = b
The fact that Anti-Symmetry holds is intuitively understandable from graph (a) as well.
First of all, entity e depends on BeyngMET but BeyngMET does not depend on entity
e. Secondly, even considering the case where x is y, entity e does not depend on itself
and BeyngMET does and does not depend on itself. Thus, [AS] holds. For the negation
of Anti-Symmetry ([¬AS]: ∃x∃y(x → y ∧ y → x)), it is enough to show that there is at
least a value of x and a value of y for which [¬AS] takes value t or b. Now, as it is shown
by graph (a), BeyngMET depends on itself and does not. Thus, V (b → b ⊃ ¬b → b)
takes value b. [¬AS] holds as well. Finally, let’s consider the last structural property of
para-foudnationalism 1.0. For the negation of Extendability ([¬ E]: ∃x∀y(x→ y ⊃ x = y)),
we consider all the values of y and at least one value of x for which [¬ E] takes either
value t or value b:
• V (b→ b ⊃ b = b) = t
• V (b→ e ⊃ b = e) = t
As we can see, [¬ E] holds. Indeed, since the negation of Extendability claims that
something does not depend on anything else, from graph (a) it is clear that, on the one
hand, BeyngMET depends and does not depend on itself; on the other hand, BeyngMET
does not depend on anything else other than itself.
At this point we know that all the structural properties of para-foundationalism 1.0
hold. In order to show that the model presented here is not trivial, we need to show that
there is a sentence which is false only. This is not difficult because, as we have already
argued, we know that, in this first kind of para-foundationalism, Extendability [E] does
not hold. Indeed, as graph (a) shows, it is false that everything depends on something
else: for instance, BeyngMET does and does not depend on itself. In both cases, it does
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not depend on something else. Thus, in MPF1.0, ∀x∃y(y ≠ x ∧ x → y) is false because
V (¬b = b ∧ b→ b) takes value f.
Now, what about a model of para-foundationalism 2.0? This second model,MPF2.0,
is not very different than the one presented above and it is defined as ⟨D,V ⟩. As in the
previous case, the domain of interpretation D is {e, b} where e represents an entity and b
represents BeyngMET while V (→) is as described in table (b). This is the case because
para-foundationalism 2.0 has exactly the same features of para-foundationalism 1.0: in
both cases, entity e does not depend on itself (e→ e is false) and BeyngMET b does not
depend on entity e either (b → e is false). Moreover, entity e depends on BeyngMET
(e → b is true) and BeyngMET both depends and does not depend on itself (b → b is
both true and false). What is different is that, in para-foundationalism 1.0, both entity
e and BeyngMET are self-identical (as table (c) shows, e = e and b = b are true) while,
in para-foundationalism 2.0, even though entity e is still self-identical (e = e still takes
value t), BeyngMET is both self-identical and not (b = b takes value b). Thus, for
para-foundationalism 2.0, V (=) is described by the following table:
= e b
e t f
b f b
At this point, as we have done before, we start checking if all the structural properties
of para-foundationalism 2.0 ([AR],[¬AR], [AS], [¬AS], [E] and [¬E]) hold, taking either
value t or value b. This is not difficult because para-foundationalism 2.0 has exactly the
same structural properties of para-foundationalism 1.0 plus [E]. This means that, since
we already know that all the structural properties of para-foundationalism 1.0 hold, we
only need to check Extendability.4 According to Extendability, everything depends on
something else. On the one hand, entity e depends on BeyngMET. On the other hand,
BeyngMET both depends and does not depend on itself. In this second case, it may seem
that Extendability does not hold: indeed, in this model, either BeyngMET does not de-
pend on anything or BeyngMET depends on itself. In both cases, BeyngMET does not
4We need to check only Extendability because the only thing that changed from para-foundationalism
1.0 to para-foundationalism 2.0 is the behavior of identity. Since, beside Extendability, all the other
structural properties (already verified in para-foundationalism 1.0) do not make use of identity, they are
verified in para-foundationalism 2.0 too.
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depend on anything else. However, we should not forget that, in para-foundationalism
2.0, BeyngMET is not self-identical. This means that, when BeyngMET depends on it-
self, because BeyngMET is also not itself (because BeyngMET is also not self-identical),
BeyngMET depends on something other than itself. This is reason why Extendability
holds. Formally, for [E]: ∀x∃y(y ≠ x∧x→ y), we consider all the values of x and at least
one value of y for which [E] takes either value t or value b:
• V (¬b = b ∧ b→ b) = b
• V (¬e = b ∧ e→ b) = t
As expected, [E] holds. To conclude, we show that, also in para-foundationalism 2.0,
there is a sentence which is simply false. In this model, since entity e does not depend on
itself, it must be false that everything depends on itself. Indeed, in MPF2.0, the sentence∀x x→ x is simply false because V (e→ e) takes value f.
Chapter 6
Afterword
To conclude, let’s summarize what we have done.
In the first chapter, we defended a new interpretation of the so-called second Heideg-
ger, namely Heidegger after the Kehre. We introduced the problem of BeyngMET and
we showed how thinking and talking about BeyngMET leads to a paradox. Following
Heidegger himself, since BeyngMET is not an entity and everything we refer to is an en-
tity, BeyngMET is both an entity and not: it is not an entity (because of the ontological
difference) and it is an entity (because we refer to it in saying that being is not an entity).
At this point, we endorsed the interpretation according to which Heidegger accepts the
contradiction implied by BeyngMET as true. Finally, we showed that this dialetheic
interpretation of the second Heidegger also casts a new light on obscure and often un-
intelligible Heideggerian concepts such as the event, Aletheia and his understanding of
negation.
In the second chapter, we compared Heidegger’s metaphysics with Meinong’s metaphysics
discussing both the similarity and the differences between the two philosophers. Such a
comparison delivers a better understanding of Heidegger’s intentionality and Heidegger’s
paradox of BeyngMET. It also casts a new light on one of the most unintelligible part
of Meinong’s philosophy, namely defective objects.
In the third chapter, we discussed Heidegger’s understanding of nothingness, and we
presented his argument according to which nothingness is identical to BeyngMET. We
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also developed a paraconsistent mereological system in which the complement of the to-
tality (interpreted as BeyngMET and nothingness) has the same inconsistent features
as Heidegger’s BeyngMET and nothingness. The totality is taken to be the fusion of
everything that is.
In the fourth and last chapter, we presented Heidegger’s account of grounding, according
to which BeyngMET grounds everything without being grounded. After that, in the
light of the interpretation presented in chapter 1, we showed how Heidegger should have
revised his grounding theory in order to do justice to the idea that BeyngMET is both
an entity and not an entity.
The present work is mainly focused on Heidegger’s answer to the question of being
developed after the Kehre. As such, a great part of both his philosophy (for instance, his
philosophical thesis about the origin of the work of art, poetry and technology) and his
interpretations of Nietzsche, Heraclitus and Plato are not considered. I believe that the
interpretation defended here will cast a new light also on parts of Heidegger’s thought
that are not directly address in this work. I hope to address these matters in future work.
Chapter 7
Glossary
Anwesenheit : ‘presence’. In Being and time (1927), this term is used to identify en-
tities that are ‘stable’ or ‘concretely present’. He inherits this term from Aristotle (cf.
Heidegger, 1993) and it refers to the essence (οὐσία) of all things. Only after Being and
time and starting from the courses given in Marburg (namely in his later period), Hei-
degger associates Anwesenheit to the german term Präsenz, namely the way in which
entities stay in front of a subject. Consistently with the phenomenological tradition, all
entities that are represented by a subject (or by the mental activities of a subject) are
present – they have presence. As it is argued in the first chapter of the present work (pp.
16-18) and since we are mainly concerned with Heidegger’s philosophy after Being and
time, we always interpret Anwesenheit as Präsenz.
Augenblick : ‘instant’. With this term, according to his phenomenology of the Da-
sein, Heidegger refers to a very specific moment of time in which the human beings
authentically realize themselves in asking the question of BeingMET or BeyngMET.
Even though this term finds its theoretical formulation in Being and time (1927, p. 397-
414), Heidegger inherits it from both the aristotelian and the christian tradition. Indeed,
Aristotle characterizes the instant as the good or profitable moment to act (cf. Heidegger,
1993) while Saint Paul thinks that the instant (namely what uniquely matters in a chris-
tian life) is the moment in which Christ came to redeem the world (cf. Heidegger, 1995).
In the late part of his philosophical trajectory, Heidegger considers the instant as the
moment of the event [Ereignis], namely when the Dasein understands that BeyngMET
is both an entity and not an entity (cf. Heidegger, 1957; Heidegger, 1989a). For more
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details, see pages 30 and 31 of the present work.
Dasein : ‘human being’. This is one of the few terms that never changed meaning
during the whole career of Heidegger. According to Heidegger, Dasein is the ontological
constitution of the human being. Only human beings can have the full understanding of
their position in the world (of their own being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-sein]) because
their being (their way of being [Sein] or, in Heidegger’s terminology, their existence)
is characterized by the possibility of asking the question of BeingMET or BeyngMET
[Seinsfrage]. Only in the late Heidegger and, in particular, in his Contributions to philoso-
phy (1989a), Dasein is actually able to answer this question, participating to the even of
BeyngMET [Ereignis]. This is shown in the first chapter of the present work (pp. 24-32).
Ereignis: ‘event’. This term was employed by Heidegger from the beginning of his
career: as Volpi points out (2010), it is possible to find it in some manuscripts dated
1919. In Being and time (1927), the ‘event’ refers to a specific experience which a sub-
ject lives in first person. For instance, given the framework proposed in Being and time,
when human beings love, pray, fight, they are part of an ‘event’, which is concerned with
their own personal, subjective experience. This characterization of the event is counter-
posed to Vorgang, namely a mechanical ‘circumstance’ in which human beings (with their
personal experiences) are not an essential part. For instance, a ‘circumstance’ (Vorgang)
is a natural or physical process: a stone that falls or a wave that crashes against the cliff.
In the second part of his philosophical trajectory, Heidegger uses the term ‘event’ with
a new meaning. As it is shown by a handwritten note on a margin of the first edition of
his Letter on Humanism (collected in Heidegger, 1967, pp. 267-317), the ‘event’ becomes
a crucial idea in his attempt at answering the question of BeyngMET. In Contributions
to Philosophy, the ‘event’ is the moment in which Dasein understands and accepts the
contradictory nature of BeyngMET. For more details, see Section 1.3 of the first chapter
in the present work.
Erzitterung : ‘vibration’ or ‘oscillation’. In Contributions to philosophy, Heidegger
describes Ereignis as a vibration or an oscillation. According to the interpretation
presented in the first chapter of the present work (pp.24-32), Ereignis is the vibration
of BeyngMET between the fact that BeyngMET is not an entity (because of the onto-
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logical difference) and the fact that BeyngMET is an entity (because we can refer to it).
As we have pointed out, this oscillation is just a metaphor to describe how the contradic-
tion of BeyngMET is understood and, ultimately, accepted as the truth of BeyngMET
itself. Such an oscillation or vibration has been formally described by the paraconsistent
mereological systems presented in Chapter 3 (pp.93-100), according to which the com-
plement of the totality (namely BeyngMET and nothingness) is both an entity and not
an entity. In particular, see theorems (9a) and (9b). It is also interesting to notice that,
in German, Erzitterung can mean ‘earthquake’. As Heidegger claims at the beginning
of his Contributions to philosophy (cf. 1989a, p. 121), the realization that BeyngMET
is both an entity and not an entity can have the effect of an earthquake in shaking the
idea that contradictions are always unacceptable.
Existenz : ‘existence’. This term appears for the first time in Being and time (1927) and
it is uniquely used to characterize the mode of being of Dasein (namely the human be-
ing). This means that Heidegger’s Existenz has a different meaning than the traditional
latin expression existentia, which refers to the property of being real or being material.
Indeed, Existenz means the unique way in which the human being dwells in the world
(for more details, see Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Morever, the human being is the only
entity that properly exists because, according to Heidegger, the human being is the only
entity that can interrogate and question the world he or she is in, asking the question of
BeyngMET (or BeyngMET).
Grund : ‘reason’. In German, Grund means the bottom of something (for instance,
the bottom of a glass). However, Heidegger uses this word to refer to the metaphysical
reason in virtue of which everything is an entity. As we have claimed in Section 1.1 of
the present work, all entities are entities because they are grounded in BeyngMET; thus,
BeyngMET is the Grund of all entities. In the Principle of Reason (1957), Heidegger
starts to write Grund as Abgrund, namely a groundless ground (or, in other terms,
an Un-grund or a non-ground). As we have argued in the last chapter of the present
work, since BeyngMET is (also) not an entity and since everything that is an entity is
grounded in BeyngMET too, then BeyngMET itself is ungrounded because it is not an
entity.
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Kehre : ‘turn’. In German, this term refers to the mountain hairpins but Heidegger
uses it to indicate the turn in his thought, that happens at the beginning of the 1930s.
Given the interpretation presented in this work, such a turn corresponds to the develop-
ment of the Ereignis and the endorsement of the dialetheic solution to the problem of
BeyngMET.
Seiendsein : ‘being an entity’. This term perfectly describes the meaning of Sein,
namely the ‘being an entity of an entity’. Unfortunately, it is not often used by Hei-
degger himself and it appears only in a short gloss in an essay entitled ‘Hegel and the
Greeks’ (collected in Heidegger, 1967).
Selbstheit : ‘being itself’. In Identity and Difference (1957a), Heidegger suggests that
this term is a synonymous of Sein. As we argue in Section 2.1.3, this understanding of
BeyngMET is similar to the interpretation given by Priest (2014c) of the Meinongian
Außersein. Everything that is an entity has Sein or it is grounded in Sein ; moreover,
since BeyngMET is interpreted as being self-identical too, every entity, in virtue of its
begin an entity, is identical to itself – it is self-identical.
Sinn : ‘meaning’. From Being and time (cf, 1927, pp.183-189; pp.384-392), this term
is understood in an existential way. According to Heidegger, human beings understand
the ‘meaning’ of something (a fact, an event or a thought) if and only if human beings
experience what they are trying to understand. This is true for the late Heidegger as
well: in the Contributions to philosophy (1989a), the Dasein can understand the truth
of BeyngMET only through the personal experience of thinking about it. The oscil-
lation between the fact that BeyngMET is an entity and the fact that BeyngMET is
not an entity (namely the Erzitterung) is realized if and only if Dasein thinks about
BeyngMET.
Welt : ‘world’. This term was used for the first time in Being and time (1927, pp.
333-334): this first characterization of the ‘world’ is developed in relation to the phe-
nomenological description ofDasein. Thus, the world is understood as the space dwelled
or inhabited by Dasein. In the late Heidegger, this term changes its meaning. As it
is discussed in The origin of the work of art and The essence of the ground (collected
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in Heidegger, 1967), the world is understood as the collection of all entities (including
ideas, numbers, feelings and nonexistent objects) – everything that is an entity is in the
world. Formally, we have described Heidegger’s account of the world as the mereological
sum of everything that is self-identical. Indeed, since all entities are entities in virtue of
BeingMET, and since BeyngMET is understood as being self-identical, then all entities
are self-identical. Moreover, since the world contains all entities (namely everything that
is self-identical), in Chapter 3 we have characterized the world exactly as the collection
of everything that is self-identical (or, more formally, as the least upper bound of the
self-identicals). See pp. 87-93.
Wirklichkeit : ‘being real’ or ‘being material’. This term is used in Being and time
(1927, p.120 and p. 253). It is a synonym of the latin word realitas, namely what is
real or material. Sachheit is the property in virtue of which something is in the world as
something that is concretely present (see the term Welt∗ in the Glossary).
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